Beyond cathartic critique, is not the wreckage and havoc wrought in the Middle East by the US a blessing in disguise, asks Stuart Reigeluth* Just as Arab nationalism emerged from European colonialism across North Africa and the Middle East in the early 20th century, a transnational water and energy cooperation for the Middle East is now in the making, based roughly on the model of the European Coal and Steel Community that served as a blueprint for the European Union. The recent Water and Energy Initiative was made possible largely by Arab and European resolve to counter reckless US foreign policy in the Middle East. Regional cooperation on water issues could be jump- started with a Benelux-like troika, including Jordan, Israel and Palestine, to expand gradually and incorporate Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, then Iraq and Turkey. The stalled status of the peace process is obviously the greatest obstacle to an initial Benelux-like push, and an Israel owned project would not be welcome by most Arab states. There is also the possibility of an initiative from Turkey, called the Peace Pipeline Project, which would essentially make water more accessible to Syria and Iraq, but geostrategic ties with Israel and Ottoman heritage again make Arab neighbours somewhat sceptical. And then there is the energy element of possible regional cooperation, which would be financed largely by the oil-rich Gulf countries. Despite EU enthusiasm for the Gulf, these nouveaux riche states are not entirely welcome in more historic states such as Syria and Lebanon where there is reticence towards millionaire money from the Gulf, mixed with a certain bemusement when Qatar, for example, had signs put up in Beirut that read "Lebanon thanks Qatar" for its reconstruction funds after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. But who will lead the Arabs in creating a transnational movement besides the Gulf? Perhaps Syria? Unlikely. Egypt? Already tried. Iraq? Definitely not. Maybe Jordan? Realistically, a Gulf-propelled initiative seems most likely: foreign policy is about favours and above all means money. Despite the push-and-pull of regional tensions confronting the emergence of a viable water and energy cooperation, there has also been an increase in EU engagement in the Middle East. European efforts include small, largely ineffective and partial, civilian missions in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as an increased military presence in UNIFIL, not to forget the revamped Barcelona Process, now called the "Union for the Mediterranean". The civilian judicial and police reform missions, the military buffer in South Lebanon, and Sarkozy's more animated foreign policy have been responses to an irresponsibly trigger-happy US profiteering in the Middle East. But like the US, there is a large degree of hypocrisy in EU foreign policy in the Middle East, most notably in democracy-promotion exercises, such as the sudden reversal of the Palestinian elections in January 2006, as well as in development programmes like the Union for the Mediterranean. Sarkozy's main argument is simple: let's develop the southern shore of the sea to reduce (if not eliminate) illegal immigration. Preventing Arabs (to not say Muslims) from entering the European market may be the implicit goal, but development -- better highways and ports, more education and trade -- can benefit everyone in the end. Even countering Hamas's democratic victory may turn out to be positive: rather than having Hamas rule whatever remains of Palestine, a national unity government, including Fatah and other factions is now being renewed, and there is really no other solution than creating such coalition governments. This power-sharing formula between Islamic and secular forces is one that is replicating across the Middle East, such as in Lebanon. In tandem with these power-sharing structures is contagious geopolitical fragmentation. Gaza is disconnected from the West Bank (and both from East Jerusalem). South Lebanon is separated for all intents and purposes from the rest of Lebanon. Iraq comprises three large sections of Kurds, Sunnis and Shia. Across the Red Sea, South Sudan is set to secede from Sudan in 2011, and Somalia has already split into different mini- regions. East of Iran, different ethnic areas, like Waziristan and Baluchistan, exist across the long porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is an apparent mess, but as groups increasingly seek representation, an incremental process of decentralisation may follow suite. This could lead to a form of regionalism -- a federation of regions within a confederation of states. Of course, the nationalist argument emerges, claiming that states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria feel increasingly patriotic, but this is largely propaganda by these states for Western ears, and from Western powers hailing the transparency of their Arab allies. None of them have real popular support: talking politics in Syria is forbidden by the Alawi sect (an obscure Shia offshoot) ruling over an overwhelming Sunni majority; and the Shia region of Saudi Arabia would most probably secede if it could. The post-colonial Arab state is a grotesque fabrication, a superficial carving-up of territorial units, separating tribes, towns and families. Why should the Jordanians, for example, cling to a fake nation-state, when a majority (over 60 per cent) of the population is Palestinian? Any map will also depict how unnatural and uncomfortable the Hashemite Kingdom looks sitting jaggedly and awkwardly surrounded by stronger states. And yet, ironically, Jordan could act as a main actor in fostering regional cooperation. Though already endorsing the water and energy cooperation concept, Prince Hassan is not the most likely to be the Arab Jean Monnet (as he was relieved of being crown prince), but the Jordan Valley and the desert extending east to Iraq, and north to Syria, could be motors for a transnational confederation in water, as well as solar and wind energy. For its part, the EU can play a positive role in financially fomenting possibilities within the existing Mediterranean partnership framework. A glaring side effect of US military unilateralism in the Middle East has been European political multilateralism in the Mediterranean, with varying results thus far, but with increasing prospects. Lastly, emanating from the global financial crisis, the EU has to ameliorate relations with Russia and Iran due to its dependence on their energy resources. And as the world becomes increasingly multi- polar again, beneath the uniformity of globalisation, with a strong China and emerging India, the Arab world can also become a potent global actor. Such a possibility need not be a replica of the European Union -- indeed the history and geography are far different, but as the US refocuses its efforts to fix the mess it created in Afghanistan with the incoming 44th presidency, Europe has many reasons to help the Arab world build upon the Water and Energy Initiative. This Arab-owned regional cooperation and integration process would be the biggest -- and most unexpected -- blessing in disguise of US foreign policy in the Middle East, if it happens. * The writer is a researcher on the Middle East based in Madrid, Spain.
