By Gamil Mattar Two years after the collapse of Soviet bloc, the first attempt was made to define the features of the "post-bipolar order". Perhaps it was not an explicit aim of the Gulf War, but certainly the war to liberate Kuwait proved an ideal occasion to declare the end of the old international order and the emergence of the new. In fact, the US did not take full advantage of the occasion. Perhaps it did not fully comprehend it, or was not fully prepared for it. At any rate, when Bush announced the establishment of a new world order, he did not openly declare the US's sole presence at the peak, and the concomitant obligations and rights this would entail. The prevalent opinion at the time was that the US had begun to exercise sole command without having declared its new status; in fact, however, the US foreign policy establishment was far more flustered than many imagine. The US administration had not expected the Soviet Union's collapse to reverberate so deafeningly. It was not prepared to suddenly assume world leadership by itself. The US establishment had been equipped and trained to deal with one world order, and one mode of interaction -- the Cold War -- within specific parameters. With the collapse of this order, the enemy disappeared and so, in its wake, did Communism. The US suddenly lost one of its most important raisons d'être. The Soviet enemy was America's antithesis, its incentive for growth, the primary threat to its security, the foremost challenge to its values and religion. It was the enemy that maintained "American unity" in the 20th century. When it disappeared, it sent shock waves through US political circles. Even so, an important segment of US foreign policy theoreticians continued to adhere to the rules and procedures of the Cold War, and a small proportion of these (Henry Kissinger is one) expected, even hoped, that Russia would resume its position as the Enemy. Meanwhile, others decided to accept the challenge posed by the end of an era. Among them were those who proclaimed the ultimate victory of Western civilisation as represented by the US. Capitalism, liberal democracy and individuality have triumphed so decisively as to herald "the end of history". The new philosophy, however, was not enthusiastically received by US politicians, Cold War intellectuals, or by more detached inquirers into the nature of the post-bipolar world -- although interestingly, most of those who criticised the notion were from Europe. Meanwhile, the US continued to struggle with the angst of not having an enemy. Every time the US foreign policy establishment thought it had found one, it soon realised that the new bogeyman did not fit the bill. It was never enough of an ogre to unite the various segments of the US public, or formidable enough to spur American energies into action, or significant enough to preoccupy the arms industry. For some time, Islam looked like a good candidate. It seemed a perfect substitute for Communism. In fact, at times, Western interest in Islam -- in terms of the volume of academic studies, the number of conferences held and media air time allocated to the topic -- exceeded interest in Communism during the Cold War. The choice, however, was not entirely foolproof. Muslims, particularly the extremists, did not possess the necessary military might to threaten US hegemony. When it became clear that Islam, as a belief, did not threaten American lives, property and ambitions, US political ideologues linked it with terrorism. Then they linked terrorism with specific countries, and were finally able to manufacture a relatively credible enemy. While the creation of this enemy was in the works, an oracle emerged and announced the dawning of a new age, one dominated by the "clash of civilisations". This oracle had better luck than its predecessor, the end of history. To the US foreign policy-makers, particularly those with a more practical, rather than academic, bent, the new notion was quite seductive. Here, it seemed, was the answer to the two conundrums produced by the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the problem of defining the post-Cold War world, and the problem of the elusive enemy. Indeed, some facets of the theory proved quite useful in subsequent confrontations, with southeast Asia and Iran, for example. It certainly contributed to the formulation of condescending, and often racist, policies towards the Palestinians and the Arabs. It was also used, in careful doses at times, and more liberally at others, against China. Its most pernicious side effects, however, have begun to emerge inside the US, against American minorities. I believe, too, that we will soon see signs of it in relations between US and Europe, and between North and South America. Still, "the clash of civilisations" failed to produce a suitable enemy. No antagonist is a credible match for America's political, economic and military power. This is why I find it ironic that the US should be so insistent on bombarding Iraq and on imposing economic blockades on impoverished and powerless countries, while Washington continues to wage its human rights crusade. This is why the director of the CIA made me cringe when he told a Congressional hearing that America's national security priorities have shifted to the fight against terrorism, drugs, organised crime, money laundering and industrial spying. In other words, instead of training South American generals to combat leftist revolutionaries, the CIA is now training police and domestic security "generals" in the detection and monitoring of drug production and trade. In fact, the US has established an international law academy in Budapest with the express purpose of training national security personnel in Eastern Europe in methods of combating organised crime. Of course, it is not surprising that this phenomenon should receive such attention. Organised crime is a major threat to the global financial system and to the internal security of a number of countries. It has been able to penetrate the US itself through some 200 transnational crime cartels. But even these "enemies" combined cannot succeed in replacing the Soviet Union as America's number one foe. Therefore, the US will continue to play good guy-bad guy with specific countries on various occasions. What is important for a great power like the US is to have an external threat, or the semblance thereof, that galvanises the public. It must also have an arena where its armed forces can acquire actual combat experience and test its modern military technology. The presence of an external threat, furthermore, gives US diplomats extra practice in lobbying and creating international alliances. Nevertheless, 10 years down the line, the international order remains undefined. It is certainly not a multipolar system, nor, of course, a bipolar system. Nor is there any discernible hierarchical order. The possession of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is not the criterion for the international pecking order; that notion self-destructed with the crisis in Russia and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests -- which, so far, have not altered their international status. In addition, Germany recently revived the question of nuclear first-strike capacity, which has been the pillar of US and NATO nuclear strategy. I believe we will soon see increasing resistance to the nuclear element in international security policies. Which brings us back to square one in our search for the new criteria. The US may be near the peak of the global order, but few would agree that it is the sole great power at present, or that it will be so for long. The US itself has been quite reticent in its attempts to secure its position at the helm. It is reluctant to bear the human, material or moral costs. At the same time, the US does not meet the conditions for imperial leadership. There are too many restraints on its power to enable it to determine the fates of other nations and peoples. Finally, the US, like other countries, is suffering from the situation of extreme international flux resulting from the globalisation process. Furthermore, while the US did not turn to NATO to legitimise its intervention in Iraq, this does not, as some imagine, imply the organisation's imminent demise, or even a significant increase in internal disputes. It merely means that the US's role within NATO is being reassessed. The US intervened in both world wars only after ascertaining that the conflicting European parties had substantially weakened one another. Following World War II, it withdrew most of its forces from Europe, bringing them back only when it felt that European weakness might provoke Russian expansionist tendencies. For a time, America's leadership forestalled potentially debilitating rivalries within the pact, while continuing to prevent Soviet expansion westward. Now, however, circumstances have changed. The Soviet enemy is no more; Europe itself is moving toward unification. The old rivalries that have frequently bred conflict may disappear, and so too will the need for the US. Are all these parties waiting for China, or for a reawakening of a new Russian "antagonist"? Or is NATO gradually losing its raison d'être, as indicated by its absence from the recent Iraqi crisis? As for the Arabs, how long will they continue to play a role they have not chosen? The Arabs are neither a potential threat to US security nor the priceless quarry they were a decade ago. Their only use is that they are still playing the game the Europeans used to play -- which is to so debilitate themselves by infighting that they must turn to the US for help.
