Assem El-Kersh asks veteran analyst Abdel-Moneim Said what the new year could mean for Egypt, the region and the world What is your perspective on the new year? How hopeful are you? At the start of a new year the world is clearly in a mood of calm. This will probably go on for the remainder of Barack Obama's term in office, reflecting positively on Washington's relations with Russia and Europe. Yet there remain exceptions, as it seems. In my view there will be no major world crises outside two specific foci where things might go out of control: North Korea and Iran. The first has entered a state of arrogance after procuring nuclear abilities evidenced in its recent aggression against South Korea, which shows how jittery they are. The situation is similar in Iran, which is equally jittery and somewhat provocative as is clearly evident in the way Hizbullah and likewise Hamas act. On the whole I do not picture a major crisis in the region unless things explode in Lebanon and Palestine usual. Will this be the spot of a possible clash that could preoccupy the world in 2011? I imagine three major explosions that are possible: besides North Korea, an American clash with Iran is on the cards but not through conventional or expected means like a missile bombardment or a raid on Iranian nuclear facilities but rather by a process of silent destruction as has happened before, whether by implanting a virus in the computers that control said nuclear facilities or by inciting trouble here and there by way of distraction. It is clear that inflation rates are rising exponentially in Iran, for external as well as internal reasons; there are perhaps disturbances perpetrated by ethnic minorities, and it is possible that Iran will react rashly where its influence is present, particularly in Lebanon and Palestine. But I find it unlikely that there will be a direct attack on Iran. The third focus of tension will obviously be Sudan, with all that the anticipated secession of the south could give way to. My concern is that Sudan should enter a difficult tunnel in the course of 2011. It is clear from the last statements of President Omar Al-Bashir that he intends to transform northern Sudan into an Islamic state in order to run away from the crisis of separation and deny his and the Muslim Brothers' responsibility for what will happen through resorting to more militancy. I also expect that the new independent state will soon be described as an agent of America if not Israel and much will be said about foreign intervention. I would not be surprised if Al-Bashir manufactured troubles with Egypt by way of emptying internal failure into external crises. Sadly Sudan is extremely fragile, which means that you will have problems in Darfur and Kordofan, which will further complicate the situation. To what extent will the separation impact on Egypt? How harmful will it be ? If a tone of Islamic militancy was adopted there, this will undoubtedly have resonance here. This may create, for our southern frontier, the same kind of troubles Hamas creates for our northern frontier. The whole situation will aggravate. I can imagine two scenarios for what could happen in Sudan after the secession. The first -- optimistic -- scenario is that the present regime will fall to be replaced by a new regime in the north which may seek unity or integration with Egypt as a means to stability within Sudan. The second scenario, which is more likely, is that the Al-Bashir regime will persist, becoming more militant leading to a state of agitation between the two countries. I expect developments will start with the second scenario and end with the first. In no way do I rule out, on the whole, a power change in Sudan as a result of the secession of the south. In the Arab context, should we keep an eye on any other developments? I don't imagine that a change in leadership in any country will alter the status quo. There are states like Iraq and Yemen to which the principle of patching up whatever is left of the broken china plate certainly applies: whoever is in charge must carry the plate carefully. At the international level, are there developments that could give rise to optimism? The greatest reason for optimism is that the world enters the new year riding on a wave of economic improvement and technological achievements. Optimism is justified by structural developments all across the world, the most prominent being how the world came out well of the economic crisis. This will be reflected everywhere, and Egypt in particular will benefit from it. According to estimates in the present fiscal year, 2010-11, Egypt will achieve approximately six per cent growth. This is not the most we can hope for, but the estimate for the next fiscal year will be closer to seven-eight per cent. As a result of what happened in 2008, the world now is more rigorous when it comes to stocks and the performance of multinationals, with the G20 having more of a say in the administration of the world's economy thanks to a greater contribution to gross product at the international level and its effective monetary reserves as well as the emergence of new world powers that managed to protect their economies through the crisis: Brazil, India, China, Turkey, South Africa and Asian countries in general. The G20 will be institutionalised to a greater extent, and will as such be more responsive to economic world trends. Thus, for example, when the meltdown almost happened again in 2010 because of developments in Greece, Spain and Ireland, the failing economies could be billed out and protected through austerity plans. In this way direct results were secured and the crisis in its European version was effectively confronted. What will be Egypt's most important news story in 2011? Of course the presidential elections remain an extremely important story, including who will run against President Hosni Mubarak. Any other suggestions? My conjecture is that 2011 will witness a regrouping of the civil alliance that includes, besides the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), three opposition parties: the Wafd, Tagammu and the Nasserist; yet despite their contradictory orientations, all four parties agree on the nature of the state of Egypt, that it should have a regional role and that it should remain stable. The problem is that all the parties [following the last parliamentary elections] are facing divisions and problems. In this area I see a number of signs in support of the revival of the alliance. The most important of these is the breakup of the radical alliance which formed at the start of 2010, composed of the Taghyeer (Change) group, Kifaya, 6 April and several public figures like Mohamed El-Baradei, Hamdi Qandil, Alaa El-Aswani together with the Muslim Brothers as well as elements of the Wafd, Tagammu and the left in general. Yet by the middle of the year and the positive changes that occurred within the Wafd, a turnaround in the political arena resulted in the breakup of the radical alliance, leaving only a bare margin, with even the small Democratic Front Party breaking up. Isn't it possible