Ahead of a new National Dialogue session, Hizbullah supporters riot in Beirut, illustrating again how sect penetrates politics in today's Lebanon, Serene Assir writes In anticipation of the scheduled National Dialogue session set for Wednesday, Lebanon witnessed another week of division among camps. Kick-starting a week filled with expressions of mutual distrust were spontaneous protests -- some of them violent -- in Beirut by thousands of Hizbullah supporters who took to the streets to protest against a spoof of Hizbullah leader, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, on a popular television programme that has regularly mocked other political leaders. On Monday, Nasrallah called on supporters to go home. Throughout the week, he has been keen to underline that the protest response to the skit was by no means centrally planned. "If we had called for it, there would have been much a larger number of people on the streets," he told journalists attending a press conference. Debate over the issue has been hot throughout the week. To many in the predominantly Sunni Muslim and Christian anti- Syrian camp, the action taken by Hizbullah supporters appears indicative of the existence of a profound divide separating the way in which the respective camps approach politics. Reactions to the protest, which was much regreted even amongst the intelligentsia of the pro-Syrian camp, ranged from mildly critical to outright angry. On one anti-Syrian website, Ya Libnan, to which Lebanese youth regularly contribute, one writer asked, "can I hope to ever share a country [with the rioters]?" Others have sharply criticised the policy of zero-tolerance demonstrated by the protesters. Observers have been keen to highlight that, in contrast with the rest of the Arab world, Lebanon has historically enjoyed a high degree of free expression. Despite constraints placed on Lebanese political life in other respects, it is indeed true that the Lebanese have historically enjoyed the freedom to talk about, joke over, mock and discuss their leaders without the slightest degree of self-constraint. Through the week, the anti-Syrian camp has criticised Hizbullah's supporters for rioting, and Nasrallah for failing to rein them on time. Indeed, although Hizbullah dispatched prominent members -- including members of parliament -- to go down to the street during the protests to try and calm the mood, riots ultimately endured until Nasrallah issued final statements of his own. Rather than assigning a characterisation of demagogy by sect to Nasrallah alone, perhaps these riots illustrate better the often-latent though absolute dedication of diverse political cadres to their leaders. Perhaps other groups would have refrained from rioting over the same reasons, but each sect employs its own methods and displays hypersensitivity over varying points. For Hizbullah supporters, criticism of Nasrallah is tantamount to attacking the entire Shia sect, let alone Hizbullah as a political party. It is no less the case that Druze supporters of Walid Jumblatt MP will shift from one political paradigm to another, always keeping time with the leader's political movements. In Lebanon, despite freedom of speech and association, loyalty to sect remains paramount. Consequently, the place of sectarian leaders -- and without doubt, Nasrallah is that for many Lebanese Shias -- is elevated beyond the normal position afforded to political figures. Perhaps those in the anti-Syrian camp calling for the liberation of the Shias from the stronghold of Hizbullah should reflect again on their own sectarian record. A look at the history of Hizbullah and other political movements representing the Lebanese Shias reveals that their emergence as a force dates to the late 1970s. What put the Shias on the political map was their leadership of the anti-Israeli resistance. Nonetheless, and despite the fact that the sect has now grown to constitute a majority in Lebanon, there is still much poverty and exclusion from the mainstream suffered by the Shias. A good number has risen in the ranks of society and has acquired power -- financial, educational or political. Yet other sects -- particularly within the anti-Syrian camp -- easily used the latest riots to mock Hizbullah supporters once again, reviving an age-old stigma. Meanwhile, it is imperative, as the National Dialogue moves into discussing the key issue of the prospective disarming of Hizbullah -- which UN Security Council Resolution 1559 demands -- that both Lebanese politicians and the population alike show commitment to debating the questions at hand, rather than engaging in secret or sectarian political discourse. As far as Hizbullah is concerned, statements issued this week reiterated a long- standing refusal to integrate its armed militia into the Lebanese Army, citing its concern for security in the South. On the eve of the resumption of talks, it appeared that the session would turn, yet again, into mere formality ratifying ready-made and inconclusive decisions.
