From the Sidelines: Why we lost By Alaa Abdel-Ghani Congratulations to South Africa. We are certain it will put on a fabulous World Cup, one that all of Africa will be proud of. And now -- misery, misery -- we must move from champagne to migraine, to the loser's corner where Egypt lies, shattered in the wake of one of the most disastrous defeats in the history of countries bidding to host a major sports event. As in any competition, only the winner really matters. Few remember who finished second or third. But few Egyptians will likely forget the humiliation of this particular drubbing. In embarrassing unanimity, FIFA was in absolute agreement that we, simply, are not good enough. Because it was secret, we do not know who were the 14 FIFA people who voted for South Africa, or the identities of the 10 who backed Morocco. What we do know for certain is that not a single voter deemed Egypt worthy enough to stage a World Cup. But having spent a good many months campaigning hard for the Cup, we thought otherwise. The Weekly, for one, genuinely thought Egypt had the right stuff and truly felt that if given the opportunity, we would wow the world. We were under no illusions; we knew the competition was tough. But we did what we had to -- indeed what we wanted to -- for a cause and a goal we fully believed in. Unfortunately, things did not pan out the way it was hoped. To say that Egypt lost because South Africa won is not only stating the obvious but also giving just half the picture. Sure, the powers that be in FIFA agreed that South Africa was the best African country that could run a World Cup. But Egypt lost it as much as South Africa won it. There were things we did not have, things we did not do correctly and things we did not do at all. One reason why South Africa will host 2010 and Egypt will watch it on TV is stadiums. We did not have many of them. What is a World Cup without stadiums? In Egypt's report to FIFA, on the page on which you state what kind of shape your stadiums are in, we had this to say: stadium in Alexandria "to be built"; stadium in Damanhur "to be built"; in Giza "to be built"; Ismailia "to be built"; Port Said "to be built"; Bani Ebid stadium -- and town -- "to be built". To be, to be, to be. Of course, in the end, it was not to be. It was all future tense; there was hardly anything "has been". What Egypt presented were too many castles in the sand. FIFA wanted facts on the ground. Having hosted the 2003 Cricket World Cup, the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 1996 African Nations Cup, South Africa's facilities were in place and require modification rather than construction. Thus the comparison between the two countries in terms of stadiums was not one of comparing apples with oranges but apples with skyscrapers. Because this was Egypt's first shot at a World Cup we lacked experience and it showed badly. We wasted too much precious time and energy on pointless gimmicks: the five million piece of paper pyramid; the bus tours through Europe; the kid who can say gracias in three languages. I don't want to break the boy's heart, but as for the rest: who cares? And what was this bizarre idea that if we flooded FIFA's Web sites with millions of hits in support of Egypt, these millions would somehow will the World Cup our way? Egypt was not asked to persuade all of mankind that it is able to stage a World Cup. There were only 24 people standing between the World Cup and us and it was these two dozen individuals whom we should have been courting. Because of our inexperience, it was imperative we enlist the support of people who have been there before. We needed minds like that of Alan Rothenberg who orchestrated a brilliant World Cup for the Americans and who the Moroccans brought on board to try to do the same for them. But this kind of recruitment means you must open your wallet wide and it is not clear whether Egypt wanted to be so generous. We did hire a French company to help steer us to glory but its name up till now I do not know and which could have been in the meat-packaging business for all we know. We were unable to understand how FIFA thinks or what it wants. Unable to connect with the association's decision-makers. Unable to grasp the complexities involved in staging world football's showpiece event. We began publicising ourselves too late. Our bid was registered 18 months ago but many of us spent the first 12 months wondering where the traffic cones will be put for the celebratory parade we would throw after winning the bid. We focussed too much on our footballing history which, while some of it is indeed glorious, is indeed history. Our 5,000-year history, that we like to brag about every other day, helps us to know where we've been, not where we're going. Also, a big commercial market in South Africa apparently beckoned the FIFA accountants. FIFA was persuaded more by South Africa's ability above anybody else's to attract bigger and better sponsors and thereby help replenish its embattled coffers. Just as political, sentimental and historical favourite Athens lost out to Coca-Cola's home city of Atlanta for the 1996 centennial Olympics, South Africa's economy triumphed over all others. FIFA was simply not convinced that its financial interest would be better served by Egypt or Morocco rather than South Africa. Which is why South Africa's strategy in the campaign was to prove its commercial competence, to prove to FIFA it had the commercial and sponsorship capacity within its domestic market. Consequently, it furiously courted local and international sponsors for itself and for the FIFA house. Ever since the World Cup race started getting serious, we were constantly told that staging the World Cup had less to do with football than with vested political and financial interests that it would be foolish to ignore. While I do not necessarily disagree, the question is that if we genuinely believed this to be the case, why didn't we pull a few political and financial strings of our own, as long as it was within the limits of the law? What was stopping us if we acknowledged that this was one way of achieving the objective? We pride ourselves on being a power in the region, a beacon of light on the continent, a guiding light in the Arab world, a shining light in the Middle East. So what happened when we needed to reinforce that view? We suffered a power failure. FIFA, it should also be said, did not want another Athens on its hands. Just last week, with only 100 days left, did the International Olympic Committee exhale, finally able to say that the Athens Olympics will start on time with almost everything in place. But for around 2,500 days before that, Athens had been giving the IOC one big headache because of its torturously slow preparations. Lackadaisical countries like Greece, and Egypt, give the IOC and FIFA fits. We have said it before: such countries are stricken with the Mediterranean malaise whose symptoms include putting off what you can do today to the next leap year, not doing anything until you are told to do it and not doing anything until it's too late. Such countries have perfected the art of looking like they are working hard when in fact they are hardly working. FIFA definitely did not want to go the same route as the IOC. If you win the World Cup rights, you are expected to start working the day after, on 16 May. Athens, then, was always on their minds. To be fair, there were some things that Egypt had no control over. It is extremely rare and almost impossible for a country to stage a World Cup after applying for it just once. Only a super duper country that has everything can win a World Cup bid on its very first outing. The classic example is the United States in 1994. Less mortal nations must get their feet wet at least once. This was the second time that South Africa had bid to host the Cup. It was Morocco's fourth attempt. It was Egypt's first. Success in this case is almost never achieved with just one swing of the bat. Probably, too, Egypt lost the battle long before the vote. South Africa was the sentimental favourite after being deprived of the 2006 finals by Charles Dempsey's abstention. Dempsey was the Oceania representative on the FIFA executive who ignored instructions from his federation to back South Africa. Instead, he abstained on the crucial final vote, which meant Germany secured a 12-11 victory. Had Dempsey voted as instructed, it would have been a tie after which South Africa would probably have won through the deciding vote of FIFA President Blatter who had declared his backing for the South Africans. To this day, the reason for the abstention remains unclear. To say the vote was contrived in Germany's favour might not be easy to prove in a legal challenge. FIFA did not have sleepless nights over the matter but had enough of a guilty conscience to owe one to South Africa. With this unwritten pledge forever in the backdrop, it might have been best if Egypt had not vied to host the World Cup in the first place. But we had to enter. We could not stand idly by, we the pioneers of so many things African, when it came time for Africa to stage the continent's first World Cup. We could not but jump into the fray, making it in many respects a candidature forced upon us. And when that happens, countries just go through the motion of competing without putting the required energy and money into the effort. But since we committed ourselves, we should have gone all-out. The consequence of half-hearted measures was a big fat zero. If it is still interested, Egypt will not get another chance to host a World Cup until roughly 2034, until the tournament does its continental rounds. If there is to be redemption, it is far off.
