Nabil Abdel-Fattah* explores the dynamics that led to the killing of an ambassador and the bombings in London, and which continue to haunt the future The London bombings and wave of kidnappings, assault and murder against Arab and Muslim diplomats in Iraq -- notably the murder of Egyptian Ambassador Ihab El-Sherif and the attempted murders of the Pakistani ambassador and Bahraini chargé d'affairs -- mark a turning point in the history of aggressively radical Islamist groups. Both reflect a profound anxiety and tension in the Sunni political Islamist movement, the spread and increasing radicalisation of which can be traced through the Islamic Liberation Party, the Takfir and Higra Organisation, Islamic Jihad, the armed Islamist insurgent groups in Algeria and Al-Qaeda. Once we look beyond the Islamic and jurisprudential rhetoric that Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi or Al-Qaeda- affiliated groups operating in Iraq use, the political motives behind the murder of the Egyptian ambassador become apparent. El-Sherif was the diplomatic representative of the largest Arab Sunni state and his appointment came as a direct challenge to militant Sunni Islamist organisations, and specifically to Al-Qaeda. To Sunni militant groups, resistance to the US-British occupation in Iraq is key for control of the state from the sectarian and nationalist groups that cooperated with the occupation and based their legitimacy within the "new Iraqi state" upon it. The assassination of the Egyptian ambassador struck a powerful blow to US policy and America's allies in the region. It is not insignificant that the organisational expertise of Al-Qaeda derives primarily from the two Egyptian radical movements -- Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya -- many of whose members had participated in "holy war" against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Egyptian leaders were instrumental in restructuring Al-Qaeda following the Soviet withdrawal, opening the door to the creation of new centres of operation and training. They stepped up recruitment, targeting younger, primarily middle class, generations in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, as well as the West. They opened the avenues both to the rise of competing cells and the creation of dormant cells that could mount operations whenever circumstances and logistics permitted. They masterminded diabolically ingenious operations, such as the 11 September attacks against the icons of American economic and military might, the purpose of which was to strike at the prestige of the world's foremost superpower and disseminate a maximal climate of fear. Since 11 September, Al-Qaeda has gone increasingly for soft targets causing immense damage, civilian casualties and public alarm, as can be seen in the strikes against Mombasa, Casablanca, Madrid and most recently London. As exemplified in the 11 September 2001 hijackings, the bombings of underground stations and a bus in London, and other operations, Al-Qaeda cells like to mount simultaneous attacks on select targets. The purpose of such dramatic operations is to ensure the widest, most sensational media coverage possible and to demonstrate prowess at planning and logistical coordination. If there is an overarching aim, it is to sew widespread chaos and instability and to wreak the greatest possible attrition on the US through unconventional means that capitalise on the Islamic concept of martyrdom and the climate of hysteria fed by the seeming randomness of the attacks. The terrorist operations in Iraq are part of a political scene shaped by instability, terror and bloodshed. Their aims are to gain control over, and politically and ideologically channel, the popular revolt in Iraq, to counter the Iranian influence and to check the Kurdish national movement. One can, therefore, presume that the radical Sunni cells operating in Iraq receive financial and material support from regional cells in order to carry out assassinations and suicide attacks against specific targets such as foreign diplomats and UN representatives, members of the new Iraqi army and police, occupation forces, as well as densely populated areas in order to generate widespread panic. The assassination of Ambassador El-Sherif was part of Al-Qaeda's attempts to prevent any normalisation of the situation and simultaneously to strike against Egypt at a time of increasing scepticism over its regional role and status. The London bombings, meanwhile, are a continuation of Al-Qaeda's confrontation with US-British policy in Iraq, the ultimate aim of which is to force occupation forces to withdraw thereby scoring an enormous victory both against the US and its regional allies. Al-Qaeda and its Egyptian leaders seek a globalised -- if we may use the term -- war of terror. Their sights are constantly trained on Egypt and Saudi Arabia and their attacks against American and British targets are at least in part intended to punish these two powers for their support of the ruling regimes in Cairo, Riyadh and other Middle Eastern capitals. Herein resides the connection between the recent terrorist attacks in London and the assassination of the Egyptian ambassador, regardless of our abhorrence of this murder of an innocent Egyptian civilian whom circumstance decreed would represent his government in Iraq. The events in Iraq and in London confirm a number of realities and help us predict the shape of things to come. First, Al-Qaeda has become a permanent feature of the global political scene and it will remain a major factor in the conduct of international relations at least for the foreseeable future. Second, the corrupt and inept Middle