Interview by Graham Usher In recent months, Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat has made it clear that, should there be no final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians by 4 May 1999, when both sides are scheduled to reach a final peace accord, he intends to declare a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with 'Jerusalem as its capital'. Palestinian commentators have played down the intended declaration as either irrelevant or as a ploy to improve Arafat's bargaining position in the stalled Oslo negotiations. Khalil Shakaki is director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus and one of the most respected analysts of Palestinian political society. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Shakaki says Arafat is "completely serious" about declaring a state since it may be the only means left to him to salvage a peace agreement from the ruins of Oslo. Following is the text of the interview: Yasser Arafat has said it is the Palestinians' right to declare a state at the end of Oslo's interim period on 4 May 1999. How seriously should we take this? Arafat will declare a state if, between now and next May, there is no progress in the peace process. There are various factors compelling him to do so. One is personal prestige. Arafat will not want to be remembered as the national leader whose only legacy to the Palestinians is the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), especially as most Palestinians see the PA as inefficient, corrupt and mismanaged. The PA in and of itself is a small achievement. Arafat would rather be remembered as the national leader who declared the Palestinian state. There is also pressure on the Palestinian national movement, and especially Fatah, to deliver something. Five years into the Oslo process, the national movement has delivered neither a system of good government to the Palestinians, based on democracy, clean government and strong political institutions; nor has it delivered a successful peace process in the sense of giving Palestinians greater control over their own political destiny. This has opened the door to challengers to its leadership, most notably from the Islamist opposition Hamas. So, assuming there will be no progress in either the peace process or in the national reconstruction process, there will be enormous pressure on both Arafat and the national movement for change. In such circumstances, I don't see Arafat having any alternative but to declare a state. But what would be gained? A declaration of statehood by Arafat should not be seen as his final word on the Oslo process. If, after declaring statehood, Arafat believes he can still reach an accommodation with Israel, he will consider this option. But this does not mean that the threat is a bluff. I believe he is completely serious. If Arafat is going to abide by the restrictions of Oslo after May 1999, I think three basic conditions will have to be fulfilled. One is that Israel recognise a Palestinian state immediately after 4 May 1999. The second condition is for Israel to announce a freeze on all settlement construction. The third is for Israel to continue the redeployment process. To continue Oslo, Arafat must be seen to gain something territorially. He cannot agree to an extension of Oslo's interim period if, meanwhile, Israel continues to create facts on the ground. If an accommodation along these lines could be achieved, both sides would gain something. But Arafat is in the driving seat. He is the one who can take the initiative. What would be the Palestinian and international response to a declaration of statehood? The majority of Palestinians would support a declaration of statehood. Even though less than 60 per cent of Palestinians favour the idea now, I believe support will rise the closer we get to May 1999. There would be support from Egypt and Jordan. Most of the countries of the world would recognise the state. So would Europe, though Britain and Germany may grant a de facto rather than a de jure recognition. It is true the US might veto any recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN. Then again it might not. The US has yet to formulate any clear position on the issue. I suspect the US won't take a position in the hope that it doesn't have to. It will 'disengage' from the process in the hope that, between now and next May, Israel and the Palestinians will sort out the matter between themselves. And the Israeli response? This, of course, is the crucial response. How will [Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin] Netanyahu deal with a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood? There are many analysts who believe this is precisely what Netanyahu wants, since such a declaration, without Israel's consent, would mean the end of Oslo. In reprisal, say these analysts, Netanyahu will annex the settlements and parts of Area C (the 73 per cent of the West Bank under Israel's exclusive security and civilian control), impose a siege on the Palestinian areas and use economic deprivation as a form of collective punishment. To demonstrate to his own constituency that Arafat's declaration is nonsense, he may be tempted to re-enter certain Palestinian areas and authorise military operations there. I don't think Netanyahu will do this. It is not in Israel's interests to reoccupy the Palestinian areas, annex the settlements or impose a long-term siege. It would be in their interests to accommodate the "state", to try and ensure that the Palestinian leadership remains committed to at least certain parts of the Oslo agreements. This will not happen if we are besieged. It would also carry a political price, since the longer we are besieged, the angrier the people will become. In such circumstances, the PA would have to raise a conscripted army and put the people under arms. I tend to think Israel will respond according to the specific steps the Palestinians will take. For example, inside Nablus there is the enclave of Joseph's Tomb guarded by Israeli soldiers. If statehood is declared, what is the PA going to do with these soldiers? What will happen to the joint patrols? According to Oslo, we are allowed only a certain number of military forces and arms in Area B (the 23 per cent of the West Bank that is under the PA's civilian control but under Israel's security control). After statehood, will we double the number of these forces and arms? These are the matters Israel will respond to rather than to any symbolic declaration as such. Israel's response will be determined by the actions of the Palestinian leadership that impinge on Israel's security, such as the number of people the PA puts under arms and the extent of Israel's practical jurisdiction once statehood is declared. Recognition by the world of Palestinian statehood may be diplomatically significant, but it is not enough to move the Israelis.
