's recent journey abroad for medical treatment has focussed attention on his likely successors, writes Sameh Fawzi is due back in Cairo on 9 July, following a trip for medical treatment that took him first to Germany then the US. The pope went abroad four days after suffering from severe exhaustion that left him unable to finish his Wednesday sermon, the weekly appearance that brings him in touch with his congregation. Following a full medical check-up in Germany it transpired that was suffering from kidney problems and anaemia and was unfit to undergo surgery. He was advised to go to Cleveland Hospital in the US, where he received intensive treatment during which his health improved sufficiently that he decided to leave hospital and return to Cairo on 9 July in time to celebrate the anniversary of his taking monastic orders. For several reasons, the media treated 's trip as his last. Many started talking about change in the church and the developments that may take place after the pope passes away and the qualifications needed in any successor. One of the reasons for such speculation is the interest the political leadership took in the health of . President Hosni Mubarak called three times to ask about his health, and sent embassy officials in both Germany and the US to see him. Meanwhile, a large number of senior Coptic bishops travelled -- in small groups -- to visit the pope. It was said the visits by clerics were undertaken upon the request of himself, who, fearing he didn't have long to live, was keen to leave the church house in order. Many Copts felt uncomfortable about the media spotlight on change within the church, considering it an intrusion into the pope's life and a sign of the wish to meddle in clerical affairs. It was an emotional response, and one that ignores the fact that the pope is not a private citizen but a public figure of considerable stature. The pope is not a man of religion in the sense commonly understood in the Arab world. His role is larger than that, for he has turned into a representative of the Copts, speaking for them, negotiating with the state on their behalf, and defining their political and social options. Any process of change that is anticipated will take place in an unusually strained climate, tense because of a number of interacting factors, some having to do with the state and political forces, others with the status of Copts and their church and with the rise of the influence of expatriate Copts. None of these factors existed when succeeded Pope Kyrollos in November 1971, at least not in the way they are currently being manifested. The state, through its agencies and institutions, has become more involved with Coptic issues than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. The clash between President Anwar El-Sadat and in the 1970s, and the coolness in the relationship between the pope and President Mubarak, which lasted for years, suggests that the regime will endeavour to influence the selection of whoever inherits the influential political status of . In recent years the Coptic issue has ceased to be a purely domestic affair, taking on international dimensions, not least within the context of Egyptian-US relations. The state is no longer just depending on the Coptic pope to consolidate the Egyptian role in Africa, as was the case in the 1960s. Church affairs have come to affect the status of the regime itself, and the shape of its rapport with the superpower that now holds sway over the Middle East. As political change becomes the key issue on the Egyptian scene, changes in the leadership of the Copts acquires greater relevance than at anytime before. In the aftermath of the July 1952 Revolution the change in political leadership preceded a change in the religious leadership of the Copts. Pope Kyrollos VI took over the patriarchate in 1959, at a time when President Gamal Abdel-Nasser was at the Zenith of his power. And III assumed the papacy in November 1971, after President Sadat had secured his hold on power in May of the same year. In both cases the new pope had to deal with an existing political situation. This time, however, there is a possibility that a change in clerical leadership will occur before a change in political leadership, which means that the "potential" political leadership will have to move fast if it is to have any sway in Coptic affairs. The process may offer insights into the course of political development in the country, though the opposite is also true, since the choice of the coming pope will determine to a great extent the nature of the role he plays in the political change. The new pope is unlikely to be without political preferences. He could follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, or choose an entirely new path. The Coptic situation is complex. The Coptic synod, which will name the candidates to the post, is made up of over 100 members, most of them from the younger generation, and differences in interests and preferences among them will surely come to the fore. is an example a charismatic leader. Many say he will be hard to replace, and no one will be able to fill the vacuum he leaves behind. The Coptic Church now has branches in Latin and North America, Europe and Africa. It is no longer a local organisation but a global one. And yet this transformation has not been accompanied with any real change in the institutional structure of the church. When confronted with major issues the church tends to react in a conventional Orthodox way, with a mindset that may be helpful in running an Orthodox monastery but which sometimes lacks a broader vision. At some point the Coptic Church will have to address the issue of building a modern clerical institution that can interact with the changing realities of Egyptian life. The process of rebuilding the institution, putting its house in order, and reconsidering its shape, will become even more urgent following the disappearance of a charismatic leader. It is a situation similar to what is happening in the Vatican following the death of