Intelligent crisis management on the part of authorities could have forestalled the rapid escalation of sectarian tensions in Alexandria, writes Sameh Rashed* A crisis recently flared up in Egypt over a theatre piece shown in an Alexandrian church rumoured to have defamed Islam. Although the crisis was contained, many aspects of the incident deserve further consideration, particularly the way it began and quickly inflated, as well as the manner in which all involved parties responded. The most eye-catching aspect of the crisis in Mar Girgis was the speed with which events developed, indicating that there is a hidden sense of constriction among Egyptians, both Muslims and Christians. This constriction might not in fact be related to the crisis itself or to sectarian or religious motives; rather this particular event became occasion to let loose. This emotional explosion was aided by rashness, impetuosity and judgements based on appearances, characteristics that have entered the make-up of the Egyptian socius over past decades. The raw fury exhibited by Muslims this time, and Christians recently (the conversion of Wafaa Costantine to Islam), can be partly interpreted as an attachment to religion and a zealousness of conviction. Regardless of the appropriateness of such things, the fact is that Egyptians easily become angry over religion and rise up in jealous protection of it. Another noteworthy aspect of the crisis was blundering poor management on the part of authorities, from the state as represented by official bodies such as the governorate, local councils and security services to popular bodies as represented by members of parliament and religious institutions, particularly the church -- both that involved in the incident itself and the mother church of Egypt. Al-Azhar did not intervene or express any opinion until after the events got out of control. All of these institutions dealt with the matter from the beginning with a large degree of indifference and underestimation. Some of them, particularly state security, are rumoured to have stood behind the events, as though security agencies in Egypt have finished with all of their accumulated political and criminal problems and now have the free time to stir up new crises and unleash strife among different sectors of the populace. While it is difficult to confirm or deny this accusation decisively, the truly dangerous ramification is that if the security agencies were not involved in sparking the crisis, they also did not act, as was necessary, to immediately contain it and prevent it from growing out of hand. The final noteworthy aspect of the incident was that the crisis was dealt with in a traditional manner, inappropriate for this day and age. The security agencies were not up to the task, and the situation grew more complicated as the various institutions involved all depended on the role of security. They did so on the basis of past experience with such events, whereby they are first dealt with by security who later determines what other institutions may get involved and what exactly their roles should be. When security dealt poorly with the crisis, this quickly revealed its complexity and it snowballed because all the other parties were waiting for a signal from security to either intervene or not. None of these institutions realised that circumstances have changed and that there is a real transformation taking place in the contexts surrounding events such as those that took place at Mar Girgis. This transformation includes two extremely important aspects: first, an opening up of the media and its penetration into all places and events around the world. There is no longer an opportunity to conceal or beautify events, or to show them in a false light. Second, the monitoring of everything related to minorities in the Arab and Islamic worlds by domestic and international actors. While these forces sometimes turn a blind eye or even participate themselves in heinous crimes against Muslim minorities, the point is that any trivial event involving a religious, ideological or ethnic minority within an Arab or Muslim state is closely followed by the Western world and particularly the major powers. At the head of these is the United States, followed by its allies and international organisations such as the United Nations, which in turn, is dominated by the major powers. In such an environment, all the parties concerned with the church crisis should have altered their management of the crisis. They should have changed their mode of thinking to combine the dynamic and the innovative with calm and good sense, and not left the matter to ignorance and underestimation. They should not have waited for a decision from the security agencies, not rushed into barbarous political and media confrontation with its possibly far-reaching ramifications. The church that Muslim citizens demonstrated in front of should have opened its doors to a delegation representing the protesters. It should have held a calm dialogue with them to end the demonstration and eventually reveal the source of the problem and agree on a way to solve it or even apologise for it. At the same time, Al-Azhar and the mother church should have formed a joint committee comprising trusted Muslim scholars and Christian priests to examine the presentation, held on CD, that was the source of tension. This committee should have decisively determined whether the presentation defamed Islam as the demonstrators believed, or as they were told, or was merely an artistic performance that criticises a small sector or a specific case without making generalisations. There is no doubt that a prompt and decisive report from this committee would have been enough to calm the crisis. Another response that may have contributed significantly towards dispersing the explosive anger would have been to show the controversial play, either at the church itself or on a wide screen before the fuming masses, so that they could evaluate the situation and determine the extent and purport of defamation of Islam and Muslims, if that was indeed the case, or reveal the falseness of the accusations made against the church and Christians. In either case, the development of the crisis would not have gone beyond a public apology from one side to another; an apology that would not have insulted the apologising party, but would have upheld the honour of the religion and the sanctity of the conviction of those apologised to. * The writer is a political analyst.
