The Egyptian-Israeli peace accords are the focus of intricate, high level wrangling, writes Ahmed Eleiba In the exchange of communications between Egypt and Israel Cairo has reaffirmed its respect for Camp David whenever the occasion permits while Israel's response has been a curt rejection of any thought of amending the 33-year-old treaty that many of the January Revolution generation are eyeing in a spirit of opposition and resistance. There is little logic to these crossed messages of "respect" and "rejection" apart from the fact that they have helped broaden the scope of intricate behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings that, as complex and intricate as they may be, rely on the other party to keep its nerve and remain cool. Fortunately, there are sources whom circumstances have permitted to enter the stage, giving them an opportunity to catch a glimpse of what is going on behind the scenes. Nevertheless, one suspects that what they have to tell only gives a view of the tip of the iceberg. The latest development from the wings is the story leaked by Israeli intelligence concerning the security cordon Israel claims Cairo has begun to construct in Sinai. Israeli military intelligence sources cited in the story published on the Israeli intelligence website, Debkafile, several weeks ago state that this corridor was dubbed the "American Highway" because it was secretly paved by US military engineers. Stretching 260km from Sheikh Zuweid on the Mediterranean coast of North Sinai to Taba, its chief purpose is to serve as a safe communications link between the MFO peacekeepers' base at Sheikh Zuweid and their headquarters in Sharm El-Sheikh. Most of the peacekeepers are members of the US 82nd Airborne division. The report also notes that some sections of the road run parallel to Israel's Route 12, which links Nitzana, near the border with Egypt, to Eilat. It adds, "Egypt no doubt intended this buffer strip to serve additionally for keeping terrorists at a distance from its border with Israel. But IDF observers in the area see very little Egyptian military activity for keeping it sterile and closed to hostile movements." The story is not new. And the surprise is not that Egyptian officials denied it but rather have begun to approach it as indicative of the scenario Israel has in store for Egypt in the future, which is to keep pressure on Cairo day and night via the US. One Egyptian source familiar with the report puts it as follows: "Israel is being very clever in the way it's handling us. It leaks stories of this sort in the hope that they turn from pure fiction to reality. But they will remain in the realm of fancy." General Mohamed Magahed Al-Zayat, director of the National Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, is also aware of many of the relevant details. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly he said: "The easiest way to show that this highway is not being constructed is simply by posing the following two questions. How can they claim Cairo is constructing it, with US assistance, and at the same time claim that Cairo is neglecting it? Secondly, how is it possible for terrorist operations such as the assassination of jihadist Ibrahim Eweida Al-Barikat or even the recent one targeting an Israeli unit to occur along the borders?" Al-Zayat continues: "The Israeli aim is to push for the creation of a buffer zone in Sinai, along the border with Israel, the purpose of which is to furnish security for Israel. The peacekeeping force, which is primarily American, would be responsible for that zone, which means that this part of Sinai would be internationalised and effectively removed from Egyptian control. This zone, which is so central to the Israeli plan, is located in Area C, in which Egyptian military presence is curtailed. In other words, by creating this zone Israel intends to forestall attempts to amend any other agreements in the Camp David accord." "Israel has long been pushing the idea of a tripartite Egyptian-US-Israeli security system based on intelligence exchange, coordinating the fight against extremist groups and activities in Sinai, and carrying out this fight by supporting and equipping the Egyptian government to engage in this task. The US supported the idea and tried to market it here, but Egypt wasn't buying because it is averse to introducing any form of foreign security and strategic military cooperation in Sinai and it opposes the idea in principle. The US proposed augmenting the MFO in that area and furnishing it with extra arms and equipment in order to enhance its ability to meet current challenges. But the purpose of the MFO is to monitor commitment to the Camp David accord. Increasing the size and equipment of the MFO means transforming its peacekeeping role into a security role. Washington is constantly pressing for a partnership with Egypt beneath the rubric of the international fight against terrorism. Egypt's position, as always, has been to take advantage of the intelligence and expertise that the US has to offer in this regard, but to oppose any operations in Sinai along the lines of what is taking place in Yemen and Afghanistan." Offering another glimpse behind the scenes, sources who have been monitoring Sinai situation suggest that the system that the US has in mind is similar to the one that US forces have in place in the Negev desert in Israel. Brigadier-General Safwat Al-Zayat explains that in the heart of an Israeli military zone there is a major ballistic missiles base controlled by a US military team. This system, over which Israel has no supervision, can only be linked to bases in Turkey, Britain or other NATO pact countries. Al-Zayat adds: "If Ankara has been giving out some negative signals with regard to the system these should be seen in the context of its deteriorating relations with Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, Cairo has listened to those signals and understood their implications and, therefore, refuses a similar arrangement." He agrees with General Mohamed Al-Zayat that while Cairo is willing to use intelligence from Washington it will continue to oppose a strategic link that could eventually evolve into a permanent military arrangement. Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon revealed nothing new when he said that Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi had come knocking on Tel Aviv's doors to ask for changes to the Camp David accord. Sources in Cairo, some close to the president's office, said as much last week, but stressed that this was not inconsistent with Egypt's declared commitment to the treaty. "Egypt respects the treaty but simultaneously wishes to alter it, and within the framework of respect for the rules of amending it," one of these sources said. The same source highlighted a word uttered by the presidential spokesman in this context. That word was "now", implying that the near future could see some significant developments. Egyptian sources helped contextualise this "now". In the statement issued on the sidelines of a meeting of the Trade and Industry Club in Tel Aviv last week Yaalon added that Morsi "understands the Israeli refusal... and did not press much". The implication of the "now", therefore, is that the timing is not right, especially given the heated US electoral race between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. Many military experts, diplomats and specialists