Along with obvious enemies, like remnants of the former regime, the Egyptian revolution faces a number of challenges that could rob it of vital momentum, writes Ammar Ali Hassan* Revolutions don't burst out of the blue or sneak up from behind, and they don't plough forward without creating a wake. In fact, if a revolution in its simplest sense is the creation of radical political, economic and social change, then this change and this radicalism do not progress in a straight line. Rather, the progress is akin to that of a torrent that encounters one boulder after another and that either accumulates behind the obstacle and eventually flows over it, or finds a way to veer around it and continues its journey. All revolutions begin with a powerful popular thrust, whether spontaneous or orchestrated. However, eventually they require the work of the intelligentsia that had opposed the fallen regime, for their perceptions and visions are essential if the revolution is to fulfil its aims. However, their ideas alone will not suffice if the "revolutionary impetus" slackens or if the revolutionaries lose their grip on the reins and find themselves increasingly unable to mobilise the masses that feel that the revolution is being hijacked, or that the authority charged with realising the aims of the revolution begins to drag its feet or takes steps that would cause the revolution to deviate from its noble intent. The revolutionaries could create organisational frameworks to defend their cause. However, whether these take the form of political parties or movements, their ability to protect the revolution remains contingent upon the size of their membership base, the public's continued support for revolutionary ideals, and the continued power of the revolutionaries themselves to persuade the people that the confusion that followed the revolution's initial success in toppling the regime is normal, that the situation will stabilise soon, and that there is a genuine drive towards democracy and development. The foregoing theoretical introduction was important in order to understand the dangers looming over the 25 January Revolution. The threats come from many directions and diverse parties. Yes, the Egyptian people are on guard against a counter-revolution and those behind it: the remnants of the former regime and the state security apparatus, certain business magnates and senior officials in the government bureaucracy, various rural notables and other such figures whose personal interests were harmed by the revolution or who fear that these interests are in jeopardy. However, most are blind to the dangers from other sources whose influence could be far worse than the members of the increasingly defunct National Democratic Party or the beneficiaries of the old regime who jumped the sinking ship and have since scrambled to change their colours so as to offer their services to their new masters with the same sycophancy with which they served their old ones. There is no reason to go to needless lengths to identify the parties that could jeopardise the revolution. Some are obvious while it takes some perspicacity to detect the others. In the first category are the waves of opportunists who seized upon the protest climate to press their own separate sectoral demands, the agitators of sectarian strife which is being used to poison the revolution, and the editors-in-chief of the national newspapers and media figures loyal to the Mubarak regime. The less obvious dangers are the US, attempts to derail the commitment of the army, certain types of behaviour on the part of a portion of the revolutionary youth or certain groups that took part in the revolution, and some aspects of government performance at the present time. When the revolution erupted, Washington initially sided with the former regime. Soon, however, it began to withdraw its support until it showed its hand and began to politically isolate Mubarak and communicate directly with the leaders of the army. Its chief motives all along were to ensure the safety of navigation in the Suez Canal, safeguard Israeli security and sustain the stability of the countries in the vicinity of petroleum resources in the Gulf. I very much doubt that the Americans are nearly as interested in helping Egypt to free itself of tyranny and to establish a modern democratic government as they are in securing their own interests. Accordingly, they would probably be more inclined to push towards "stability" than to support a genuine drive towards sound governance in Egypt. They would therefore tend to lend their support to parties that would keep the situation under control, even at the expense of the demands of the revolution. The army, for its part, could be misled into taking actions detrimental to the demands of the revolution. Possibly it could be encouraged towards this end by veteran politicians who have appointed themselves official "priests," by popular demands for an end to all forms of "anarchy" now and in the future, or by the rise of persons who are enticed by the lure of power. Admittedly, some of revolutionary youths are also -- probably inadvertently -- behaving in ways that are potentially harmful to the revolution. Some, for example, are growing puffed up by invitations of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to speak with them, or more precisely hear them out, and are snubbing the representatives of other parts of society that participated in making this grassroots revolution. Others are alienating public opinion with their remarks to the media, to which testify many complaints and commentaries on the Internet. Such behaviour plays into the hands of the enemies of the revolution by opening avenues to play one side against the other. Meanwhile, some forces that took part in bringing the revolution this far have diverted their energies into winning petty gains for themselves before the revolution bears full fruit. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic community in particular have been guilty of this. As for the government, it has fallen into the trap of responding to the "revolution of escalating demands" being waged by broad segments of the people. As good as its intentions may be, the government should not concede to all demands before undertaking the necessary studies to determine whether it has sufficient resources and whether the government bureaucracy can cope with additional burdens at the present time. The Mubarak regime bequeathed a heavy legacy and the people's needs are endless, while the capacities of the state at this time are limited. The government should avoid acting in a way that leads people to believe that the revolution is a sugarcane press -- that all that's needed is to stick the cane in one end for the sweet juice to come out the other. Instead, it should structure a course for development that will genuinely benefit the people in the future. Still, as formidable as these problems may be, they are not insurmountable. Many we can even eliminate before they take root, as long as we keep the principles of the revolution foremost in mind and are constantly prepared to defend and protect them. * The writer is a political analyst.
