In this last of a four-part series addressing the main points of the roadmap, Muna Hamzeh argues that Israel plans to ethnically cleanse Palestinian refugees from West Bank and Gaza camps Nearly two weeks after the start of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the residents of Tulkarm refugee camp in the northern West Bank were abruptly roused by the sound of very heavy gunfire. An all-out pre-dawn Israeli military invasion of their camp was apparently underway. As a substantial number of troops sealed the camp and closed off the main road, all males between the ages of 14 and 40 were ordered to gather in a local schoolyard. For the more than 16,000 camp residents, the 2 April invasion and the rounding up of refugees was the norm rather than the exception in the 33- months-old Intifada. But the events that unfolded in the schoolyard some six hours later proved to be anything but normal. For in a vivid remake of the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 -- when more than 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes and become refugees -- Israeli troops forced the nearly 2000 rounded-up men to climb on waiting trucks and then "transferred" them to a make-shift camp outside Tulkarm. The make-shift camp was then sealed off with piles of dirt and the men were ordered not to return to their homes for three days. This highly significant operation was seen by many refugees as a testing ground for a much bigger future transfer of camp residents. Yet for all its importance, the operation passed without any noteworthy criticism or outcry. For its part, the Palestinian Authority failed to highly publicise the operation as part of an Israeli strategy aimed at ethnically cleansing the refugee camps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It further failed to use the operation as a reminder that Israel is seeking to strike the right of return from any final status negotiations with the Palestinians. More importantly, however, the PA did not draw any parallels with the other highly crucial operation which took place inside a refugee camp during the Intifada -- the April 2002 Jenin camp massacre. History might some day reveal that the grotesque events in Jenin -- which resulted in the burial of dozens of refugees under the rubble of their homes and the complete destruction of an entire camp neighbourhood -- had a purpose other than rooting out armed Palestinian "terrorists". Indeed, the scale and nature of the Jenin refugee camp massacre leaves little doubt that it was part of a military strategy aimed at testing the speed with which Israeli forces could destroy a refugee camp, whether the ensuing massacre and destruction would force the refugees to flee their homes, and how much of a resulting international outcry Israel would have to contend with. At this stage, it would not be unrealistic to argue that the PA might actually not be interested in drawing parallels between the two operations for fear that doing so would bring to surface Israel's real intentions vis-à-vis the right of return and the future of the nearly 651,145 registered refugees in 27 West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. For although Palestinian officials are usually quick to reiterate that the right of return is a "sacred" and "unalienable" right, there are signs indicating that PA officials might be willing to relinquish that right in a final peace deal with Israel. In late 2001, the PA's senior representative in Jerusalem, Sari Nusseibeh, caused a controversial debate when he declared that in the framework of a two- state solution, the Palestinians cannot demand the return of refugees to homes now located within the internationally recognised boundaries of Israel. In early September 2002, Nusseibeh and the former head of Israel's Shin Bet security service and former Naval Admiral Ami Ayalon released a joint peace initiative to end the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. The initiative, known as the Nusseibeh-Ayalon agreement, merely recognised "the suffering and the plight" of Palestinian refugees and called on Israel, the international community and the Palestinian state to "initiate and contribute to an international fund to compensate them". Nusseibeh was not the only Palestinian official to withdraw from the right of return. During a debate at the Brookings Institution in Washington in November 2001 -- with the participation of former Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin and former US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk -- then Palestinian Minister of Information Yasser Abed Rabbo described the process needed to resolve the refugee problem. "We asked for the principle of the right of return, but the implementation of it, it should be discussed in a very practical and even pragmatic way, without affecting or without -- yes, without affecting -- the Jewish nature of the state of Israel. We said it. This was our position," Abed Rabbo said. Palestinian President Yasser Arafat himself caused shockwaves when he was quoted in the New York Times in October 2001 as saying that "there could be no peace and a Palestinian state could not be established unless the Palestinians abandon a long-standing demand (and not their right) to return to their homes". For his part, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas has been repeatedly quoted in recent weeks as saying that the right of return "is one of every refugee and I cannot abandon this right". Yet back in 1995, Abbas and his Israeli counterpart Yossi Beilin drafted the very controversial "Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement Between Israel and the PLO", better known as the Abu Mazen-Beilin Plan. Although its existence was denied for five years before being published in September 2000, the Abu Mazen-Beilin Plan suggested the establishment of an International Commission for Palestinian Refugees for the final settlement of all aspects of the refugee issue. The plan stated that the Palestinian side "recognises that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of this right [of return] impracticable". The Israeli side, according to the plan, acknowledges the Palestinian refugees' right of return "to the Palestinian state" and "their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses". It is difficult to imagine that the same man who was the architect of such a plan would suddenly not want to abandon the right of return. Indeed, Abbas has come under harsh criticism in recent weeks for avoiding to make any reference to the right of return during the Aqaba Summit in early June and in his subsequent meetings with the Israeli prime minister. This criticism comes at a dangerous time when both Israel and the US are seeking to delegitimise Palestinian resistance and turn it into nothing more than acts of "terrorism" whose infrastructure must be uprooted. If the Bush administration and the Sharon government succeed in their objective, it is quite plausible that Israel would then shift its attention to resolving the refugee problem by destroying the refugee camps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and embarking on the transfer of the refugees. Even amongst Palestinians, there are those who do not believe that Israel would possibly embark on such a project. Yet the idea of expulsion as a solution to the refugee problem has never been far from Israeli political consciousness. There are indications that a new Nakba, as great as the Nakba of 1948, might actually be in the offing. In December 2000, some 300 leading Israeli figures -- including former Defense Minister Moshe Aens, former prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, former foreign minister Shimon Peres as well as Ariel Sharon -- attended what was called the Herzliya Conference. The conference's recommendations, or policy directions, involved using the principal of population transfer to Jordan as a way of resolving the "demographic threat" to Israel. In June 2002, both Sharon and Israeli President Moshe Katsav made an appearance at a "Transfer Now" conference which was organised by the right- wing Moledet Party to promote the policy of population transfer. During the same month, Moledet leader and Minister of Tourism Benny Elon met with US senators and congresspeople as well as with American Jewish organisations to promote the idea of transfer of Palestinians to Jordan. Elon's seven-point plan incudes the nullification of the Oslo Accords, the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the countries in which they currently reside and the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian state with Amman as its capital. Other indications of Israel's intent to transfer the refugees are not so harmless. Shortly after Sharon launched the major military operation in the West Bank -- known as Operation Defensive Shield -- at the end of March 2002, he appointed General Effi Eitam of the ultra right-wing National Religious Party as his new cabinet minister. Eitam has publicly favoured what he terms "evacuation by choice" whereby the life of the Palestinians would be made so difficult that they would "voluntarily" relocate elsewhere. There is no doubt that during this Intifada Israel has created unprecedented harsh economic conditions for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, particularly in the refugee camps. With the continued closure of the West Bank still in effect, it is unlikely that the economic situation of the refugees would improve anytime soon. No one can predict under what pretext Israel would carry out the transfer of the refugees. But whatever transfer plans Sharon might have in mind, the current regional climate indicates that the future of Palestinian refugees is going to be an ominous one. While Palestinian refugees insist that they will not flee their homes as they did in 1948, there are new regional conditions sweeping the area in the aftermath of the US-British invasion and occupation of Iraq that cannot be ignored. How would the refugees resist any transfer attempts when hostile conditions are being created all around them might be the biggest challenge they face since the Nakba of 1948.
