Hassan Nafaa* outlines the implications of last week's referendum It was never realistic to think that the opposition in Egypt could prevent the NDP from pushing through its amendment of Article 76, let alone tailoring the reform process to its own whims. The opposition attempted to question the legality of the referendum in the courts, and when that failed they launched a boycott campaign. That, too, backfired, with the majority of the electorate going to the polls and voting in favour of the amendment. But, does this mean the battle over the amendment has been settled in favour of the NDP? The NDP seems to thinks so. The amendment provoked an unprecedented degree of polarisation between the state and the ruling party on one side and society on the other. The line was drawn in such a way because there is, in the end, no real distinction between the state and the NDP and they were pitted not just against the opposition, in the narrow, party-sense of the word, but against all forces within society that are not organisationally linked with the state and the ruling party. For the first time since the introduction of political plurality in the mid- 1970s there was an issue over which political parties and independent forces could adopt a unified stand and test their strength through the ballot box. The government responded by using its media leverage more intensively than ever before in an attempt to neutralise the boycott. We must accept the results of the referendum as announced by the minister of the interior on 26 May, at least until more information comes to light on opposition allegations of electoral fraud, including the multiple casting of ballots. It is noteworthy, though, that even if such tampering did take place there was at least an attempt to make the ballot appear credible. Yet despite its massive efforts to get people to the polls the government could do no better than engineer a 53 per cent turnout of registered voters. True, this was high as compared to other public referendums held in Egypt, but then no previous referendum has been as politically charged as last weeks. The end result is that the voters who actually said yes to the amendment account for less than half the electorate. Some 18 per cent of voters casting a ballot -- i.e. three million -- voted against the amendment. This no vote is unlikely to reflect the strength of the opposition, whether established political parties, independent groups or the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which urged their supporters to boycott the referendum. The most likely explanation for the figure is that the three million represents a combination of government employees who, for one reason, had to make an appearance at the polling stations but then voted against the amendment, and voters who felt it their duty to exercise their right to register opposition to the amendment in the ballot box. Whatever the composition of the no vote, that it reached 18 per cent of the total is significant. It is the highest dissenting vote in any referendum held in Egypt. According to official returns 500,000 ballots were judged spoiled. Voters either left them blank or ticked both the yes and no boxes. While legally these ballots signify nothing it could be argued they count in favour of the opposition. It seems reasonable to suggest the vast majority of these voters were in favour of multi- candidate presidential elections but were opposed to the wording of the amendment itself and the provisions regarding the restrictions governing the eligibility of candidates. Factoring in spoiled ballots raises the no vote to 20 per cent. The vote in favour of the proposed amendment reached 13.5 million. As there are 32 million registered voters, this is equivalent to 40 per cent of the electorate, hardly a majority. The opposition can, then, claim a victory of sorts. The results confirmed one thing -- there is a strong belief in the necessity of amending Article 76, and in a way that paves the way for substantial political reform. The battle over political reform has clearly not yet been resolved, a fact that begs the question of what comes next. To answer this requires an examination of why Egyptians are dissatisfied with the amendment that has just come into effect. The amendment sanctions three types of discrimination. It discriminates between the NDP and all other parties by restricting the eligibility of candidates to their ability to secure the support of a fixed percentage of the members of elected parliamentary or municipal bodies. By including this provision the NDP has ensured that, with the exception of the forthcoming elections in which the eligibility quota will not apply, it controls who runs in the presidential elections. An alternative would have been to allow for the selection of candidates on the basis of their ability to secure a certain number of signatures of registered voters. The NDP rejected such a procedure with the spurious argument that it would be impossible to assess the validity of such signatures. The amendment also discriminates between political party candidates and others. By insisting candidates have the support of 250 members of elected councils effectively bans independent candidates and not just adherents of the Islamist movement, widely perceived to represent the greatest threat to the ruling party. There is also a temporal discrimination between 2005 and 2011. In the forthcoming presidential elections existing political parties will be able to field candidates without having to meet eligibility quotas. Not so in 2011, when they will have to obtain the support of five per cent of the People's Assembly, or some 25 seats. No existing political party has ever obtained anywhere near that number of People's Assembly seats, even though some parties have been around for almost 30 years. The suggestion that this provision was included in order to encourage political parties to get their act together ahead of the 2011 elections is simply risible. Fortunately the opposition parties were astute enough to realise that their exemption from qualifying quotas in the forthcoming elections was little more than a bribe to lure them into a long-term trap. Many are of the opinion that the way Article 76 was amended succeeds in accomplishing one thing, which is to pave the way for Gamal Mubarak to run for president in a way that appears, superficially, at least, legitimate. I stress "superficially" because the possible election of Gamal Mubarak cannot be regarded as legitimate unless it occurs after a thorough process of democratisation. Legalistic ruses designed to bring the president's son to power before Egypt has attained a fully democratic system will never wash with the people and can only further charge the domestic political climate. A growing number of patriotically minded observers fear that influential groups of businessmen and politicians within the NDP are determined to go down this road, regardless of the consequences, and that the constitutional amendment was a step in this direction. I believe that, at such an important crossroads in our history, we should appeal to President Mubarak, whose record of dedicated and courageous service to the nation is second to none, to defuse the crisis that is engulfing our body politics by taking two steps vital for the peaceful transition to democracy in Egypt. The first of these would be for the president to stand down as leader of the NDP and to take the legal measures necessary to separate the state and the ruling party. The second is to encourage Gamal Mubarak to relinquish any high profile involvement in politics and confine himself to acting as a personal envoy for the president or director of the president's council or some other such position that would not entail blanket media coverage. These two initiatives would alleviate current tensions and allow for a climate conducive to national dialogue on drawing up a new constitution. Some perceive the storm clouds gathering over Egypt's political life. To dispel them requires foresight and vision. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
