Could a six-month hiatus in which meaningful reforms are implemented be the best path forward for Syria, asks Scott C. Davis The US and Europe have levied sanctions against Syria this past August. Although the US sanctions will not be a difference-maker with Syria due to the limited amount of commerce between the two countries, the European sanctions could hurt Syria deeply if the Europeans follow through, especially if they make it difficult for Syria to sell its oil. Syria still has Iran in its corner. But the Iranians have recently taken a step back and urged the Syrians to listen to the "legitimate desires of the Syrian people". Translation: Iran has enough economic problems of its own without being forced to support a country of 22 million under sanctions. Although the Europeans have made a strong statement against Syria, joining the US in a strict sanctions regime, why is Europe still hesitating for the moment to implement its sanctions? Well, for one thing Italy needs to replace Syrian oil with Libyan oil before the EU can refuse to purchase any more Syrian oil. The larger question is that of military action. The Europeans are aware that strict sanctions against Syria, like those against Iraq prior to the 2003 war, will kill Syrian children and Syrian elderly first and will affect the Syrian regime and its security apparatus little if at all. The Europeans know that a Syria where people are suffering will trigger a military response. So, to Europe the actual implementation of sanctions is a promise to engage in military action five or ten years down the road. The Europeans, like the Iranians, are asking themselves if there is another way. In the meantime, observers such as commentator Sami Moubayed who is close to the regime in Damascus report that the Syrian Baath Party leadership feels that it has turned the corner on the opposition and that life should now return to normal. Sanctions? One Syrian who advises the government on economics says that Syrians can now expect to be eating brown bread instead of white. The Baath Party in Syria does not grasp the point that its days are numbered. It sees no reason to negotiate a dignified and constructive exit from power. Yet this is exactly what Syria needs. That's because the Syrian opposition, despite the recent naming of Sorbonne professor Burhan Ghalioun as leader of the opposition council and organisational meetings in Turkey featuring earnest and competent Syrian expatriates such as Wael Merzak, is weak and divided. Yes, there is a secular opposition in Syria. There are the young who want to connect their lives and their careers to global culture and the global economy. What no one in the West and especially in the US wants to think about is places such as the Lebanese city of Tripoli, which Lebanese Shias say has turned into a staging area for Sunni extremist incursions into Syria. Here, the Saudi-inspired are talking about turning Syria into a Wahabist or Salafist state. It is hard to say how much weight to give to this. Certainly, the Syrian regime is kidding itself when it attributes the opposition largely to armed Islamist thugs. Yet, such elements do exist. So, it's not right to think that an opposition overthrow of the government of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad would automatically usher in democracy. We could be looking at a Sunni theocracy instead. What is needed is five or 10 years where actual politics with the development of secular political parties can exist. At this moment, the only viable political alternative to the regime within the country is Sunni-religious or perhaps Kurdish. The regime cannot prevent people from attending the mosque. So, religious association has had many years to grow. And the regime can't prevent Kurds from talking to one another, with the same result. In contrast, civil society has been exposed and vulnerable. Potential members of civil society organisations have been held in check since 1963. And their political organisations are weak, if they can be said to exist at all. The current opposition is officially leaderless. When individuals become recognised by the regime, they leave the country. To avoid prison or worse, the secular opposition is forced to organise abroad. There is always a problem in creating a party outside the country because the expatriates have not shared the same experience as those who have stayed at home. No matter how well the secular parties organise, they will always be at a disadvantage compared to the religious or Kurdish parties within the country. Al-Assad's reforms since 2000 have been good in principle. It's just that most of them have been announced but never implemented. Or they have been implemented and then rolled back or gutted. The only reforms to take root are those that make money for the small circle close to power. What does this say about power in Syria? To me, it means infighting within the regime. There are the reformers, and then there are the hardliners. Presumably, Bouthaina Shaaban, an academic who has risen to be an adviser to Al-Assad, is a reformer. The latter's wife Asma is a prototypical human rights/ arts/ civil society person, who, if she has any say, will likely be pushing reform. On the other side, Al-Assad's brother Maher administers the army and commands its elite units. Certainly, he is a hardliner. Shawkut, the husband of Al-Assad's sister, runs the security services amidst periodic rumours of his exclusion from power. There was an incident a few years back when he was rumoured to have shot Maher in the stomach. Shawkut certainly is a hardliner. Rami Makhlouf, the cousin who runs the most lucrative enterprises in the country and has been called "the collector" for the regime, is also a self-described hardliner. Makhlouf announced with cheerful demeanour to the New York Times last spring his support for a hardline approach. Aghast at Makhlouf's foot-in-mouth display, the regime forced him to announce that he was retiring from business and giving his wealth to charity. Since no one knows what Makhlouf owns, no one can say what this statement means or if it will be implemented. But the point is that Makhlouf, like Shawkut, may not always be at the table when decisions are made. It could be that the conflict between the reformers, Shaaban and wife Asma, and the three hardliners, Maher, Shawkut and Makhlouf, is actually a conflict inside the mind of Bashar Al-Assad himself. The latter is fond of saying that the international community has no right to dictate to a leader such as himself who was "elected by the people." He did win re-election with 97 per cent of the vote, but he was the only candidate on the ticket. Does he really believe he has the electoral endorsement of the Syrian people? One wishes that the protests would cease for six months. Al-Assad could then implement the oft-announced constitutional changes that would remove the Baath Party from its primacy, hold a presidential election under international supervision, and welcome a newly elected parliament with limits, for now, on the seats allotted to religious or Kurdish parties. The problem is that the Syrian government, since Al-Assad's rise to power in July 2000, has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity. The Baath leadership is smug and complacent. Even now when it is under siege from an internal opposition that continues peaceful protests and an armed guerrilla underground is currently taking root. Moreover, the regime is facing European-American sanctions with the possibility of eventual military follow-up. Iran is expressing its reservations, and the Russians are urging reconciliation. Thus, a six-month hiatus could unfortunately see the hardline tendency of this government once again stymie the reforms that are needed to ensure the well being of the Syrian people. The writer is the author of The Road from Damascus: A Journey Through Syria.
