Washington's pre-emptive policy in Pakistan's borderlands is fraught with risk, writes Graham Usher in Islamabad On 3 September commandos parachuted into Angoor Adda, a remote village on Pakistan's North West border with Afghanistan. They stormed three houses, shot dead 20 tribesmen and melted back to the mountains, where helicopters whisked them away. There seemed nothing unusual about the raid. The Pakistan army has been battling Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in this area of South Waziristan for years. Thousands have been killed in the war; 10,000s have been displaced. But the commandos weren't Pakistani. They were American Special Forces flown in from Afghanistan. Those slain were "suspected Al-Qaeda fighters", said the CIA. They were martyrs, including "women and children", thundered Qwais Ghani, governor of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. The raid was an "outrageous assault on the sovereignty of Pakistan and people of Pakistan". It certainly crossed a line. But it was clear it was coming. On 9 September George Bush designated Pakistan's border areas with Afghanistan as one of the three major "theatres" in the "global war against terror". And, like Iraq and Afghanistan, they have become victim to American intervention. Aside from the commando raid, there have been seven cross-border US missile strikes into Pakistan in the last month, killing 38. Some of the dead may have been Al-Qaeda militants; most were not. On 11 September the New York Times (NYT) confirmed that since July the US president has granted his soldiers licence to invade Pakistani territory "without approval of the Pakistan government". No senior US government official has denied the story. And US military commanders confirm it. Pakistan and Afghanistan "are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them," Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, told US Congress on 10 September. This required "a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region, one that covers both sides of the border." Mullen said the new strategy should be done "with the Pakistan government" if possible but, as Bush's new orders show, without it if necessary. Pakistani analysts cite three reasons for their army's sudden demotion from "partner" in the US "war on terror". One is Washington's perception that it is losing the war in Afghanistan and that the principle reasons are Taliban and Al-Qaeda "sanctuaries" inside Pakistan that the army lacks the capacity -- and probably the will -- to defeat these cancers. In essence, Bush has recognised that the seven- year-old policy of renting the Pakistan army to fight Islamic militancy on his behalf has failed. The position now is that Washington will include Pakistan's border areas within its counterinsurgency orbit for Afghanistan. The Pakistan army will play the same subsidiary role as its Afghan counterpart. Another is the crisis of faith between the CIA and Pakistan's premier surveillance agency, the ISI. The Americans have long suspected the ISI of having ties to the Taliban. But in July, administration officials went public with the accusation that the ISI had a hand in the 7 July bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul that killed 60. The NYT went so far as to cite CIA "analysts" saying former ISI head and Pakistan's current army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, was in on the Kabul plot. Pakistan denies the charge. Finally -- and this is the reason held most strongly by Pakistan's military -- the Bush administration desperately wants a trophy to parade ahead of the US presidential election in November. Zaffar Abbas is the Islamabad editor of Pakistan's Dawn newspaper. "Bush wants to catch a big Al-Qaeda figure in the tribal areas. He wants to tell the American electorate Iraq is solved and Afghanistan will be solved. The only problem is Pakistan's border areas". The Pakistan response to the American offensive has been wall-to-wall outrage. In a statement on 10 September, Kayani said: "The right to conduct operations against militants inside Pakistan's own territory is solely the responsibility of the respective armed forces." He also denied "any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border." Pakistan prime minister, Youssef Raza Gilani, said the army chief reflected government policy. There was only one crack in the wall. At his inaugural press conference on 10 September, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari pointedly did not condemn the American attacks on his country. He called for an "international fund for the victims of terrorism", implying that he accepts the American war in Pakistan as necessary or irresistible. Zardari's stance wasn't helped by the presence of Hamid Karzai. The Afghan President Karzai supports US operations in the border areas. The NYT quoted senior US officials saying the Pakistan government had "privately assented" to the new US strategy. Zardari is beholden to Washington for smoothing his way to the presidency. It was Bush that persuaded former president Pervez Musharraf, his "ally of allies", to retire gracefully from office. And Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani gets a $1 billion a year in overt American aid, and the same in covert. With an economy in freefall and tensions rising again with India over Kashmir and Afghanistan, no Pakistani army chief can ignore such a treasure. There is also the fact that Kayani met with Mullen and other senior US army officers on 27 August. Few Pakistan analysts can believe he wasn't in on the new American policy. Yet, say the same analysts, for Zardari and Kayani to hand over counterinsurgency policy inside Pakistan to Washington is also unbelievable. Such a decision would not only unite mainstream Pakistani opinion behind the Taliban as a nationalist movement defending their country. It could trigger a revolt within the army's lower ranks. It may already be happening. On 4 September Pakistan suspended oil supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The official reason was that the Khyber Pass border crossing was too dangerous for the transit. In fact the decision to suspend supplies was taken by local Corps Commanders in "retaliation" for the Angoor Adda raid. On 15 September Pakistani soldiers reportedly repulsed a US raid in South Waziristan by opening fire on the invaders. Army spokesmen denied their forces were involved. Local officials and tribesmen insisted that they were. These incidents mean one of two things. Either the army is saying one thing to the media and another to its soldiers on the ground, or local commanders have independently decided to take up arms against a foe they, like most of their people, view as a graver threat to their country's sovereignty than either Taliban or Al-Qaeda -- the USA.
