Has really reached the end of his tether or is his demand merely a tactic tinged with Ottoman pride, asks Amani Maged "Don't keep us waiting" is a new phrase in the Turkish political lexicon on its bid for EU membership. For many years, Ankara has been doing all in its power to win a seat in the European Union. It has fought diplomatically, instituted political reforms and taken enormous strides in economic development in pursuit of this dream, through which it hoped to attain a higher international standing and greater economic advantages. Now Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip , is saying, "Our patience has worn thin," and telling the EU to state its position on Turkey's accession clearly and unequivocally. Turkey has long tried to prove its credentials to the EU in many ways. Since coming to power, the Justice and Development Party has elevated the Turkish economy to one of the most robust in the world. Turkish manufactures and agricultural products have made sweeping incursions into Arab markets especially in the Gulf, and Turkish companies are engaged in numerous major construction projects in the region. Politically, Ankara has leveraged itself into high-profile strategic positions. It has become a key player on the Iranian nuclear issue, acting as a prime mediator between Tehran and the West and even fostering a preliminary nuclear fuel swap deal. It has also brokered talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv while also proving itself a champion of the Palestinian cause. Ankara's mediating capacities, enhanced by its ability to go where no European power on its own could go, should logically work in Ankara's favour in its EU membership application. So too should the results of the recent referendum on amendments to the Turkish constitution. Many analysts are of the opinion that these amendments marked a major turning point in Turkish-EU negotiations. That it has loosened the grip of the military establishment over civic life promises to undermine EU pretexts for withholding full membership and keeping Turkey hovering in the realm of a "privileged partnership". Ottoman history suggests that "compromise" has no place in the Turkish lexicon. Yet, it appears that Turkey is still determined to fulfil its pledges to institute the many reforms that the EU insists are conditions for membership. Ankara's negotiations with the EU, which began in 2005, are progressing very slowly, so slowly that they could be described as stalled. There are many reasons for this, foremost among which is the stiff opposition on the part of France and Germany which fear losing their standing in the European organisation upon the accession of a country carrying the demographic weight of a population of 73 million. Other analysts suggest that European opposition is also founded upon a religious/cultural bias. A large segment of Europeans object to opening the EU doors to a country that is 99 per cent Muslim, an attitude aggravated by the arrival of the Justice and Development Party to power in Ankara and the consequent fears of the mounting influence of Islamists. On the other hand, the Kurdish question also remains a major stumbling block in the Turkish accession bid. Among the other pending problems is the question of Turkey's continued closure of seaports and airports to Cyprian ships and planes. Cyprus is one of the thorniest issues between the EU and Turkey, and Ankara has persistently asked that the subject be delinked from the negotiating process. The EU has just as persistently insisted on including it in the negotiating agenda along with Turkey's recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Political life in Turkey closely resembles that of other EU members such as Greece, which has experienced both military and civil rule. But unlike Greece, Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, a fact that EU members, such as France and Germany, fear will jeopardise Europe's predominantly Christian cultural identity and social fabric if Turkey is allowed into the EU. The long train of measures that Turkey has introduced to substantiate its commitment to human rights, democracy and social and economic modernisation have made little dent in the prevailing European attitude. Another factor that alarms the major European powers is that by 2015 Turkey's population will be larger than Germany's. If allowed into the EU, it would top Germany in the number of its representatives to the EU parliament and, hence, in voting power. Add this to the fact that the EU spends the majority of its money on agriculture and aid to poverty stricken areas in its member countries. Turkey desperately needs both and the outlays would severely tax the EU budget which already is encumbered by funding problems and cries out for serious reform. But the question of EU membership is not entirely one-sided. Psychological, social and cultural spectres also haunt many Turks who realise that EU membership means cultural and linguistic diversity in their own country. In fact, according to a recent poll conducted in Turkey, support for joining the EU has plummeted from 75 to 50 per cent. Of course, the drop in enthusiasm is in considerable part due to the frustration at a negotiating process that has dragged on for five years with no encouraging sign to date. Only 13 out of the 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire (the accumulated legislation, acts and court decisions that make up European Union Law) have been broached and agreement has been reached only on one, that pertaining to science and research. Eight of the chapters have been frozen in the accession talks. According to EU negotiators, Turkey still has a considerable way to go to meet the conditions of membership as formulated in Copenhagen. These include the sovereignty of law, respect for human rights, economic stability and improved performance in areas ranging from agriculture to education. For example, Turkey has frozen the death penalty, but it is still being told to release "prisoners of conscience". It has made great strides in educational reform, but university enrolment levels still lag behind those in other European countries. As strong as European objections are to Turkey's accession, they have some very good reasons to offer Ankara an EU seat. Some officials in Europe and elsewhere have voiced concern that continued rejection of Turkey's membership application will drive Ankara into the arms of the Arabs. Turkey has deftly turned this to its advantage through repeated demonstrations that it holds the key to Iran and the Arab world. The likelihood is that Turkey will continue its pursuit of EU membership and that the EU will continue to resist the persistence of the "neo- Ottomans". Nevertheless, ultimately the EU may open its arms to Turkey if only to prove, implicitly, that it rejects racism and extremism. Meanwhile, the length of time that Ankara has had to wait on the platform in order to board the train to Brussels is as much contingent on the efforts of Turkey and its supporters as it is on a change in the attitudes of France and Germany.
