As the Obama administration continues to insist that the political transition is on track in Yemen, the country's revolutionary movements are demanding an end to impunity and genuine democracy, writes James Gundun in Washington The rise of asymmetric warfare has suspended the possibility of entrenched conflicts fought between conventional armies, bringing dreaded "meat grinders" to a halt. Now entire populations are subjected to the political gears of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), and the fear of uncertainty is drawn equally from their own governments and fellow citizens. Yemenis currently find themselves smashed between enormous grinders: Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and foreign powers holding interests in their country. These forces recently collided as a result of the capture of Radaa, a modest town located 100 miles south of the Yemeni capital Sanaa by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Like Yemen's southern governorates and the local capital of Zinjibar (Abyan), Radaa serves as a microcosm for everything wrong with international policy in Yemen. While headlines blared "AQAP takeover", JMP officials and democratic activists busied themselves in detailing Saleh's mastery in sacrificing the town. The process combined a number of factors, including opportunistic militants, government-controlled "jihadists", and the withdrawal of Saleh's Republican Guard, later redeployed to the scene. Yemen's strongman president feeds on instability to maintain his rule, perversely arguing that only he is capable of stabilising the country. Saleh also understands -- far too well -- that Al-Qaeda provides the quickest means of manipulating the international community. Emboldened by his presidential immunity, but still refusing to cede power under the terms thrashed out by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saleh continues to exploit his cooperation against the AQAP in order to sustain his influence in Washington. The group doubles as a bogeyman for a western audience, with the capture of Radaa producing more media coverage than Saleh's resistance. Given that the AQAP has increased its activities in Yemen since US forces escalated their operations there in December 2009, the Obama administration is now holding on to Saleh's regime beyond the point of necessary security. The longer the international community obstructs Yemen's pro-democracy movement through an unrepresentative GCC deal, the longer Saleh will direct his energy towards survival and allow the AQAP to expand. His son Ahmed sits on the military commission that is supposed to decommission his relatives, commanding the Republican Guard, a US-trained "counter-terrorism" unit that spent 2011 terrorising anti-government protesters and tribesmen. Concerned neither with democracy nor stability, US policy in the region is pursuing the goal of controlling the Arabian Peninsula at any cost, even a stateside vacation for a potential war criminal. This doppelg��nger policy requires instability to justify hegemony. "Neither vice-president Hadi nor anyone else will succeed in ruling and implementing real reforms if they do not preside over a unified and obedient army," Tawakkul Karman, Yemen's resident Nobel laureate, warned upon her return to the country. "If this doesn't happen the next president will be nothing but a pawn of the old regime." Despite local reports of friction with Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Yemen's vice-president of 17 years, Saleh continues to oversee government functions and to communicate through Hadi. The vice-president speaks regularly with GCC Secretary-General Abdel-Latif Al-Zayani, whose organisation has negotiated a power-sharing agreement between Saleh and the JMP, Al-Zayani recently giving himself high praise for "putting an end to the Yemeni crisis according to this initiative and United Nations Resolution 2014." Ending Yemen's "political crisis" has become a constant theme amongst western and Gulf diplomats, though it is one that prolongs the revolution. Many protesters want to complete this with minimal bloodshed, making Saleh's exile appear bearable, but the GCC's deal is too undemocratic to achieve popular consensus. Washington, Riyadh, their satellites and the UN are also viewed with widespread suspicion in Yemen after their ignoring of the Yemeni people's demands. Hadi has been responsible for hosting veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, even allowing them to attend meetings with Yemen's cabinet and security officials. All parties are looking to drum up financial support for the GCC-controlled elections in February, these featuring Hadi as a consensus candidate of Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) and the JMP. Meanwhile, the JMP's Salem Basindwa, Yemen's new prime minister, has just concluded a GCC tour to raise his own political and financial support. Fearful of irreversibly alienating Yemen's pro-democracy movement, the JMP continues to hedge around the divisive issues of Saleh's legal status and exile. Basindwa told the news agency Reuters from the United Arab Emirates recently that "I'm hopeful he will leave [before February 21], but let us wait and see." A week before, the prime minister defended