In the second of a four-part review of what comes after Bush, Azmi Bishara laments that the trope of "good versus evil" in US political culture will prevail for some time to come It was 11 September that fired both the neoconservatives' and the liberals' zeal to go to war, even before the National Security Council was convinced by their justifications. Both had a perception of America's global role and its historic mission. Thus we find Francis Fukuyama, Richard Armitage and Robert Zoellick together among the signatories of the petition to Clinton calling for Saddam's forcible removal. We also find regular columnists in such major liberal newspapers as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Yorker and The New Republic coming out in favour of the war, along with many former Clinton officials and Senator Hillary Clinton as well. The neoconservatives and Democrats had converged over what America should do to protect its national interests and secure oil supplies and how it should behave, which included the right and duty to do what it sees fit without having to bother obtaining international approval. In their eyes, the American empire was the natural leader of the coalition of the willing. Undoubtedly, the outlook of the neoconservatives converged with that of many erstwhile leftists in this part of the world who were now looking for a new deliverance theory to take the place of communism. These now began to treat democratic theory as the panacea, and they also looked forward to a blatant and decisive American military intervention. The former left in the Third World had grown so accustomed to the outside Soviet revolutionising agent that when the Cold War was over they turned to America's "permanent revolution". They had grown even more accustomed to anticipating the will of their people. What distinguishes the neoconservatives is not their conservatism, in the sense that they are among the ranks of the American right that believe in American military might, the market economy and an ultra-chauvinistic American patriotism. Rather, it is the way they use various liberal values and principles, and even some leftist fads such as political correctness, to promote what they have identified as US interests. In the past, of course, at the height of the Cold War, Washington used "values and principles" to rally world opinion behind it in its fight against communism. These values were, variously, faith versus godlessness, freedom versus tyranny, democracy versus dictatorship, and the like. It would not have entered anyone's head until around the Reagan era to reduce the international balance of power to such factors as the security vulnerability of Europe, mutual interests, oil and arms sales, not when on the other side there was a regime that laid claim to a philosophy that would free the world. This was communism; an ideology that structurally and organisationally bore considerable resemblance to a religion. It may be useful, here, to recall that moment in which securing control of oil resources in the name of freedom made its first historical appearance in the Middle East. That was not Saudi Arabia where the US monopoly over oil there dates to the 1930s, via an unshakable partnership with regard to which the US has developed a very prickly sensitivity towards anyone -- friend or foe -- who might try to elbow in. In Saudi Arabia, oil security adopted the guise of defending religion against the threats of communist atheism and defending traditions against nationalist modernism. Rather, the façade of defending freedom in the face of communism was first brought into play by the Eisenhower administration in order to justify its support for the British-engineered coup against the Iranian national leader, the relatively enlightened Mohammed Mossadegh. Britain, at the time, feared that Iran might nationalise the Iranian oil industry. The US was rewarded for its efforts in championing freedom over communism and restoring the Shah to power with 40 per cent of the shares in the British- Iranian petroleum company that monopolised oil drilling and refinery activities in the country. Still, there is an essential difference between this and what the neoconservatives used when they came into their own in the US administration after 11 September. With them, the ultra right appropriated the utopianism and quasi- religious redemptionist theories of the left, and campaigned effectively to put these theories into practice by force of arms. All societies could be changed, they held, because societies were essentially the same and there was no such thing as a society or culture that was not suited to democracy (which enlightened rhetoric would quickly be seized upon by the domestic erstwhile left). But if democracy did not take hold, they turned around and laid the blame on the societies themselves, as occurred in Iraq, whose culture and sectarian order, which actually arose from the occupation, they held accountable for democracy's failure there. Such is the foreign policy approach of the neoconservatives. They justify the use of force to change human beings and their societies. Their outlook is reminiscent of the Jacobins in revolutionary France, and the Bolsheviks and Trotskyites, only these ones are coming from the far right. Their ideal seems suitable for every place and age, and is why they do not come off as racist. Their democratic utopia is accessible to all societies, regardless of cultural differences. Their approach also reminds one of redemptionist doctrines that reduce ideas, politics and people to good versus evil and that justify the most atrocious violence against that "evil" in the name of "good". Moreover, this violent utopianism represented by the neoconservatives has acquired a strong evangelical edge. It is not enough that, according to the polls, 90 per cent of Americans describe themselves as religious and that 80 per cent believe to some extent in miracles. The fundamentalist churches and their perceptions of good and evil have been having a steadily mounting impact on US policy. I am not just talking about questions of abortion, gay marriage and religious instruction in public schools. They have been growing increasingly active and effective in lobbying for their vision of America's divine mission to combat "evil" (such as Islam) and, of particular concern to them, to advance Biblical prophecies with regard to the resurrection of Israel, the "ingathering" of Jews and the second coming of Christ. Even after Bush leaves the White House, the influence of religious zealotry the generally tolerant American political culture will remain. Look how presidential candidate Obama, in that supposedly secular nation, had to proclaim that he was a devout Christian and had "opened his heart to Jesus". Even more shocking was that televised debate in the Saddleback Church in California between Obama and McCain, mediated by Pastor Rick Warren who wants to inherit the mantle of Billy Graham. Not only was the first debate between the two candidates held in a church, the clergy set the beat! Moreover, much of the substance, such as it was, of that first debate revolved around how each of the candidates would combat evil -- literally. Pastor Warren asked them, "What are your plans for confronting evil?" This oversimplification of the treatment of political issues distorts public opinion, undermines political culture and lends itself to a facile handling of complex problems, which is merely to vilify the adversary. This dangerous superficial political culture will not reverse itself regardless of who succeeds Bush. Obama's protestations with regard to his Christian upbringing and his refutation of the attribute of Muslim, as though it would be a taint on his person, are indicative of the depth to which religious rhetoric has permeated the public sphere in the US. For a brief period, conservatives and liberals were of one mind over their goals and the instruments to achieve them. These led to a string of disasters that, in turn, drove the two camps apart amidst a torrent of mutual recriminations. The collapse of the state in Iraq, the rise of the Iraqi resistance, regional and international revulsion at the consequences of American-led aggression, the failure of the so-called war against terrorism, the failure of the American war against the Lebanese resistance using Israeli instruments, severely eroded the US's international prestige and drove a wedge through American society. It was a necessity that forced Washington to change its policies, not an awakening of conscience. In like manner, it was political expedience that compelled the liberals to disassociate themselves from the neocons. From here it was a short road to the end of the phase of international and domestic tolerance of America's post-11 September delirium. All of which occurred before the Georgia experience and the resurgence of Russian nationalist policy. The conservatives have been at odds with themselves, caught as they were between their conventional isolationism and the necessity of involvement in fulfilment of Washington's responsibilities to its new allies. Moreover, these now had begun to rely on the balance of international power to swing unfavourable local and regional equations to their favour, and they became prey to a bout of trigger-happiness. The instances of Lebanon in 2006-2008 and Georgia in 2008 illustrate. And, in both cases, US warships shuttled back and forth along the coast and either sailed off or did not act when required. But there still remains that type of local leadership that floated to the surface in the climate of American belligerency, constantly led down and having to change tack and deal with local balances of power that bear no resemblance to the international ones that suddenly seem to have been neutralised. It turns out that the attempt to project international power balances on the local scene sets off wars and disasters that the US cannot resolve. Little wonder that, regionally, forces allied to the US are now attempting to carve for themselves a larger realm of relative autonomy in the formulation of their alliances and conduct of their foreign relations. In other words, the world appears to be returning to the pre-11 September period and the increasing dismay with mono- polarity. There is a difference, however. Today, we are observing the reversion to the nation state, in general, with greater emphasis on the role of the major powers, with regard to which one notes a distinction between the majority of these and the superpower. There is still only one of these and it spends more on arms than the next 45 highest spending countries combined, and this expenditure accounts for only four per cent of its GDP. These are definitely superpower figures. However, there are countries that are seeking to play the part of regional powers and seek a considerable measure of autonomy on matters that touch upon their national interests. The more they succeed in this endeavour, the more this erodes American hegemony and sets its limits. Among these strong, economically emerging powers are India and Brazil, which are allies, not foes, to the US. In fact, we can say that with India the US has gained an important ally in Asia. Not all cases of emerging powers are like Russia and China. But China and Russia are there.
