Tension between the executive and the judiciary is only an indication of the lines of fragmentation that characterise state and society in Egypt, writes Khalil El-Anani* The so-called "judges crisis" has exposed how frail the relationship is between the branches of power in Egypt. In fact, the situation would never have reached such critical proportions had each side not felt the need to establish superiority over the other. Moreover, the estrangement -- as opposed to separation -- between the executive and judiciary remains so acrimonious as to suggest that the crisis will loom again. Naturally, there will always be those parties that feed on crisis and try to turn circumstance to their own ends. However, the crux of the dilemma resides in the executive's determination to control all the strings and to prevent other political forces from exercising their fundamental right to take part in the development of the Egyptian system of government. Certainly, a system of government that does not permit for intermediaries between the state and the people in the form of political parties, pressure groups and NGOs cannot be regarded as dynamic and effective. Which, in turn, leads to the conclusion that something is terribly amiss with how Egypt's executive authorities understand the nature of their role and their powers, not only with respect to the judiciary but also with respect to all other political forces and to the country's intellectual circles. All the more worrisome is the fact that the executive's attitude is entirely inconsistent with the climate of openness and invigoration that had prevailed for several months and threatens to propel society back to the political stagnation and aridity of the pre-2005 period. The government's violent repression of demonstrations, attended by only a few dozen citizens, and its random arrest of hundreds of alleged political activists are not signs of strength. On the contrary, they suggest that authorities are panicking and unable to cope. Executive authorities handled the judges as though they were a political party pressing ideological demands rather than defenders of inalienable rights enshrined in the constitution. The approach is one guaranteed to create more troubles for the government than it will solve. That this comes on top of the government's failure to deal effectively with other crises that have surfaced earlier this year has only worked to augment public discontent and to raise further doubts concerning the government's competence at crisis management. The tensions prevailing between the three branches of government, and between the executive and judiciary in particular, could be a healthy phenomenon if constitutional provisions and principles were intact and respected. Sadly, as things stand, the tensions reflect a considerable degree of obstinacy and inflexibility over the question of structuring that relationship and ensuring the existence of its most essential conditions, notably the autonomy of the judiciary and clear lines of separation between its jurisdiction and that of the executive. Further aggravating the situation were the attempts on the part of agencies in the executive to subvert the judiciary by co-opting some of its members. Against this backdrop, there were sharp clashes of opinion between those who supported the judges' drive to press for judicial autonomy and those who opposed the judges' involvement in public affairs and maintained that the members of the judiciary should stay clear of the flashpoints between the regime and other players on the political scene. No one doubts anymore that Egypt is in the midst of a period of political and social turmoil. The spate of recent disasters -- from the sinking of the Egyptian ferry three months ago and its owner's flight abroad, the Wafd Party scandal, the sectarian violence in Alexandria, the Sinai bombings and the judges' sit-in -- are all indicative of the scale of the turmoil and the extent of its ramifications both in terms of the relationship between state and society and in terms of the state's ability to regulate tensions between its various institutions of government and the organs of society. Egypt, in short, as at the threshold of a new phase in its political history: we are standing at a juncture in which vying interests intersect within the framework of the "conflict" over the "legacy" of the state. The parties to this struggle are many, as are their methods, motives and means of impact. If its focus is the nature of the political hierarchy, it embraces a broad array of social, economic and cultural issues. It is further fed by a dynamic that propels towards increasing polarisation and agitation, which, in turn, has generated lines of confrontation that intersect horizontally and vertically to form the weft and warp of a complex crisis that encompasses both state and society and that must be resolved soon before it erupts and engulfs us all. Another feature of this struggle is unfolding within the power structure itself and among its elites. It is a fight over the future, as opposed to for the future, and the question of hereditary succession -- a notion that has emerged from backroom whispers and speculation to public controversy -- is at its core. Even discarding the extremes on this issue -- which range from the fear that inheritance is just around the corner to total denial -- there is no doubt that the country is at a crossroads, one path from which threatens to turn the clock back on the relative political openness we have seen during the past few months and the new and exciting expectations this has generated in society. This particular facet of the power struggle could never had arisen had we had a stronger culture of institutionalised government and had there been clearer and more stringent constitutional provisions for the smooth and incontestable rotation of authority. The travesty that has been made of the amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution is but further evidence of the paucity of the imagination of Egyptian legislators in this regard. Like stagnant water into which a stone has been tossed, the succession controversy has generated subsidiary eddies, all revolving around circles of financial and political influence. Its participants are those scrambling to keep pace with this phase of "formation" through which the Egyptian political system is passing, mostly by investing in the remnants of the public sector, which is regarded as the express elevator up the political ladder. It is little wonder that "big" businessmen, although the smallest sector of society, are the luminaries of the current phase and the levers of the new legitimacy. This phenomenon also helps explain why the new government has been so slow to fulfill the "generous" promises that were made on the eve of the presidential elections; they were the most the government could offer in spite of the fact that they met only the minimum expectations of a vast segment of the Egyptian people. A deeper and more vicious arena of the current turmoil is the struggle over social leadership. The primary players here are the new comprador elite represented by reformists in the ruling party and in various branches of government, and the Muslim Brotherhood in its new guise after having broken the hold of the old elite over the Egyptian parliament. Coming in a distant third is the civil society sector, which is seething but too fragmented to mobilise constructively. All these parties are searching for a grassroots source of legitimacy to brandish in the face of their rivals and all are scrambling to monopolise the right to speak on behalf of the people. The new elite boasts a monopoly over the conventional tools of power, notably the government apparatus and agencies of the executive branch which still form the nerve centre of the Egyptian state. In addition, in spite of all the talk of privatisation and decentralisation, the new elite also sets great store in the cumulative legacy of awe and veneration for "the government" and its unlimited powers to provide and prohibit. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, boasts grassroots legitimacy and flaunts the recent parliamentary election results as evidence. They also claim to have won this legitimacy on the basis of their ability to fill the "brutal" vacuum created by the government's abandonment of its fundamental duties towards society. This, among other things, suggests that the Brotherhood is not presenting itself as a rival political party but as an alternative to the state and aspires to supplant the existing governmental administrative structure with its own. Civil society, meanwhile, is desperately trying to establish its credentials as the bearers of the "DNA" of democratisation and, hence, the agency best equipped to steer the process of modernisation and social enlightenment. Perhaps, what the Egyptian government and people need most at this juncture is to take pause to rediscover their common legacy, with an eye to formulating a more rational and balanced relationship between state and society. Then, perhaps, we will be able to transcend the present impasse and proceed towards a brighter and clearer future. * The writer is a political analyst with Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya magazine published by Al-Ahram.
