Ayman El-Amir* plots the rise of a resurgent Russia Since the downfall of the former Soviet Union 15 years ago Russia has been suspended in the stratosphere of international relations between two historical stages of global power, that of imperial Russia and of the former Soviet Union. The first was eroded by war, attrition and revolution while the second imploded after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that symbol of Soviet-era domination. During a long soul-searching retreat the vacuum left by the former Soviet Union was filled by the other competing super-power, the United States. Meanwhile, the one-time ally of the former Soviet Union, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, slipped into oblivion. Former Soviet Republics and East European satellite states moved towards Western liberal democracy, helped by US goading. The global theatre seemed to have a new show. But by the end of the 20th century the world had grown too complex for a single actor and a self-styled new world order based on hegemony. Fears of the consequences of single super- power dominance were confirmed by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the confrontation with Iran, Syria and North Korea, the free hand granted to Israel to suppress the Palestinians, and withdrawal from the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court and agreements to curb nuclear proliferation. It is against this background that Russian President Vladimir Putin's state-of- the-nation address delivered last week should be viewed. The message is not only that a unipolar world has become too dangerous but if China and India are now flexing their foreign policy muscles then it is time for Russia to reclaim its place on the international stage. In reviewing the international security situation, President Putin remarked that "the key issues of disarmament have practically been removed from the global agenda against the backdrop of the threat of international terrorism." He outlined the gap in defence spending between Russia and key Western powers, saying that Russia's spending, in absolute figures, was half as much as that of the United Kingdom or France. In 2005 US spending was 25 times higher than Russia's ($447 billion for the US against $20 billion for Russia, while China is spending close to $30 billion this year). He noted that Russia had no guarantees that weapons, including nuclear weapons, would not be deployed in outer space -- something US administrations had pledged not to pursue since the Reagan-era Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), better known as Star Wars. The present Bush administration has signaled that it is now interested in the system again. Putin's response was that Russia would increase defence spending, modernise its strategic nuclear forces in the next five years and commission two new strategic nuclear submarines that would be armed with nuclear missiles this year -- the first such commission since 1990. The arms race, both nuclear and conventional, is back. Putin's strategy may be a much-delayed response to President George W Bush's National Security Strategy outlined in a defining paper released in October 2002. The Bush doctrine, coming a year after the 11 September terrorist attacks, focused attention on terrorism and the launching of pre-emptive strikes against "countries that are suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction which could be perceived as a threat to the US". But it sweepingly defined US interests, stating that "the US will not allow the military supremacy it has maintained since the collapse of the former Soviet Union to be equaled or surpassed." That was a strong signal to a much weakened Russia and a rising China. Russia has been groping its way back to global power since it recovered from the 1998 financial crisis in which it defaulted on its foreign debt obligations and tipped international markets into a downward spin. A year later, in December 1999, Vladimir Putin was elected president, replacing Boris Yeltsin who lurched out of office after dismantling the former Soviet Union. The old nationalist sentiments of imperial Russia combined with nostalgia for the influence exercised by the former Soviet Union to forge a new set of aspirations which Putin and his policies came to embody. But the world of the 20th century had changed irrevocably. It was not until the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the US and UK that Russian strategic interests in the Middle East were seriously threatened. Not only was the former Soviet Union fragmented and many of its republics lured into Western political and economic institutions, but the warm waters of the Mediterranean became forbidding, and former allies along its coastline and beyond estranged. The US became the dominant power in the Middle East, with unprecedented hegemony over politics, oil resources, intelligence and military facilities. But while the invasion of Iraq and its consequences excluded a Russian role, the dispute over Iran's nuclear activities did not. Historical relations and strategic interests between the two neighbouring countries, including Russia's commitment to building two nuclear reactors in Iran, give it a central role in the running dispute. Besides, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power that it will play to strengthen its alliances, defend its interests and build new ones as do the other four permanent members. As a key player in the Middle East problem, sidelined by the US after the Camp David agreements, Russia has won accolades within the Hamas-led Palestinian government when it offered $10 million in emergency assistance just as the US and its Western allies were trying to strangle it. As a member of the Middle East Quartet Russia is playing a moderating role to counterbalance the unqualified support the US lends Israel. In recent months Russia has twice welcomed Palestinian leaders to Moscow; first the leaders of the Hamas government led by Prime Minister Ismail Hanyya, and then Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. In rebuilding its position in the international arena Russia will no longer rely on the discredited ideological affinities that were the hallmark of the former Soviet Union. The 21st century world is built on shifting loyalties and loose alliances and, above all, economic interests. As a major oil and gas producer with enormous reserves, estimated at 60 billion barrels of oil and 1,680 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to 2006 figures, Russia is poised to strike many alliances in an energy- hungry world. It can play the role of a trusted political mediator in major world crises. But it also has a significant overlap of interests with the US and the Western alliance. Russia is still seeking membership of the World Trade Organisation and has a common interest in fighting terrorism which, because of the conflict in Chechnya, is making the country vulnerable. In addition Russia is still a significant player in the international arms market, with annual exports estimated at $5 billion. With its new-found confidence and wealth Russia is re-emerging on the international political scene as a re-energised power that can make a difference. And its new role is being reinforced by an unlikely ally, strengthened by the debacle-strewn policies of the Bush administration. * The writer is former corespondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC, and ex-director of the United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
