By Salama Ahmed Salama Perhaps the most significant result of the critical and troubled time following the attack on Iraq was the disclosure of the roles played by Israel, America and Britain. This is a case not of one desert fox, but of many foxes raiding a barnyard full of chickens, to capture whatever they can seize. The operation to crush Iraq militarily does not seem to be terminated. The threat to resume strikes against Iraq, if the regime does not submit to the inspections, still exists. Until now, the number of casualties and the true extent of the destruction have not been determined. But the damage appears to exceed most estimates. According to American and British reports, the strikes succeeded in destroying military headquarters, the installations where missiles and weapons of mass destruction were produced, as well as the barracks of the president's Special Republican Guards. Both US and British leaders expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the strikes. So why would the inspection teams want to return? What can they possibly hope to find? The problem of whether Richard Butler should stay or go will continue to preoccupy diplomats in the coming days. Will Russia, France and China succeed in revising the task of the inspection teams, and the link between their presence and the lifting of sanctions on Iraq (a link which continues to be made despite the fact that there is no valid reason for Iraq to accept their unfettered presence and unlimited access)? It is evident, at any rate, that Arab vulnerability has incited many players to enter the game and take advantage of the weakness and defeatism prevailing in Arab capitals. Netanyahu was encouraged to suspend the Wye agreement only a week after Clinton's visit -- hours after the military operations against Iraq had come to an end -- without the least concern for the international community. By striking Iraq in a manner that humiliates Arabs everywhere, the US and Britain have frozen the peace process. The Arabs are hopelessly divided, their oil wealth has been squandered, and they cannot hope to salvage anything of note from the ashes of this conflagration. Second to Israel, Britain has been the most important protagonist in the collusion with American brute force. Blair's aims seem to have been to squeeze every possible benefit from the strike, support Clinton vocally, and silence any Arab opposition. We can therefore expect an escalation in Britain's role following Blair's announcement that British military presence in the Gulf would be boosted. Those who tried to disregard Britain's total subordination to US decisions, and who emphasised differences on some policy points, will find it difficult to explain Britain's enthusiastic participation in the attack on Iraq. The manner in which it took place has stirred sharp criticism in the British press and political circles, leading to queries about the extent and limits of the "special relation" between Britain and the United States. The British prime minister parroted the pretexts and allegations Clinton had trundled out in Washington. Blair and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook were both forced to adopt a defensive stance in an attempt to convince the general public that certain British interests demanded full cooperation with America. Perhaps Blair's most amusing claim was that Britain is seeking to contain the threat which Saddam Hussein poses to the stability of the region and the security of his neighbours. It seems that Blair has placed all his cards on Clinton, gambling on the strength of their friendship, the closeness of their political viewpoints and the support he received in resolving the Irish problem. But Blair's rush to support the American venture in Iraq may cost him a great deal. Saddam seems more likely to remain in power than does Clinton. Besides, the American-British military operation not only failed to remove Saddam, it contributed to strengthening him, and will expose British interests to considerable danger, if only by association. Blair may be seeking to achieve a success similar to Thatcher's victory in the Falklands war. But he has no experience of how treacherous the Iraqi marshlands can be.