Eastern dictatorships are one of the major causes of the spread of violence and terrorism and they have facilitated the export of this phenomenon to other countries of the world. The continued support for these authoritarian regimes in the Middle East has generated hatred against them and the countries that support them. Third, the global military-intelligence campaign against terrorism has clearly failed to make significant inroads against this phenomenon. Indeed, the London bombings are testimony to large gaps in the security network meant to monitor terrorist activities and prevent attacks. Fourth, it has been suggested that the London bombings may have been carried out by dormant Al-Qaeda cells that have retained autonomy. If this is the case, Al-Qaeda now has a new generation of members present in Europe, many of whom may, in fact, possess European nationality by birth. Fifth, the rapid crackdown approach to fighting terrorism will probably not reach its objectives. Indeed, the US-British led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and their continued support of dictatorial regimes in the Middle East in the hope of checking the spread of terrorism have worked to aggravate the phenomenon. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was correct when he stated in an interview with the BBC that this form of terrorism has deep roots and can ultimately only be eliminated by addressing root causes. He also stressed the importance of enhancing mutual understanding between religions, stepping up the Middle East peace process and pressing forward with democratic reforms in the region. "What we now know is that wherever there is fanaticism or various forms of poverty the consequences of these phenomena are not restricted to the areas in which they exist. They reach to all corners of the earth." While Tony Blair certainly touched upon some of the root causes of terrorism, he avoided mention of the part his administration -- along with that of Bush -- played in frustrating the aspirations of the Arab peoples for democratic liberties and systems of government, new leaderships, an end to poverty and corruption, an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab territory and an end to the occupation of Iraq. In all events the recent terrorist attacks will have widespread socio-political repercussions. Most immediately, one foresees greater tension between religious communities in Britain and the West in general, as well as more intensive surveillance and rights abuses of Muslims. In addition, we can expect the media in those countries to intensify their reproduction of negative images of Islam and the Muslim people, who have and will continue to be depicted as intolerant, violent, oppressive of women and innately given to the perpetuation of corrupt dictatorships and to terrorism. These developments, in turn, will generate a climate inhibitive of interfaith dialogue and understanding, and conducive to the recruitment of new terrorist cells and the creation of new militant Islamist groups. In this region one envisages a rise in the tendency to cast political issues in religious terms and the deepening of the Islamicisation of the public, political and cultural spheres. This will most likely augment the influence of political Islamist forces which, in light of the intransigence of ruling elites, raises the spectre of increased polarisation of society and perhaps a reversion to violent confrontations with militant Islamist organisations, including unheard of splinter groups or dormant cells. We may have seen a prelude of things to come in the Taba bombings, the recent suicide bombing near the Egyptian Museum and the attack against a tourist bus in Sayeda Aysha. The terrorist attacks in London and the assassination of the Egyptian ambassador to Baghdad also strengthen the hand of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes against US/Western pressures to institute democratic reforms. Moreover, on the pretext of keeping the terrorist genie in its bottle, one can further anticipate that these regimes will revert to harsher restrictions on the freedoms of opinion, expression and the press and to clampdowns on NGO activities and political movements. Particularly vulnerable in the forthcoming period will be the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya), the 8 March group for the autonomy of the university, the Egyptian Movement for Democratic Development, the youth, lawyer and journalists' societies for change, not to mention the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time the US and Europe are certain to step up their pressure on religious establishments in Arab countries to take serious steps to reform religious rhetoric and educational curricula. This, in turn, may trigger undeclared alliances between more conservative members of the religious establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood, as occurred during other transitional phases in the latter quarter of the 20th century. More ominously, the foregoing developments will combine with the linkage made in the Arab consciousness between Islam and patriotism to strengthen the arguments of the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islamist groups, and to weaken non-sectarian national bonds. Among the consequences of this will be the heightened likelihood of sectarian tensions as well as terrorist attacks against foreigners on the grounds that this is a form of patriotic holy war against the country's and Islam's enemies. * The writer is assistant to the director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and editor of Religion in Egypt annual report issued by the centre.