Saleh's immunity, while urging those "who think a revolution can force Saleh out of power" to "try it and see". Considering the repeated delays over approving Saleh's immunity, JMP officials could be trying to accumulate their resources before a gradual takeover after February's elections. However, for the time being the organisation seems to be most interested in securing its political and financial capital, a process that will divert foreign aid from its intended recipients. The JMP may have the sincere intention of removing Saleh's family from power, but its track record both prior to and during Yemen's revolution suggests that these oppositional figures desire power for themselves. Basindwa's office has denied his statements, but it has also not left room for Yemen's protesters when he is reported as saying that "the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] agrees to play a major and leading role in the development of Yemen. This is not surprising, coming from a kingdom that has always stood by us." The only foreign entity more unpopular in Yemen than America is Saudi Arabia. Protesters looking forward to Yemen's referendum on Hadi are easily outnumbered by Saleh's men, the JMP and foreign powers. Last week, UN envoy Jamal Benomar highlighted the Security Council's commitment to "ending the crisis in Yemen" during meetings with Hadi and Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi. A further UN report on the country is due soon, when Benomar is due to note Yemen's political progress as all parties steam toward 21 February. While some UN Security Council member states, among them Germany and France, have mounted sporadic resistance against the GCC's undemocratic procedures, with Benomar now lamenting Saleh's "blanket immunity," these are the same countries that unanimously approved UN Resolution 2014 in late October. Every part of the international plan is in working order, except for Saleh himself. Shortly after the Radaa attack, Al-Qirbi told the TV news channel Al-Arabiya that the country's deteriorating security situation could delay the UN-GCC sponsored elections, an excuse that could be used indefinitely. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has responded in passing that Yemen's elections must be held on schedule in order to ensure a "peaceful transition," comments that have temporarily knocked Al-Qirbi back into line. However the odds indicate that Washington's efforts to remove Saleh will still continue to fail. After multiple itineraries had Saleh stopping off in Dubai or Riyadh, the Obama administration's latest flight plan sent him through Oman on his way to New York. However, this plan suffers from an extensive list of flaws, starting with a general lack of transparency. Putting John Brennan, the White House's counter-terrorism adviser, anywhere near Yemeni diplomacy is an automatic red-flag: although considered friendly, Brennan has also been routinely outmaneuvered by Saleh. Bringing him to America after a month of international warnings and during Obama's State of the Union address also demonstrates the administration's insensitivity and running him through a third party won't prevent his return. Saleh's son will reportedly be holding down the situation in Yemen from the presidential palace until his father's return. While the White House has theoretically banned Saleh from engaging in political activity, what would be the consequences of his resistance? Keeping him in America? Shipping him back to a Gulf state? Little of US policy makes sense beyond the need to maintain American influence in Yemen and keep Saleh from testifying on Washington's military cooperation. Both the White House and the state department have denied that the trip to New York was for "political purposes," calling the timing "fortuitous" in completing the GCC's unpopular transition plan. Yet, this deceptive rhetoric prompted one reporter to ask why the state department was "playing this game with him on semantics? I mean, he's doing what you want him to do." Saleh may be willing to play along now that he possesses immunity at the national and international levels, but his trip is simultaneously relevant and irrelevant. He and the Obama administration are treading opposite paths to the same end: one would ideally want to keep Hadi as Yemen's vice-president, while the other wants February's elections to "keep the transition on track". Saleh naturally desires to remain in Yemen while the White House plans to secure influence through his exile. Saleh has allegedly requested permanent sanctuary in neighbouring Oman, a sensible choice that would facilitate quick access back into Yemen, and perhaps the US administration will accept a compromise along these lines. After promising to lead his party when the ballot boxes open, Saleh has triumphantly declared that "we will inaugurate Abdo Rabbo Hadi as head of state after 21 February in the presidential palace." Any outcome in Yemen based on the GCC initiative leaves the JMP scraping for power and locks Yemen's pro-democracy movement out of the political process. The country's revolutionaries are demanding a democratic transition and a clean break from Saleh's regime, not ongoing impunity and cooperation with a tyrant. The writer is a political analyst.
