At the end of the day, interests determined US policy on Egypt, not loyalty to ally Hosni Mubarak, writes El-Sayed Amin Shalabi* For years now, the US and the West have been calling on Arab regimes to introduce reforms concerning democracy and human rights. Arab regimes either ignored these demands or paid them lip service, offered minimal concessions, and carried on with business as usual. The US and the West didn't insist too much. After all, these regimes were their strategic allies and their regional interests. Egypt was a case in point, where the Mubarak regime was seen as a force of moderation and a bulwark against extremists. This is why it was hard for the US and the West to react meaningfully when pent-up discontent finally came to the surface. In Tunisia and Egypt, followed by Libya and other countries, when the demonstrators finally took to the streets, the Americans and Europeans weren't sure what to do. Their position, as well as their perception of reality, kept changing with every passing day. It was clear that the protests weren't going to end. Soon waves of mostly peaceful protests spilled over to Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere. Eventually, the US and the West decided to support the protesters and denounce the use of violence against them. Initially, the US administration was averse to antagonising the Egyptian regime. Hillary Clinton, in her earliest statements, said that the Egyptian regime was stable and that Mubarak was a trusted ally. But as the protests went on, a White House spokesman said that the Egyptian regime should use this "opportunity" to introduce political, economic and social reforms. Senator John Kerry, chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and a close associate of President Barack Obama, urged president Mubarak to say that he wouldn't run for another term or allow his son to do so. Kerry also hinted that US aid to Egypt should be diverted from the military to economic and social development. As it became clear that a full- fledged revolution was underway, the US president phoned Mubarak and told him that the time for change was "now". To press home the point, the US administration sent former US ambassador Frank Wisner to Cairo to tell the Egyptian authorities that Mubarak's time was up and that an orderly transfer of power should start. When Wisner suggested that Mubarak's presence was needed to conduct the constitutional amendments, the US administration distanced itself from that remark, saying that it was Wisner's personal view. Immediately afterwards, Secretary Clinton called vice president Omar Suleiman and told him that the acts of violence in which four people were said to have died were unacceptable and that those responsible for the bloodshed should be brought to trial. Republican Senator John McCain, having met Obama, also called on Mubarak to step down, saying that such a move would be in the best interest of Egypt, its people and its army. When US Secretary Clinton came to Egypt on 17 March, the US administration announced a package of economic assistance involving the increase of Egyptian tax-free exports to the US. The administration urged the creation of an Egyptian-American Fund with a capital of $60 million to bolster investments by the private sector. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation simultaneously announced $2 billion in financial aid to private investment in North Africa and the Middle East. The US promised $90 million in short-term economic assistance to various projects in Egypt, with the emphasis on the creation of new jobs. In addition, the Export-Import Bank of the United States promised $80 million in loan guarantees to Egypt's financial institutions. This change in the Obama administration's approach to the developments in Egypt came about with considerable reluctance. The US felt a certain gratitude to Mubarak, who toed its line in many regional issues, from Palestine to Iran. But gratitude alone was not enough to determine the course of US policies. Before long, the Americans sensed that the Muslim Brotherhood was not the threat Mubarak made it out to be and that a change of regime didn't automatically lead to a breakdown in Egyptian-US relations or to the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. The Americans also realised that the Brotherhood wasn't the main instigator of the revolution and that the discontent was widespread. At which point, the regime had become too much of a liability and siding with the revolution was the way to go. * The writer is managing director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