Pope John Paul II. The church synod will not remain insulated from outside voices that emanate from two basic groups -- businessmen and middle class professionals. The overwhelming majority of these two groups seek change in line with the reformist ideas of the National Democratic Party Policies Committee. The businessmen support such change because of their economic interests, whereas the middle class fears the Islamic project. Political and sectarian considerations now overlap in manner more complex and interdependent than at anytime before. Expatriate Copts will participate in the selection of the next pope through their churches and parishes. But the activists among them may engage in lobbying to promote their views regarding the administration of Coptic issues. Because expatriates are divided in an unprecedented manner, no clear options may emerge. It is well- known that Coptic expatriates have only recently become vocal. Expatriate activists cannot bypass the church, though some have harsh words to say about it. But for most expatriates, remains a true shepherd who stood up to the political leadership and refused to compromise. managed -- deftly -- to benefit from expatriate activities and use them to promote Coptic interests at home. At times he opposed the state, at others he reined in the expatriates so as to help the government in its difficult relations with the US. The question is: can the future pope walk the same thin line between the needs of Copts at home and those abroad? The Islamic current -- in its various forms -- is relevant to the debate. The Islamic current definitely wants a clerical leadership that maintains 's policy in national and pan-Arab affairs, especially the Palestinian issue. The Islamic current, however, doesn't want to have a clerical leadership that opposes or challenges the Islamic project. In brief, Islamists want a leadership that doesn't place obstacles in their way. Naturally, they have no real say in the matter, which will be handled by the church and the state, but they do have ways of complicating this phase of clerical change. Here, again, the change of clerical leadership could react as a dress rehearsal for more widespread patterns of change. Existing church bylaws, written in 1957, define the way the pope is elected. When assumed the papacy he promised to change these bylaws, but 25 years later said the task would best be left to his successor. According to the bylaws the eldest bishop -- currently Anba Mikhail of Assiut -- presides over the first meeting of patriarchs and bishops to choose a chief of staff, who remains in his post until the new pope is elected. The bylaws confine the selection panel to bishops, prominent laymen from the parishes as well as some public figures, including current and former ministers, members of parliament, and journalists. Any nominee to the papacy -- whether a bishop, a patriarch, or a priest -- must be a monk, with at least 15 years of service in the monastic order. He must also be over 40 years of age. In theory, any priest from any parish may stand for the post. But on the two last occasions, both in 1959 and 1971, the man elected to the papacy was either a monk (Abbot Mina Al-Baramusi, who assumed the name of Pope Kyrollos VI) or a bishop without a parish (Anba Shenouda had been the bishop in charge of education). There are some Copts who question the eligibility of a diocesan bishop for the post, arguing that such bishops are already ordained for particular congregations. The members of the church synod agree now that a diocesan bishop cannot be named for the post. Only bishops without a diocese can become pope. Following the elections, the names of the three candidates with the most votes are placed on the altar and a child picks one up. Whoever is chosen becomes the next Coptic pope. Several names are being put forward for nomination. They include Anba Yoannis, 46, born and raised in Mallawi in Minya Governorate. After graduating from the Medical College at Assiut University, he joined the monastic order at Saint Paul Monastery in 1986. employed him as a secretary in the early 1990s, and in 1993 Yoannis was ordained a general bishop. Since then he has served as private secretary to and performed other tasks, including supervising the Bishopric of Public and Social Services, a body concerned with development issues and social care. In recent years he has been in charge of liaisons with various government bodies. He has written a number of ecclesiastical works including a commentary on the Bible. He also represents the Coptic Church at the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches. Anba Moussa, in his early 70s, is currently the bishop with special care for the young. He graduated from the Medical College at Assiut University then served in Beni Sweif under Anba Athnasius. In the late 1970s Bishop Athanasius wanted to make him assistant bishop, but in 1980 appointed him bishop of youth, a new post in which Anba Moussa revolutionised services provided to the young. He has written dozens of books on ecclesiastical and national matters. Anba Makarios, now in his early 50s, is currently the assistant general bishop in Minya Governorate. He joined the monastic order at Anba Samuel Monastery in Maghagha, then moved on to Baramus Monastery in Wadi Al-Natrun. He served as secretary to for several years, before assuming his current post in 2004. He has several written books, including a critique of Jewish theology. Other names being discussed are Anba Serabion, who became services bishop in 1986 and in 1996 the bishop of Los Angeles, and Anba Bishawi, 46, secretary of the Synod and bishop of Damietta and Kafr Al-Sheikh. Bishawi became a bishop at the age of 30. He used to be a teaching assistant in the Engineering College at Alexandria University before joining the Al-Sourian Monastery in Wadi Al-Natrun. Bishawi is currently in charge of several important dossiers, including ecumenical relations and clerical colleges. He has written extensively on ecclesiastical and spiritual matters.