in Egyptian-Israeli relations were struck by another remark in Yaalon's statement. "Any agreement that does not achieve security for Israel is not worth the paper it's written on," as though everyone had a reason to grumble about Camp David, including the Israelis. But to Egyptians the security situation in Egypt is more important than anything that might be said in Israeli assembly halls, although it is wiser not to broach this subject now, as Ambassador Hussein Haridi, former assistant foreign minister, said. In Haridi's opinion such matters require more conducive circumstances than those that exist at present. Others appear to prefer to strike while the iron is hot, as seems to be the case with presidential adviser Esmat Seif Al-Dawla. In an interview with the Weekly Seif Al-Dawla said that Egyptian national forces, without exception, are calling for the amendment of Article 4 of the treaty so as to liberate Egypt from the restrictions this article imposes on it. The provisions of this article prevent Egypt from asserting its full military and security sovereignty over the whole of Sinai�ê� and make the multinational forces [MFO] there not subordinate to the UN but rather to the US." Security and military experts and diplomats in Cairo afforded a glimpse of what transpired behind the scenes before the president tendered his proposal to Tel Aviv. Israeli affairs specialist Tarek Fahmi told the Weekly, "Recently there have been mounting Egyptian demands to reduce the level of cooperation with Israel. Egypt asked to reduce the Israeli component in QIZ from 11.5 to 8 per cent. It is no secret that Cairo has refused to lease Israel new premises for its embassy. With regard to the peace treaty numerous proposals were suggested, although in general opinion is divided into two camps, one targeting the treaty as a whole and the other focussing solely on its security protocol. Between the two, we came to the conclusion that Israel would prefer the creation of an additional protocol that would not affect the treaty or its existing annexes. Something of this sort occurred with the Philadelphia Agreement following what is referred to as the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza." Hawks on the Israeli National Security Council, the so-called Committee of Seven, want to sustain pressure on Egypt in order to obtain extra guarantees. According to Fahmi, these would include official letters attesting to Egypt's continued commitment to the peace treaty and to building a real partnership as called for in the treaty. Such pressures have already taken the form of blazoning in the media the substance of the letter of credentials introducing the new Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv and other documents of this nature. Two electoral processes are shaping the backdrop to the Camp David controversy these days. One is the US presidential elections and the other is early elections in Israel called for by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Emad Gad, an Israeli affairs expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, believes we should not dwell too much on the possible impact of the latter elections, "because they won't change much in the current political scene in Israel". The US elections, on the other hand, are another matter. "If the polls favour a second term for Obama, then we will see some movement, but conducted with elegance and diplomatic style. If, on the contrary, Romney wins, we can only expect worse. When Romney looks at the Arab Spring he only sees the rise of Islamist forces and he will have plans to deal with this similar to the way the US handled Afghanistan. Some reports in the US have referred to Sinai as the Egyptian Tora Bora which is indicative of the type of thinking that could lead to a precipitous and reckless [US] military intervention in Sinai." To some critics the Camp David treaty as a whole is problematic, "riddled with gaps from the moment it was drafted" as military affairs expert General Talaat Muslim puts it. "Israel sees the continuation of the peace treaty with Egypt in its current and unaltered form as insurance against another full-scale armed conflict between Israel and the Arab countries and a guarantee of its security. This combines with US guarantees to maintain Israeli military superiority over Egypt to safeguard Tel Aviv from any military risk from the Arabs, in general, and from the direction of Sinai in particular." "The Israeli leadership continues to regard the Suez Canal as a security border for Israel. Sinai it wants kept under conditions that make it possible for Israel to reoccupy the peninsula to serve as a buffer zone between Egyptian forces and Israeli targets. Although there has been some limited modification to permit for increased numbers of troops to the east of the Suez Canal and for some light forces to the east of it, there can be no effective air defence or air combat forces, keeping Sinai vulnerable enough to return to the situation that existed before the 1973 war. In the same spirit, Israel does not want good relations to develop between the people of Sinai and Egyptian authorities and sees its interest in stirring trouble between the two. In addition, Israel insists that Egypt must never be in a position to threaten the freedom of Israeli navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, for which reason it supports an international military presence on the Straits of Tiran in keeping with the position that 'any international military presence between Egypt and Israel in Sinai is a guarantee of Egypt's commitment to the treaty, as long as the constituent elements of that presence are acceptable to Israel.'" Sinai has been a source of inspiration for the Israeli imagination in other ways. As both General Mohamed Al-Zayat and Brigadier-General Safwat Al-Zayat point out, Israel is forever looking for ways to shed the burden of Palestinian refugees and their call for the right to return. One scenario was the Sinai "Los Angeles" project to serve as a place for Palestinian refugees to "return" and towards the creation of which Israel would offer, as it has done in the past, some land in the Negev in exchange for some land in Sinai so as to shift the borders a few dozens of kilometres. Cairo is, of course, fully aware of such scenarios and undoubtedly Morsi had them in mind when, in the address he delivered from Cairo Stadium on 6 October, he said "the Palestinians love their land and will settle for no alternative." Not that this stopped the Israelis from pursuing another strategy for undermining the cause of Palestinian refugees and perhaps the prospects of peace talks. This was to raise the issue of the rights of Jewish "refugees" from Arab countries in a recent UN session that was boycotted by all Arab countries. In a subsequent development Said Okasha, an Israeli affairs expert, relates that 13 packages containing documents and books related to this subject were confiscated at Cairo airport. They were being conveyed to Tel Aviv by a third party. Okasha adds, "over the past decades, many documents of this sort have been smuggled out of the country. There are court cases involving Egyptians who have been involved in incidents of this sort. The Jewish synagogue on Adli Street houses a wealth of documents pertaining to the life of Jews in Egypt, but it is certain that much of this wealth was smuggled out of the temple and ended up in Israel."
