The secular Turkish establishment last week stepped up its campaign against the new Islamist government of the Justice and Development Party, Gareth Jenkins reports from Ankara President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed constitutional amendments that would have allowed Justice and Development Party (JDP) Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become prime minister. Even though the JDP won a landslide victory in the November general elections, Erdogan is banned from holding public office as a result of a conviction in 1999 for "inciting religious hatred" after reading out in public a poem that mixed religious and military imagery. Earlier this month parliament voted overwhelmingly to amend three articles of the Turkish constitution and clear the way for Erdogan to stand as a candidate in forthcoming by-elections. Once in parliament, Erdogan was expected to replace the JDP's Deputy Chairman Abdullah Gul, who is currently serving as prime minister. But last Thursday Sezer vetoed the amendments, arguing, "Laws should be general and objective and not aimed at a single individual." But his decision drew protests even from the parliamentary opposition, the Republican People's Party (RPP), most of whose deputies had voted with the JDP to pass the amendments. "What determines whether a law is passed is not who will benefit from it and who will not. The changes were meant to make our constitution a more democratic one," said RPP Chairman Deniz Baykal. Under Turkish law, the president cannot veto constitutional changes that are passed a second time by parliament without any changes. If, as expected, parliament votes for the same amendments later this month, Sezer can ask the Constitutional Court to annul them on procedural grounds. However, as no rules or regulations have been broken, the court is unlikely to be able to block the amendments. Sezer's only other option is to hold a referendum on the changes 120 days after their final approval. Few doubt that the amendments would be approved by the Turkish public. But a referendum is unlikely to be held until at least May 2003, which, given the need for a by- election and the parliamentary summer recess, would mean that Erdogan could not become prime minister until at least September 2003. Other staunchly secularist elements in the Turkish establishment, particularly in the military and judiciary, have already prepared a string of court cases against Erdogan based on allegations of corruption during his term as mayor of Istanbul in 1994-1998. Although the evidence is mostly flimsy at best, if Sezer sends the constitutional amendments to a referendum, Erdogan's enemies would have almost nine months to try to make at least one of the charges stick. Even his detractors acknowledge that Sezer is both exceptionally honest and committed to the rule of law. However, there were signs last week that more sinister forces are at work and trying to destabilise the new government. Last Wednesday evening, Necip Hablemitoglu, a fiercely secular academic at Ankara University known for his penchant for impossibly intricate conspiracy theories, was shot and killed outside his home in Ankara. No organisation has claimed responsibility, although the Turkish media has been quick to blame Islamist extremists. Hablemitoglu's university also implied that the killers had connections with one of the country's handful of tiny Islamist groups, which have sometimes resorted to violence in an attempt to reverse the secularist reforms introduced in the 1930s by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. "Ankara University is a staunch defender of Kemal Ataturk and his principles. For this reason, it has lost many of its members in attacks by forces working against the modern Turkish Republic," said Ankara University. "We hope this loathsome attack on Hablemitoglu is not the beginning of a new dark era in our country." The government immediately condemned Hablemitoglu's murder. Prime Minister Gul not only attended his funeral but served as one of the pallbearers. Yet the killing has only reinforced the fears of the country's secular establishment. The Turkish military turned out in force for the funeral in a silent demonstration of its determination to protect Turkey against what it sees as the threat from Islamic fundamentalism. Although the Turkish police have yet even to identity the group behind Hablemitoglu's assassination, much less capture his killers, there is no doubt that, as a result of the murder, the Turkish military will be even less willing than before to withdraw from the political arena; and, in addition to destabilising the country, that may turn out to be exactly what Hablemitoglu's assassins wanted.
