It was the US historian and diplomat George Kennan who coined the term “Cold War” to describe the turn that US-Soviet relations took following their alliance and cooperation during World War II. It was “cold” because a “hot” war was no longer possible between the two superpowers that possessed more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy the entire planet. But it was not that cold when it came to various areas of political, diplomatic and ideological influence in international forums. Not did either of the superpowers object to turning up the heat through proxy wars in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Although the term “Cold War” only came into currency in the post-World War II era, something similar existed in the 1930s in the form of the protectionist trade wars that industrialised nations waged against each other using tariffs and other such instruments to bar or reduce goods and imports from other countries. That type of mercantilistic “Cold War” was one of the major causes of World War II. The phenomenon would be brought to an end with the creation of the UN and, more importantly, such international institutions as the IMF, World Bank and ECOSOC which sought to realise economic stability in the global market. A whole new world of ideas, ideals and even drives towards cultural, civilisation and interfaith coexistence emerged in the process. Or, at least, that was the aim of the international community regardless of how successful its members were at realising the liberal ideals and principles which had formed the underpinnings of post-WWII international conventions and treaties. Even in their disputes with capitalist states, socialist states appealed to “people's democracies” in order to justify the application of their ideas. In other words, the path towards equality and recognition of the other was the prevailing rule. When “globalism” was universalised as a consequence of the collapse of economic, technological and ideological walls and barriers between nations, the international compass was set towards “freedom” in the marketplace, opinions and beliefs, and basic human rights. This gave rise to a number of corollaries such as humanitarian intervention, democratic transformation, universal human rights, the International Criminal Court and the World Trade Organisation. With the fall of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, that entire world of ideas and ideals teetered. This, combined with the rise of the “clash of civilisations” hypothesis, precipitated a huge gap between a world that had already changed towards coexistence and the free movement between nations of goods, ideas and peoples, and another world gripped by fear and suspicion of the other. In a strong sense, the world became caught in a harsh contradiction between the economic and technological mechanisms pushing for closer contact, communication and interaction between peoples and a spreading revulsion and antagonism towards the cultural and civilisational outputs of these mechanisms. Long ago, in the 19th century, Karl Marx held that the contradiction between developments in the forces of production and the current nature of the relationships of production will generate conflict of one sort or another. If, to Marx, the conflict was inevitably a class conflict, in the context of today's world, it is a cultural and ethical conflict with the “other”, even if that “other” happens to be a next door neighbour. Up to the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the values opposed to globalisation rested on cultural and civilisational premises, many of which set the Islamic world against the rest of the world. In the Islamic world, “hot wars” spread from Afghanistan into the Arab region after the so-called Arab Spring. As the second decade of this century continued, the problem no longer concerned this region alone. Warfare, in varying temperatures from hot to cold, spread into Ukraine and to other parts of the world where old conflicts were rekindled and new ones were ignited. The turning point came with the British exit from the EU which had stood as a proud fruit of globalisation, political engineering and international economic integration. After Brexit there came a surge of other populist and isolationist waves. If they gained majorities in parliaments in Hungary, Poland and Greece, they failed in France, Germany and Holland. But even in these latter countries they scored strong presences in parliament and in the streets and they cannot be ignored in the formulation of economic and sociopolitical policies, especially as regards immigration. What is new is that the US, which had spearheaded the globalisation process and once presented itself to the world as the model of the globalised nation that opened its arms to immigrants and downtrodden minorities from around the world, now leads the movement away from the global order and towards the creation of isolationist walls wherever possible. President Donald Trump swept into the world of US politics armed with a bunch of ideas about “America first” and “making America great again”. At the time, he also felt that a US-Russian partnership would serve the interests of both countries and the rest of the world as well. His negative feelings were focused on the Third World and on immigrant communities in the US from Latin America. Now he is setting the groundwork for policies that augur in a new Cold War. For starters, he imposed economic sanctions on Russia for having assassinated a former British spy, leading London to expel some Russian diplomats to which Moscow responded in kind. Trump moved to support Britain and, at the same time, he appears to have changed his mind about Russia and Putin on a number of issues. At another level, Trump has initiated a series of executive orders to impose tariffs of 25 per cent on imported steel and 10 per cent on imported aluminium. This is aimed at the whole world. He singled China out for a 45 per cent tariff on imports. These moves were accompanied by a cabinet reshuffle. As concerns foreign policy, Trump fired Rex Tillerson as secretary of state and H R McMaster as national security advisor and nominated Mike Pompeo and John Bolton to replace them. Neither Tillerson nor McMaster could ever be said to be doves, but they do not hold a candle to Pompeo and Bolton's hawkishness on such questions as Iran, Russia and China. These changes in US policy are only the beginning. They are certain to be followed by reactions and repercussions in Europe and elsewhere. Perhaps they will usher in a multi-dimensional Cold War with both strategic and economic outcomes. As for us in the Arab world, every change in the international sphere presents opportunities and risks. We need to seize the opportunities when they appear and avoid or minimise the risks. In all cases, unity and solidarity is our key to survival in this stormy world. The writer is chairman of the board, CEO and director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.
