The opponents of President Hugo Chavez scored a small victory when they gathered enough votes to trigger a plebiscite which could impeach him. But it may be too early to celebrate, Hisham El-Naggar writes from Buenos Aires This week, the Venezuelan opposition to President Hugo Chavez had possible cause to celebrate. After a lengthy give-and- take with the Electoral Commission, there now appears to be little doubt that the opposition has collected the required number of signatures, with a few hundred thousand to spare, for a recall election, which might result in the impeachment of Chavez. Chavez accepted the result with something approaching good grace, but also declared his intention to launch a campaign to defeat the attempt to impeach him, a provision of the constitution he himself drew up. Ever the populist, Chavez had always been in favour of "direct democracy", which includes direct consultation with the electorate. He never envisaged, however, that this clause would be used against him. As a president, Chavez is difficult to classify. He often passes for a leftist, although conventional leftists disdain his personality cult and his application of what are essentially conservative fiscal policies. About the only thing some of these leftists like about him is his outspoken anti-Americanism, which has turned him into a buddy of Cuba's Fidel Castro and is causing no end of worry to President George W Bush's closest aides. One of the results of this has been thinly disguised US support for attempts to ease him out of power through not altogether constitutional means. A couple of years ago, the leaders of a putsch which sought to overthrow Chavez were immediately and openly assured of the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as Western governments, including Spain, then ruled by José Mar�a Aznar. A few hours later, however, the coup faltered, as its leaders demonstrated their democratic credentials by making short shrift of the constitution, and the army made up its mind to stand by Chavez. The debacle discredited Chavez's opponents in much of Latin America, but only briefly. The opposition lined up against Chavez at present, organised by a coordinating committee comprising most traditional parties, insists that it is not 'putschist' and that it is acting within the constitution. Chavez himself appears to have tacitly, if reluctantly, accepted this declaration. So is Chavez on the way out? Not necessarily. The opposition will need to mobilise a higher number of votes to force him out of office than were collected to trigger the plebiscite. Chavez will no doubt cast himself as an opponent of the plutocracy which once ruled the country with the backing of the traditional, and highly corrupt, political parties. Anti-Americanism could also serve to rally support. And finally, the experience of Haiti, where the democratically elected -- although in less than transparent elections -- President Aristide was thrown out under visible American pressure, may sober Venezuelan voters. Haiti has not exactly been thriving since then, as civil strife persists. The risk of violent clashes between pro- and anti-Chavez forces cannot be ruled out. Chavez has strong support among the poor, who reacted with fury when he was overthrown two years ago. But so far, physical confrontation has been avoided. After the fiasco of the failed coup against Chavez, the opposition knows better than to flirt with violence. As for Chavez, he does not want to be branded a dictator. Both he and the opposition know that the result of the plebiscite is not a foregone conclusion. Much will depend on who chooses to participate; voting in a plebiscite is not compulsory. And Chavez has a few cards up his sleeve. The plebiscite has been "tentatively" scheduled for 8 August. But there is little constitutional precedent with regard to plebiscites; it seems Chavez can pick the date himself. If so, he may be tempted to schedule it slightly later. If the poll is held after 19 August and Chavez loses, he will be replaced by his own vice-president, who is required to call general elections but may finish the presidential term himself. This would, of course, infuriate the opposition, and may incline some anti-Chavez voters to stay home rather than participate in a plebiscite which at best, from their point of view, would replace Chavez by one of his men. Another possibility is that Chavez could resign before the plebiscite and call for new elections. In this case, his relative strength will be set against the opposition's relative weakness: there may be considerable anti-Chavez feeling, but there is no obvious opposition candidate to replace him. But an opposition united only by anti-Chavez sentiments would almost immediately splinter if faced with an electoral free-for-all rather than a yes-or-no referendum about Chavez's rule. Chavez still has time to weigh his options. Meanwhile, the uncertainty will not exactly help the ailing Venezuelan economy. Ironically, because the price of oil, Venezuela's main export, is at an all-time high, the US, Venezuela's main customer, may end up involuntarily financing the campaign of one of its biggest bêtes noires.
