In Israel, they do not see eye-to-eye on Egypt. Emad Gad looks at the opposing camps Over the past week, the Israeli media focussed on several domestic and regional issues, among the most prominent being the repercussions of the assassination of Hamas's spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and the corruption case against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his family. The media speculated on the possibility that Sharon might be indicted and the various alternatives left to the Israeli right if that actually happens. Many in the press focussed on Egypt's decision to cancel the visit of a parliamentary delegation to Israel to commemorate 25 years of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Although the cancellation was a response to the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, some segments of the Israeli media began to reassess relations with Egypt, with some even questioning the benefit of peace with it. Two camps are in evidence on this issue. The first believes that peace with Egypt is mutually beneficial and that Egypt is officially adhering to its peace accord with Israel. This side of the fence read the barring of the Egyptian delegation from visiting Israel as merely a direct response to the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, which occurred as Egypt was exerting all efforts to avoid conflagrations. In contrast, the second camp saw the cancellation as indicative of Egypt's hostile intentions towards Israel. For them, 25 years of cold peace has not changed "Egyptian enmity towards Israel." The first camp did its best to show that Egypt's decision was a natural consequence in the context of angry reaction in the Arab street to the assassination of Sheikh Yassin. This was the gist of an article by Arik Bender, Jackie Hougi and Itamar Inbari published in Ma'ariv 's online edition on 22 March. Nevertheless, reader responses to the article revealed the victory of the second camp which views Egyptian policy as hostile to Israel and peace useless. Hebrew Web sites were inundated with a veritable barrage of attacks on Egypt and its policies, claiming that what is between Egypt and Israel is "merely a cease-fire agreement, not a peace treaty". The occasional Israeli media campaigns against Egypt reflect the dilemma of Egyptian-Israeli relations which, since the mid-1980s, have been determined by the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically the Palestinian issue. Egyptian-Israeli relations have thus been affected, for better or worse, by what goes on in regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty embodies an official peace between two nations that, after fighting several wars and many battles, both recognised at a certain point in time that they were unable to impose their will on the other. Israel was unable to break Egyptian will in the 1967 War, and it was unable to maintain Egyptian territory occupied in the conflict. For Egypt, the October 1973 War was clearly a tactic to activate the political process and push Israel into a peaceful resolution. Israel bet that the peace agreement with Egypt would lead to a rapid normalisation of ties and, more importantly, that Egypt would wash its hands of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese tracks. Since Egypt did not do so for reasons of national security and its Arab ties, Israel has always believed that Egypt intends to "freeze" the peace. Thus, it has always been a cold peace. With time, relations between the two nations have evolved into alternating between a cold peace and what the Israelis term "cold war". This description was coined as a form of protest at the tension in Egyptian-Israeli relations and the prominence of the Arab factor in Egypt's foreign policy. In general, a cold peace has been prevalent when the Labour Party has been in charge in Israel; it is when the right under the leadership of the Likud gains power that it becomes a cold war. Nevertheless, there have been times in which relations have witnessed positive developments, usually due to the coincidence of two factors: a Labour government in Israel, and tangible progress towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian issue. The most prominent example is the Yitzhak Rabin government (1992-1995) and later the Ehud Barak government (1999-2000). The second year of the Barak government was an exception, perhaps because Barak was closer to Likud than Labour. This was clearly reflected in Egyptian reservations to his government's policy in the Camp David negotiations of July 2000 and his permission to allow Sharon to visit the Dome of the Rock, which in turn sparked the Intifada on 28 September 2000. Shortly thereafter, Barak lost to Sharon in the 29 January 2001 elections. It was thus logical that tension would rapidly permeate Egyptian- Israeli relations. The strain in ties was raised a notch when Egypt decided to recall its ambassador to Israel to protest the continued aggression against the Palestinian people, and later when it froze all relations with Israel, save diplomatic ties that served the Palestinian issue. Sharon paid no heed to Arab opinion and did not seriously address any ideas from the Arab world. Instead, he intensified the press campaign against Egyptian policy while continuing his attempts to break the will of the Palestinian people. 2003 saw several regional and international developments that had a strong impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations; indeed, it even partly changed the equation of relations. These developments included: the Anglo-American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq; changes in the positions of Arab states taking a hard-line approach in the Arab- Israeli conflict, primarily Libya and Sudan; US pressure on Syria; the chaos within the ranks of the Palestinian Authority and the inability of Palestinian factions to agree on a national agenda, despite efforts by Egypt, which sent delegations to the PA to patch over differences and hosted more than one inter-Palestinian dialogue; increasing American pressure on Arab nations to introduce fundamental reforms in several arenas, embodied in the Greater Middle East Initiative; the response of several Arab nations to US pressure and the marginalisation of others in any common Arab action. Some believe that these factors have changed the calculus of Israeli- Egyptian relations. Firstly, the nature of the ruling party in Israel has less of an impact on Egyptian government stances or its view of the future of relations. It has become possible to imagine relations developing with Israel regardless of the ruling party in Israel. Secondly, the Palestinian issue has less of an impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations as bilateral relations have been partly freed from the bonds of the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict. That is, relations between the two are now being determined more and more by bilateral issues. This was clear in the first three months of this year, as bilateral relations saw positive progress even though there were no tangible developments in the peace process. There were several phone calls between President Mubarak and Sharon, a visit by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher to Israel, and a visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom to Cairo which did not provoke the usual campaign in the opposition press. The assassination of Sheikh Yassin and the fallout abruptly halted the process, making Egyptian-Israeli relations once more the prisoner of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace process and the Palestinian cause. It is here that we can get a true sense of the dimensions of the Israeli campaign against Egypt. To read more about the campaign, visit the Web site of Arabs Against Discrimination (www.aad-online.org).
