Indonesia has accepted foreign aid for one of its worst hit provinces, writes Damien Kingsbury*, but corruption and state violence may still prevent it reaching those who need it The response from the international community to the crisis in Southeast and South Asia has demonstrated what is best about global cooperation and assistance. In the face of a humanitarian disaster, many unaffected countries have recognised the validity of John Donne's meditation, that "no man is an island"; that the death of any diminishes us all. The governments of the affected countries have also acted with courage and dignity in dealing with this crisis. In particular, when the Indonesian military, the TNI, refused to allow in aid workers and relief supplies, they were swiftly over-ruled by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yet this did not stop the TNI from initially refusing to allow aid planes to land in Banda Aceh, or treating arriving aid workers with suspicion and hostility. Aceh has been the TNI's fiefdom since 1989, and since May 2003 has effectively been cut off from the outside world. While many in the TNI are now assisting with the massive relief effort underway there, many other army staff are not. Some are guarding stockpiled warehouses, and only releasing food selectively. Others have been reported to be stealing food and other supplies from villagers, continuing a practice that has been commonplace since Aceh was first declared a "military operations area" in 1989. There have also been reports of Acehnese trying to leave the province having to pay bribes at roadblocks that are still in place on the Medan-Banda Aceh highway. But, most disturbingly, after the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) declared a ceasefire in order to allow the relief effort to go unhindered, and the TNI initially agreed to do likewise, when unarmed GAM guerrillas came out of the hills to the villages to help, they were ambushed. The TNI has subsequently launched an extensive military operation against GAM, diverting much of its scarce and desperately needed resources, in a bid to wipe out the organisation while the province is in a state of chaos. As with previous such attempts, this one does not appear likely to be successful. What is of concern is that, at a time when tens of thousands more people could die due to lack of clean water and other preventable problems, the TNI has well and truly taken its eye off the ball. It has, in effect, reverted to type. There are now fears that, as aid money pours in, the TNI will divert much of it for its own purposes. Just as when schools in Aceh were burnt down wholesale after May 2003, it was TNI-owned companies that provided the rebuilding services, for which they were generously paid. And it was TNI- owned companies that provided the construction materials. The TNI also owns transport companies, which are essential for shipping goods around the country. To date, there has never been an aid programme in Indonesia where a percentage of the funds was not pilfered at each stage along the way before finally reaching the intended recipient. It has not been unusual for less than 10 per cent of the original funds to finally make it to their destination. The TNI are past masters at this sort of theft, in addition to their protection rackets, smuggling and other black market activities. Despite being one of Indonesia's key hydrocarbon suppliers, and otherwise rich in natural resources, Aceh has long been one of the nation's poorer provinces, largely as a consequence of such impositions. This is not the cause of the separatist movement, which is based on Aceh's identity as an historically separate state, but it has certainly helped fuel the conflict. Within the TNI, there is a saying that soldiers sent to Aceh either come back rich, or in a body bag. But now, despite the TNI's best efforts, the international community is in Aceh in droves. There are some 3,000 US marines, hundreds of foreign aid workers from respected organisations such as the Red Cross and Medicins Sans Frontiers, and the beginnings of a UN presence. The first thing these organisations need to do is ensure that incoming aid is not stockpiled or diverted by the TNI, as private reports are now saying it has been. The second thing they need to do is to make sure that the flow of money into the province is not spent on price-inflated TNI-provided goods and services. The third thing they could do, while there, is demand an end to TNI operations -- GAM is still holding its ceasefire -- in order to expedite the relief effort. After that, if the international community is really serious about relieving the suffering and death of the Acehnese people, they could insist on an internationally brokered settlement to the province's 29-year- old conflict. As the international community has learned from Cambodia, East Timor, Rwanda and so many other experiences, conflict is the single biggest impediment to development. No amount of foreign aid can change that. * The writer is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University. He recently completed an Australia Research Council project on military business in Indonesia.
