Israel's ability to strike inside Syria with impunity is another reminder that military parity simply doesn't exist in the region, Galal Nassar comments The Israeli strike near Damascus marked a dangerous and undoubtedly deliberate heightening of regional tensions. As the spectre of regional war loomed closer in the days following the attack, Israeli officials spoke of "preemptive war" and military scenarios against Iran, Syria and even Egypt -- in spite of the peace agreement between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Perhaps the most ominous statement came from Israeli Minister of Defence Shaul Mofaz in Maarev -- expressing his "concern" over Egypt's growing military strength. Referring to "Egyptian armament activity over recent months, especially with US-made arms", Mofaz asked what purpose these arms served since he could see no country posing a threat to Egypt. He went on to voice Israeli fears of "a situation in which Egypt comes under another leadership that could change its position on Israel". The London-based Al-Hayat also relayed information from a number of intelligence reports on Arab arms capacities -- with particular focus on the arms deals from the US to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These arms could be used against Israel in a forthcoming war, warned Mofaz. Glaringly absent from the Israeli defence minister's statements is any mention of the Israeli policies that perpetually keep that country on the brink of military confrontation. Officials in other Middle Eastern countries -- whether or not they share a border with Israel -- are aware of this situation and feel compelled to equip their nations with modern defence systems to establish strategic parity with Israel. Egypt, perhaps, most acutely senses this need. An Egyptian military source told Al-Ahram Weekly, "Peace always requires the power to protect it. Peace does not mean letting the military go lax and placing Egypt's higher interests and national security at risk because of the reckless impetuousness of Israeli politicians. We cannot let 1967 happen again." At the same time, the official stressed, "Most of Egypt's armaments systems are purely defensive. Their purpose is to protect Egyptian borders and Egyptian interests. They are not directed at any particular country. Ancient and modern history testify that Egypt has never attacked a neighbour or occupied neighbouring territory." This brings to mind presidential advisor Osama El-Baz's remarks during an awareness-raising seminar held for the Egyptian armed forces. He related that during the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations over the international boundary in the Sinai, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin came to Ismailia to air the idea that the pre-1967 borders had failed to protect both countries. As a solution, he proposed a boundary stretching from Al-Arish in the north to Ras Mohamed in the south. Later, in a meeting held at the Mena House in Cairo, Israeli negotiators charged that the Egyptians were attached to the old border as though it were sacred. They cited numerous examples of mutually agreed upon shifts in international boundaries between European countries before and after the two world wars as proof of the need for a more pragmatic approach. Egypt refused to budge against that spurious argument. El- Baz recounts that Sadat -- and later Mubarak -- remained adamant in their refusal to give up so much as a grain of sand of the Sinai. The ancient Pharaohs had regarded the Sinai as property of the gods, and therefore sacred. Not only had the Pharaohs bequeathed tangible evidence of this sacred title, they were also reluctant to annex foreign territory to the Sinai for fear of tainting the holy with the profane. The Egyptian armament policy may well be seen as the military manifestation of this spirit. Certainly it imbues the discourse of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, commander-general of the armed forces, who has said on numerous occasions that the Egyptian armed forces are currently in the midst of an important phase of upgrading and modernising their capacities to attain the highest possible level of combat readiness and performance. He has further noted that the armed forces are concentrating their efforts on reducing the threat to Egyptian national security -- even as the region works to build peace and reach a just settlement to the Middle East conflict. Tantawi's remarks that Egyptian forces are being trained and equipped to operate under circumstances in which the enemy seeks recourse to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sheds light on the nature of this threat. Contrary to Israeli claims, Egyptian foreign and strategic policy is not determined by the Israeli factor alone. Rather, it operates on a number of interrelated regional dimensions -- including Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Egypt has attempted to weld these dimensions into the framework of a single enterprise for regional cooperation that should advance Egypt's role as the geographical and cultural link between these diverse spheres. Egypt has further made it clear that it is open to all concepts for political, economic and security cooperation as long as they are grounded in the incontrovertible reality that this region is geographically, culturally and historically Arab. But Egyptian strategic planners have evidently learned the lessons of the past. According to informed sources, they are adamantly opposed to revive the era of divisive pacts and alliances which would bring the region closer to a potentially explosive situation. They also reject attempts to belittle Egypt's status as a regional power on the grounds that no outside party has the right to determine the nature of Egypt's role or the scope of its influence. In his annual address to the People's Assembly National Defence and Security Committee, Field Marshal Tantawi reaffirmed that Egypt's military force aims to maintain security and stability in the region and defend Arab territories and interests. However, he stressed, if Egypt is to participate in regional security arrangements certain conditions must be met. Above all, any perception of security in the Middle East must emanate from within the region and conform to its needs, circumstances and aspirations. In addition, the success of any project for regional security is contingent upon the realisation of equality, which from the Arab perspective means achieving a quantitative and qualitative balance between the military capacities of the region's nations. It is important to regard the nations as individual entities, and therefore to discard the notion of Arabs versus Israel. It follows that no country should be exempt from restrictions on certain types of weaponry or armament ceilings. This condition is obviously meant to apply to Israel -- specifically to Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arabs cannot consider entering into negotiations over a regional security order while one party retains the advantage of exclusive possession of WMDs. If multi-party arms limitation negotiations are to resume, this issue must be addressed head-on as the starting point for a systematic regional disarmament drive -- within the context of broader efforts to rid the Middle East entirely of WMDs. No allowances should be made for structural weaknesses such as small population size or land area. Rather, the focus should remain fixed on weapons capacities, which would be reduced in a phased process, prioritised so as to exclude consideration