that the so-called radical alliance will regroup? It is of course possible in the wake of the last election results, but the chance for a return of the civil alliance is stronger. The equation could appreciably alter if the People's Assembly must willingly abide by the word of courts regarding the suits filed against the legitimacy of the electoral process. Secondly, not one of the 53 independent MPs, running on the ruling party's agenda, should join the NDP. Should both these conditions obtain, there would be a kind of re-balance within the assembly, with the independent MPs playing the role of opposition (since independent is by default opposition) and most of them are among those who left the NDP for electoral reasons or in protest of some of its policies. But we must add that the NDP itself is a huge front with a sizable internal opposition of its own. The optimistic scenario is that the problems of three parties will be resolved, which might take up some time. On the other hand there is a pessimistic scenario in which a splintering of parties will gather into a critical mass of powers that reject government policy so that we end up with significant headache throughout the year. With talk shows and the independent press, does the opposition need a place in parliament? In reality, no, because they exercise their opposition in practice all the time and in various ways. In my view what the opposition lacks is its being an opposition with a true political programme, while with the exception of El-Baradei's seven-point programme, no such thing exists. By contrast the NDP offers a fully-fledged and meaty programme; whether you agree with it or not is a different issue. It has programmes in healthcare, education, construction, land management and transport. The rest of the parties refuse to see all this, concentrating on the political aspect of the NDP programme, which is the secret of their weakness. Even in that they seldom pay attention to what is important, paying great attention to the issue of the rotation of power (which is good), but paying no attention to the question of national unity and making no effort and posing no challenges on the national-unity front. Only the NDP takes responsibility for this issue. That is why I feel one cannot restrict all effort and movement to a single issue however serious and important it is. To what extent was the NDP's sweeping triumph a double-edged sword? Is it a dilemma or an opportunity? I am among those who don't see the triumph in the way it happened as a blessing; to my mind it created an imbalance in the civil alliance that was already there; and I have written frankly, being a member of the NDP, that it should seek to rectify what has happened by not admitting independent MPs into its ranks and by accepting the rulings of the courts willingly without resorting to the principle that parliament is the master of its own decision, and regardless of the constitutional justifications the NDP could put forward. In that case a settlement could be reached with the Wafd. What is the best way for the NDP to make use of its victory in the year of the presidential elections? This is precisely what the president dealt with in his address to the parliamentary commission of the party, with the greatest degree of clarity regarding directing Egypt's economic and social programme towards the free market, the role the state should play in this and in encouraging investment. Opposition to a speedy switch to the free-market economy, reducing the role of the state to organisation and observation without direct intervention in market dynamics, usually came from within the party itself. Moving in this direction is the only thing that could be populist because it is in the interest of the people. At the economic level, some businessmen here and abroad are reserved and -- let us say -- not sufficiently reassured while they wait for the presidential elections. What would be your recommendations for dealing with such worries? I imagine the apprehension will disappear once the president officially announces that he will be running. When this happens I think the atmosphere will be much calmer, with quieter expectations as if you were in an ordinary electoral year. Two or three candidates will run against the president. This should clear the air for a year or two, calming the fears of local and international capital and Western governments alike. Do you have reasons to be optimistic regarding what awaits Egypt in the next few years? Any growth inevitably results in optimism, since it boosts the middle class in particular. There is a huge push in the issues of education and healthcare. The essential thing in any country is how calm and tranquil the critical mass is. My view is that Egypt wants more and has greater ambition. What is certain is that -- whatever the reservations -- the NDP programme remains the best possible programme for Egypt. What could change in 2011 in Egypt and what are its most pressing challenges? - That the presidential elections should take place smoothly. - What will happen in Sudan. - Bringing the civil alliance between the NDP and the opposition back on course, because it is this alliance that defeated the Muslim Brothers whom I consider to be the greatest threat to the modern civil state. And I believe they have been effectively downsized, and received a strong message. Yet the Brothers will never end. They will atrophy and grow smaller in size, but they will remain; because they are an authentic part of the political environment in Egypt and they will never disappear. Would you add Yemen, for example, to the list of woes? Yemen is among the greatest challenges but it is far away. It may witness an intervention or become another Afghanistan. We can live with what's happening in Afghanistan or Somalia (or Yemen) but we could not live with it if it were to happen in Sudan or Gaza. What about our disagreements with the Nile Basin states? I don't consider it a pressing challenge even though it is of course an important issue for national security. Water is always an urgent concern, but no one will cut off our water supply just yet. Don't you feel that poverty and unemployment should be at the top of the list of challenges? My view is that these are serious problems but that they lie in a manageable area. The more you grow the more able you will be to contain these problems. The great conundrum is that this phenomenon tends to be narrowly focussed in some population centres like shantytowns, which is why sustainable development is extremely important. Doesn't the situation require broad visions and grand dreams like those that drove countries that were in our shoes like Malaysia or Turkey? What could realise such dreams is the effective translation into action of what the president has said about the orientation of the state and the development of laws with which to complete the development of free-market economics in Egypt. The free market also means paying attention to education and healthcare and developing infrastructure, which is the path that Malaysia and Turkey trod.
