Almost a year after America's 'liberation' of Afghanistan, Iffat Malek finds only small gains against a backdrop of continued, albeit changed, suffering One year on from the horrific events of 11 September 2001, the world is a changed place. The impact of that day's terrorism was most deeply felt in the US, but most visible thousands of miles away in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. If one compares the world today with that one year ago, it is these two countries that have changed the most. The hordes of journalists scrambling to get to Afghanistan (or failing that Pakistan) immediately after the attacks on the US was an accurate indication of where the hunt for the perpetrators would focus. Washington wasted little time in pinning the blame on Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda network, and demanding that his Taliban hosts hand him over. Their refusal to do so cost them dearly. Unable to persuade or threaten the Taliban into compliance, the US resorted to force. Taliban resistance delayed the American victory for a few weeks, but the vast imbalance between a Kalashnikov-armed guerrilla force and the world's sole superpower soon proved overwhelming. The Taliban disappeared even quicker than they had emerged -- many foot-soldiers simply shaved off their beards and re- entered mainstream society -- and the Afghan people hailed their new rulers, the US-backed Northern Alliance. In the past regime change in Afghanistan has not been a harbinger of stability and peace, in fact, it has meant quite the opposite. The exit of the Soviets, for example, was followed by years of bloody civil war. In the 1990s the Taliban eventually gained control of over 90 per cent of the country, but exacted a heavy price in intolerance and denial of human rights for the stability they brought. Last year, though, the Afghan people felt genuinely hopeful that an end to decades of conflict and war was finally in sight. Their optimism was sparked by the renewed international interest in their blighted country. Afghans believed that after years of neglect, the international community would assist them in restoring peace and rebuilding their country. One year on, many of those hopes have been shattered. True, millions of dollars of reconstruction assistance was pledged at a conference in Tokyo in January. But so far only a fraction of it has been delivered. True, an international security force was eventually dispatched to maintain order. But this is only deployed in the capital Kabul. True, all the country's ethnic groups were brought together to choose a representative government of national unity. But, despite its Pashtun head Hamid Karzai, it is dominated by the minority Northern Alliance. What was the problem? Answer: divergent interests. While the Afghans wanted financial and military assistance to help them rebuild, the Americans were only interested in finding Bin Laden and Al-Qa'eda. President Bush made it clear the US was not in the business of "nation-building". Hence the lack of financial assistance and peace-keeping force. There was also an outright clash of interests. Washington was quite happy to pay regional warlords for their cooperation in the hunt for Bin Laden. In doing so, it strengthened them, and made the task of the fledgling central government that much harder. Today, Bin Laden and Mullah Omar remain on the US's most-wanted list. American forces continue to search for them and fight pockets of Al-Qa'eda resistance. In Kabul, meanwhile, Hamid Karzai rules over an increasingly fragile administration. The real power rests with the Northern Alliance and with regional warlords like Abdul-Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan. One of Karzai's Pashtun ministers suffered an assassination attempt in the capital recently, and he is now protected by the Americans. In the absence of strong central control, lawlessness and crime are flourishing. Many Pashtuns have fled persecution in the north. Poppy cultivation -- banned by the Taliban -- is back in full swing. And for ordinary Afghans, life continues to be the same struggle against poverty, homelessness, hunger and disease that they have faced since the Soviet invasion of 1979. Little wonder that many are questioning whether the sacrifice Afghanistan has paid in America's war against terror -- several thousand civilian casualties not to mention many more injured or displaced -- has been worth it. Isolated but increasing attacks on American forces indicate growing anti-US feeling among the population. On the plus side, Afghan girls and women are going back to schools and universities after years of banishment under the Taliban. They can walk out with their faces uncovered. Music is heard on the streets again, and many men have shaved off their beards. Small gains against a backdrop of continued -- albeit different -- suffering. If Afghanistan saw a total regime change after 11 September, neighbouring Pakistan saw a regime shift. General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a military coup in October 1999, stayed in power -- indeed consolidated his position -- but in a vastly different environment. In response to George Bush's "with us or against us" ultimatum, General Musharraf had no option but to side with the US. In Pakistan's case that meant abandoning its long-time support for the Taliban and making Pakistan airspace and bases available for the US to wage war in Afghanistan. The domestic backlash against this foreign policy U- turn was surprisingly tame. The extremist religious parties mounted half-hearted demonstrations, but the majority of the public accepted their leader's argument that he had no choice but to help Washington, and stayed at home. In exchange for the minor loss of support at home, Musharraf made huge gains on the international stage. His lack of democratic credentials was suddenly forgotten, as leader after leader rushed to greet him in Islamabad or invited him to visit. Pakistan also benefited, though not to the extent many people had hoped. A substantial portion of the country's debts was rescheduled, prohibitive sanctions were lifted and greater access was granted to foreign markets. But if Musharraf thought his problems were over, he was soon proven wrong. An attack by militants on the Srinagar Assembly in Indian-held Kashmir, followed by another on the Lok Sabha in New Delhi, prompted a crisis with neighbour India. Taking advantage of the post-11 September international obsession with eradicating terrorism, the Indians quickly characterised the perpetrators of the attacks as Pakistani-sponsored terrorists. They demanded that Islamabad end all support for Kashmiri militants and seal the Line of Control (LOC) dividing Indian- Kashmir from Pakistan's Azad Kashmir. To back their demands, they expelled Pakistan's high commissioner, closed Indian airspace to Pakistani aircraft and cut all road and rail links. More ominously, India deployed huge numbers of troops along the LOC and international border. Musharraf tried to bluff his way out of compliance with India's demands. There was no infiltration across the LOC, he claimed, adding that Pakistan would respond with force to any Indian "aggression". In a historic speech in January he did, however, promise to clamp down on religious extremists -- including those fighting in Indian Kashmir. New Delhi kept its troops deployed along the Indo-Pak border while it waited for Musharraf to match words with actions. But more militant attacks in Kashmir convinced them that he was not serious, and by May the subcontinent appeared poised on the brink of war. The spectre of nuclear conflict galvanised the international community into action. A flurry of diplomatic visits (especially by the Americans) and pressure on Pakistan caused Musharraf to promise to seal the LOC. His pledge averted war -- at least for the time being. Troops remain in a state of high alert along the border. India insists that Pakistan has not done enough to control the militants, while Pakistan insists that the international community apply pressure on India to withdraw its forces and start dialogue on Kashmir. Both sides are now waiting for the outcome of legislative elections in Indian Kashmir in October. Within Pakistan, the domestic backlash to Musharraf's second major foreign policy U-turn has been more serious. A number of terrorist attacks in the country, targeting foreigners and Christians, have shattered confidence. In one of the most serious incidents, Washington Post reporter Daniel Pearl was abducted and murdered, and 11 French engineers were killed by a bomb blast -- both in Karachi. Virtually all non-essential foreign personnel have now been evacuated from Pakistan. Pakistan will be holding elections in October, for the national and provincial assemblies. In the run-up to the transfer to civilian rule, Musharraf has been doing everything possible to ensure he stays in power -- even after October. A heavily manipulated referendum in April allowed Musharraf to claim the presidency for the next five years. He has also introduced a series of constitutional amendments and electoral regulations, designed to limit the powers of the civilian government and enhance those of the president and army. For both Afghanistan and Pakistan then, the year after 11 September has been one of turbulence and uncertainty. Unfortunately, both countries appear to be in store for more of the same. Related articles: 9/11 Supplement -- 12 - 18 September 2002 9-11 - WAR COVERAGE -- Archives