of conventional weapons in the initial phases and linked with various confidence building measures along the way. However, if such confidence building measures are to be effective there must first be a just and comprehensive settlement on all tracks of the Middle East conflict. Finally, all parties to an arms limitation agreement must collectively identify threats to the security of the region, placing the region's interests above individual calculations of their own, narrower national interests. Evidently Israel has its own agenda and intends to impose it on its neighbours with disastrous consequences for the stability of the region. Indicative of these plans are the repeated leaks to the press about Israel's arms build-ups -- most recently of three German submarines delivered to Israeli ports. The intent of such "leaks" is obviously to intimidate the Arabs and throw them into disarray. The submarines -- which can be armed with nuclear missiles -- are supposedly capable of approaching the coastline of any of Israel's neighbours undetected by radar or early- warning systems. Although Arab armed forces have the capacity to monitor Israeli land and mobile delivery systems, the submarines now give Israel an added advantage of surprise. Moreover, they enable Israel to deliver a second nuclear strike without advanced warning. According to military experts, while it is possible to deliver a first surprise nuclear strike from land or air, only an undetectable submarine could retain the element of surprise for a subsequent strike or response to a counter- offensive. Israel's acquisition of the German submarines is part of a new military strategy shaped by a resurgent militarist mentality in conjunction with a variety of political, economic and demographic factors. Such factors include the perceived incompleteness of the Israeli state project and the exclusive priority of military means to safeguard it. Other factors include Israel's limited natural wealth and water resources, the concentration of its population, industry and infrastructure in the coastal areas, lack of social cohesiveness due to the diverse origins of the populace and the fragility of its historic rootedness, few natural ports, the narrow geographic breadth of the country and the consequent lack of horizontal and vertical manoeuverability, as well as the short advance warning period and available response time. One prime component of this strategy is to upgrade early-warning systems so as to create a comprehensive, integrated system relying both on its own state-of-the-art technology and on facilities made available by the US. A second is to remain the only country in the region possessing nuclear and other non- conventional deterrents. Israel currently possesses approximately 1,000 Jericho 1, 2 and 3 missiles and 150 nuclear warheads, and is currently planning to upgrade its Jericho 3s to a range of 2,000 kilometres. A third key element of the strategy is "proactive defence" -- the capacity to intercept ballistic missiles between take-off and their entrance into the range of anti-missile systems. Patriot and Arrow missiles, pilotless aircraft, fighters and US warning systems will all come into play in this process. The strategy depends on absolute air superiority. Israel currently possesses 750 fighter planes, alongside a range of helicopter gunships and transport planes. Approximately 80 per cent of Israel's aircraft are advanced models and a plan is in progress to upgrade the main combat force to F-15s and F-16s, which are equipped with nighttime vision and have the capacity to cover long ranges and refuel in flight. A final component of the strategy is to possess top-grade conventional ground and naval forces. Israel seeks to retain possession of 15 artillery and mechanised infantry divisions and approximately 4,000 modern tanks. There is a plan to replace older tanks with Mircavas and to upgrade its M-60s and M-48s to equip them with greater durability, precision targeting and the capacity for nighttime combat. It is also reported that some 2,000 guns are being linked to satellite and pilotless aircraft systems in order to enhance precision targeting. Israeli naval forces are currently undergoing a thorough overhaul as well. In addition to 40 ships currently in its possession, it has added a number of submarines -- including the three German-made Dolphin- 209s -- and plans to obtain craft that can operate on the high seas and obstruct maritime communications in the Gulf, Red Sea and Mediterranean. Many of these units are to be fitted with advanced missile systems as well as other defence, early- warning and special operations technology. Israel has three main objectives in possessing these systems and a nuclear deterrent. Intimidation is the obvious one, particularly given that Israel has been brandishing the open-secret of its nuclear capacity since the 1960s. However, there is no reason to discount the possibility of using them to compel the Arabs to bow to Israel's will on certain strategic-political issues. The current bellicosity that prevails in certain sectors of the Israeli political- military establishment enhances the likelihood of a third possibility, which is to wreak massive destruction on its Arab neighbours, thereby eliminating the possibility of Arab military resistance for an extended period of time. Particularly ominous is a subject that has come to occupy the attention of Israeli military planners and strategic study centres over the past few years. The "future battlefield", as it has been described, extends over an area in which Israel perceives its vital interests lie. Ariel Sharon, as minister of foreign affairs, delineated this area as extending from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west and from the Islamic republics of Central Asia in the north to South Africa and the southern entrance to the Red Sea in the south. Israeli strategists have also identified the potential combat zones in which the IDF would confront Arab forces. Forward zones include the Sinai and Negev, the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, east of the Jordan River, and the West Bank and Gaza. They have further identified the entire Red Sea and the Mediterranean, up to the Gulf of Sirte, as a major theatre for naval operations. Secondary theatres extend from western Saudi Arabia in the area of Tubayq to western Iraq around the area of Al-Rutbah and northern Syria from Aleppo to the Turkish border. With regard to the latter area, Israel would call into play its strategic alliance with Ankara, through which the Israeli air force may avail itself of Turkish air space in operations against northern Syria. Most of these combat theatres are characterised by open desert topography. A few mountainous areas would present some natural defence against the deployment of Israeli ground forces and would offer considerable strategic advantages. These areas include the central Sinai mountain ranges, Jabal Al-Sheikh in Syria, the Al- Shabibi and Ata'ita mountains east of the Araba Valley in Jordan, the Lebanese mountains to the east and west of the Beqa'a Valley, and Al-Khalil Mountain and the Shahrout Heights on the eastern bank of the Jordan River. In any future war, Israel would have to coordinate with other countries within or bordering on what it has identified as its vital sphere. It would have to coordinate with Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, in naval operations in the Red Sea, with Turkey in aerial operations against Syria or Iran, with India and Sri Lanka aerial operations against Pakistan.
