Hassan Nafaa* plots the demise of the Project for the New American Century, the power-house think tank that once drove US foreign policy In 1997 two prominent neoconservatives, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, founded a non-profit think tank which they called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). PNAC soon published its Statement of Principals, effectively the organisation's charter, signed by 27 public figures, among them some very powerful and influential figures, occupants of key positions in the Bush administration. The statement outlines a very specific vision for US strategy in the post-Cold War era. The vision is essentially founded on the following premises: - Since the US led the West to victory in the Cold War and since it possesses the material and moral assets that qualify it to lead the world single-handedly following the collapse of its rival in the bipolar global order the US must step forward and assume its historic responsibility in the 21st century. - US leadership will serve not only American interests but also the welfare of the entire world. Hence, American leadership of the world is something not only to be desired but welcomed. - The US will not be able to exercise its historic responsibility unless it immediately undertakes certain tasks. Above all, it must increase military spending and upgrade the armed forces to meet the needs of the 21st century. Two years later, just months before the 2000 presidential elections, PNAC published a 90-page report on Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century. This assessment of the shape US security policy should take focussed heavily on developing American military capacities, not just for defensive and deterrent purposes, but also for proactive pre-emptive strikes and rapid intervention. Observers could not help but to be struck by the zeal of PNAC's members, who wrote endless open letters to president Clinton, criticising his policies, in general, and in Iraq, in particular. With regard to the latter, they urged him to do what was necessary to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, by force if necessary. Following the collapse of Camp David II, the blame for which was immediately cast upon Yasser Arafat, they urged Clinton to isolate the late Palestinian president and give Israel all the support necessary to crush the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Following the US elections in 2000 and the victory of Bush and his running mate Dick Cheney, one of the leading lights of PNAC, more statements, letters and reports were issued advising the new administration not to deal with the PA and Arafat, and to use every means possible to topple Saddam. The peak of PNAC activity followed 11 September 2001. They realised this was too good an opportunity to miss for pushing the White House towards putting their vision into effect. They were instrumental in forging "the universal war against terror" as a platform for this purpose. They were particularly successful in capitalising on post-9/11 panic to propel the US administration towards: elevating the priority of recourse to arms as an instrument of foreign policy; shunning multilateral decision-making frameworks and working with trustworthy allies only when necessary and to the minimal possible extent, and bringing the mission in Afghanistan to an end as soon as possible so as to be able to focus on seizing control of Iraq, the cornerstone for a "New Middle East", recast in a shape friendly to American interests. The relationship between PNAC and the White House changed radically following the election of George Bush. From one of many possible think tanks that decision-makers might refer to, it was elevated to the very centre of the decision-making process. Indeed, PNAC effectively became the government's policy-design centre. One does not have to go far for proof of this assertion. Look at how many PNAC members were handed key security and defence positions in Bush's first term. Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, Richard Armatag, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Richard Perle and Robert Zolick make up the short list. In other words, the most important architects of US foreign policy under Bush were signatories of the PNAC's Statement of Principles. Sure enough, Bush's policies following 11 September reflected a total ideological commitment to these principles and to the recommendations laid out in PNAC's report on rebuilding America's defences, replacing the pragmatism that has generally characterised US foreign policy. The administration used every ruse, including lies and falsified documents, to establish a link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda and the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Ultimately this deceit backfired on some of PNAC's masterminds. As American forces sank deeper and deeper into the Iraqi quagmire the PNAC's influence began to fade. With scandals leading to the dismissal of one after another luminary the PNAC dwindled to little more than a website. It is important to distinguish between ideological visions for US global hegemony, of which the PNAC manifesto was the most important in recent years, and imperial ambitions and designs, which are generally fed by the far right and the military-industrial complex. Ideological visions generally have a short shelf- life; they blaze for a bit then sputter out. Imperialist ambitions and designs, on the other hand, live longer. So, although US foreign policy and military operations in many parts of the world are floundering, and while the chances of a US victory in Iraq or Afghanistan are slim at best, the US itself is tenacious and resilient. Yet US policy will have to change, regardless of whether Obama or McCain succeeds Bush. The international order has changed in the last eight years and even assuming that McCain represents a practical extension of the right-wing policies of the current administration he will have to adopt a new approach, especially on the "universal" war on terror. Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism, which poses a real threat not just to one society or country, with imperial ambitions. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. In the future, if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism, it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. The second lesson is that it is dangerous for a single nation, however powerful and however great its resources, to monopolise the international decision- making process, especially on matters, such as terrorism, that concern the whole world. The commitment to multi-party mechanisms has become not only desirable but vital, for which reason one hopes that the US will dedicate itself to the type of support and reform of the UN that will transform it into an effective and representative decision-making body. The third lesson should by now be glaringly obvious. It is impossible to uproot terrorism solely by military and security means. Although terrorism may be one of the foremost threats to nations and societies, it is simultaneously a symptom of an illness. Ending terrorism, therefore, entails addressing its underlying causes and not just the symptoms. A multi-pronged approach is required using all available diplomatic, economic, social and cultural remedies alongside military and security ones. The fourth, and related, lesson is that it is impossible to treat terrorism as separate from other threats to international security such as poverty, pollution, illiteracy and disease. In an age of globalisation none of these threats can be treated in isolation from the others. A holistic approach is required. In short, it will be impossible to devise an effective policy for fighting terrorism unless it is part of a comprehensive policy for a global order that deals seriously with all threats to security. After all, eliminating such threats is a collective responsibility that demands the cooperation of all peoples and societies. * The writer is secretary-general of the Arab Thought Forum, Amman, Jordan.
