Turkey has taken the opposite course to that of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on the Qatari crisis since it erupted 5 June 2017. It has flown in food for the Qatari people in order to alleviate the impact of the economic sanctions that the four countries have imposed on Qatar and that precipitated an 85 per cent drop in Qatari imports in the first week of the embargo. Ankara has also opened Turkish airports to Qatar Airways and, more significantly, the Turkish parliament approved a bill to send some 3,000 soldiers to Qatar to help support and protect the Qatari regime against any possible coup attempts. The troops are to be based in the Turkish military base in Qatar the construction of which will be completed in 2018. Ankara has pursued policies that have supported and promoted terrorism in the region for years. These policies are part of a larger project of engineering regional change through the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood in the countries of the Arab Spring and elsewhere in the Arab region. Qatar is its partner in this project. Nevertheless, the Gulf countries have retained strong economic and diplomatic relations with Ankara. For example, Saudi companies have some $6 million invested in 960 companies in Turkey, as of February 2017. About 250,000 Saudi tourists visited Turkey in 2016. Turkish exports to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar come to $33 billion. In addition, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have been strengthening their military relations with Turkey in its capacity as a member of the “Sunni axis” that seeks to contain the Iranian-led “Shia axis”. This is why Riyadh was keen to bring Turkey aboard the Arab coalition that was formed to combat the Houthi coup in Yemen. In addition, Turkey, in its capacity as a member of the Islamic coalition that was formed in late 2015, participated in the military manoeuvres that were staged in northern Saudi Arabia in February 2016. None of this has prevented Turkey from maintaining good relations with Iran, especially in the economic domain. In light of the foregoing, one is particularly struck by two phenomena. Firstly, the Gulf countries have made no moves whatsoever to pressure Turkey to change its pro-Qatari stance, even though they have the leverage to do so, especially in the realms of tourism and investment. Secondly, the Gulf countries have made no mention of Turkey's support for terrorism. All the charges raised in the official statements from the foreign ministries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE concerning Qatar's support for terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State group, Al-Nusra Front and the Muslim Brotherhood apply just as much to Turkey. Ankara, like Qatar, opened its arms to host Muslim Brotherhood members from Egypt and other Arab countries. Ankara's policies toward Egypt are every bit as hostile as Qatar's. Moreover, Turkey has failed to pursue resolute policies to curb the movement of Islamic State group operatives across the Turkish-Syrian border. The Turkish response to the Qatari crisis confirms that Doha is a major Turkish ally in the Gulf and that the two sides share similar outlooks and strategies for the future of this region. It simultaneously drives home the point that it will be impossible to dissuade Qatar from its current policies as long as it has regional backing, primarily from Turkey which furnishes the necessary support to alleviate and counter the diplomatic and economic measures taken by the Gulf countries. In this regard, Ankara is collaborating with the US and Europe that also see it necessary to alleviate the effects of the embargo implemented by Riyadh, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt in early June.
