Iraqi leaders finally approved a transitional constitution this week, but the splits that delayed the signing are far from resolved, writes Ramsey Al-Rikabi in Baghdad Something went right this week in Iraq, sort of. After weeks of wrangling, Iraq's Governing Council signed an interim constitution on Monday. But the by-play of the ceremony highlights just how much influence one Shia cleric can have and how nearly incompatible the demands of the Shias and Kurds can be. The interim constitution, also known as the transitional administrative law, has had a difficult birth. Last week, negotiations over the role of Islam, women's rights and details affecting Kurdish autonomy pushed an agreement two days past the deadline. A consensus was reached with a little nudging from the US proconsul in Iraq Paul Bremer. The initial blip of hope the document offered Iraq was snuffed out the next day by coordinated attacks in Karbala and Baghdad that killed over 180 people, delaying the signing by three days out of respect for the dead. US and Iraqi officials suspect the attacks are part of an overall plot to destabilise the country, and in the wake of the bloodshed members of the Interim Governing Council (IGC) called for calm and unity among Iraqis. Imbued with a unity of purpose that usually follows national tragedies, the signing was expected to go off without a hitch. But last Friday, five Shia Council members unexpectedly backed out of the signing. Ahmed Chalabi, a long-time friend of the Americans; Abdul-Aziz Hakim, from the Iran- backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); Ibrahim Jafari, of the Shia Dawa Party; Mohamed Bahr Al-Uloom, current IGC president and Mowafaq Rubaie never showed up for the ceremony. Besides the elaborate preparations, the only memorable scene that day was an empty stage and 25 untouched pens, framed by giant banner inscribed with "We all participate in the new Iraq." Obviously, not that day. The Shia leaders, representing Iraq's largest group, balked at signing the constitution because they wanted to scratch a specific clause that would allow a significant minority of Iraqis to block the passage of a later, permanent constitution. Specifically, a draft permanent constitution would fail if two-thirds of three provinces rejected it, even if a majority accepted it. In practical terms, this would mean the Kurds, who control three of Iraq's 18 provinces, could potentially scuttle any permanent constitution. It's of some significance that the back out was preceded by consultations with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the top Shia cleric in Iraq, who expressed reservations about the transitional law. In spite of the Coalition troops and the Governing Council's American stamp of approval, Al-Sistani, for all intents and purposes, is the most powerful man in the country. Last January, Al-Sistani's rejection of an American caucus plan in lieu of direct elections forced the US to abandon its original handover framework and crawl back to the previously spurned UN for technical expertise to prove the impossibility of elections. Al-Sistani was able to bring almost one hundred thousand protesters out onto the streets of Baghdad to demand immediate direct elections. To get the strongest country in the world to change tack is no small feat for a man who hasn't left his house in seven years. In a very real way, Al-Sistani, for all his talk of shunning politics, has the kind of popular support the IGC members can only dream of. It's no wonder some were willing to heed his warnings. Coalition officials played down the significance of the delay, stressing that democracy can be "messy" and calling the disagreements "a healthy process". Shia Council members and their deputies spent the weekend in the holy city of Najaf seeking advice from Al-Sistani and other Shia leaders. They emerged ready to sign the constitution as-is, without any further modifications. It is widely believed Al-Sistani refrained from vetoing the proposed constitution to avoid being seen as a spoiler of the first step towards Iraqi sovereignty. After the signing, Shia leaders, including Al-Sistani, were quick to voice their criticism of the document, and play down the significance of the Kurdish factor in the reservations. Some claimed the delay was not an attempt to stonewall minority rights, rather a necessary interval to explain the transitional law to their constituencies. "People outside the IGC had no time to look over the final form," of the interim constitution, said Adel Abdul-Mehdi, deputy of council member Hakim, explaining the reason for the delay. "We discussed mechanics, not rights," he said, and stressed that their reservations had nothing to do with the Kurds. Kurdish council member Mahmoud Othman called the Shias final acquiescence "a wise choice". Referring to the contentious two-thirds-of-three-provinces rejection clause, Othman said, "This could go against the Kurds as well, the Kurds could be blocked," in approving a favourable permanent constitution, but he added the clause "is a general guarantee, which makes the law more democratic". Shia council members judiciously shifted the focus away from their fears that the Kurdish minority could block the Shia majority to a general concern over Iraq's political future. "We could be in a vicious political circle that will make the transitional period last indefinitely," said Intifad Qomber, spokesman for council member Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress party (INC), referring to the minority veto clause. "A remedy must be put in the permanent constitution to make it clear that a small minority of people do not put us in a useless cycle." The logic underlying such concerns is sound. With some provinces only holding about six hundred thousand people, it's easily conceivable that a little over one million people could block something that the other 25 million support. Objections were also raised about the makeup of the yet-to-be-formed presidency council, which will consist of one president and two deputies. Shias are pushing for a five-member presidency, with three Shias, one Sunni and one Kurd, reflecting the commonly held demographics of Iraq. Shia leaders were also bothered by a section of the draft constitution barring changes unless approved by 75 per cent of the future national assembly and the presidency council. Al-Sistani issued a statement from his office in Najaf, pointing out the fundamentally flawed nature of the interim constitution. "Any law prepared for the transitional period will not acquire legitimacy until it is approved by the elected national assembly," he said in the statement, adding, "This law places obstacles to drafting a permanent constitution for the country that preserves its unity and the rights of its people, in all their ethnicities and sects." Coalition officials expressed satisfaction with the transitional law, highlighting the cooperation, negotiation and compromises the council members made and the key role the document will play in setting Iraq up for a freely-elected, sovereign government. "Not everybody got everything they wanted in this law," Coalition chief Bremer said during a meeting before the signing ceremony. "That's the way democracy works." The interim constitution defines Iraq as "republican, federal, democratic and pluralistic" and guarantees all Iraqis equality before the law "without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin". Along with a bill of rights protecting freedom of speech, religion and assembly, as well as the right to education, healthcare and due process, among others, the interim constitution has been hailed as the most progressive body of law in the region. Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi headed off criticism that guarantees of individual rights were an American import. "Some say these ideas are borrowed from the West, without any roots in Iraq. My answer is that these rights are not owned by the US, but universal values that should be implemented at all times, everywhere," he said prior to signing. The interim constitution sets 31 January 2005 as the latest possible date to hold direct elections for a 275-member interim national assembly. This national assembly will elect a president and two deputies, who will in turn choose a prime minister and appoint a cabinet. This national assembly will be expected to draft a permanent constitution to be ratified, if all goes according to plan, by 1 January 2006. Given the pressing deadline for elections -- by early next year -- Coalition officials say the current IGC will draft elections and political party laws, as well as the makeup of the caretaker government after sovereignty is handed back to Iraqi people and until direct elections can be held. These are expected to be included in an annex to the draft constitution signed last Monday. Shia leaders hope to use this annex as a way to implement the changes they want. The constitution signing ceremony took place in the convention centre inside the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headquarters, right across the Rashid Hotel struck by seven missiles the night before. Those missiles, as well as mortars fired on a Baghdad police station a short while before the signing ceremony, are reminders of the still unstable security situation in the country. The signing of the document itself took place on a desk used by Faisal I, proclaimed, with the support of the British, king of Iraq in 1921. One can only hope that the new Iraqi government's fate be a little more generous than the former monarchy, whose last member was shot dead outside his Baghdad Palace in 1958. Whatever the long-term influence of the document signed last Monday turn out to be, most Iraqis, in the here and now, are more concerned about jobs and security, something an interim constitution will hardly affect.
