Galal Amin speaks to Aziza Sami about Egypt and the Egyptians, how they are and where they are heading A spiral of events conspired to make the year 2006 appear a landmark one. The reverberations of the government's democratic reforms continued, as did the social and economic repercussions of new privatisations and continuing unemployment. The spotlight was shed by the Egyptian media, for the first time, on graphic stories of violence inflicted against street children, as well as labour strikes and harrowing tales of the alleged harassment of women in downtown Cairo. The outcome was a mosaic of dramatic events, some of them seemingly unprecedented. Author and professor of economics at the American University in Cairo Galal Amin, whose works include a two-part series entitled Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly of his vision of Egypt's present, and its future. Looking at the past year, how do you assess the Egyptian state's ability to draw up policies and meet challenges? When I think of this matter, I find myself referring to Gamal Himdan, (geologist, and author of the seminal work, Shakhsiyat Misr (The Character of Egypt) . Himdan often quoted Napoleon's axiom that "in no country in the world is a powerful state necessary as it is in Egypt." I strongly believe that when the Egyptian state weakens, all else collapses. This having been said, over the past 20 years, the state in Egypt has weakened to an alarming degree. It is withdrawing and very candidly relinquishing its role in the sectors of education, health, and, even, social matters. Government-affiliated members of parliament, in addressing the recent "incidents" related to street gangs which killed tens of children, very simply lay the blame on civil society organisations. Their attitude was as if such incidents are not the outcome of social and economic conditions for which the state is primarily responsible, and which it must tend to. It is as if this is not a question the state needs to concern itself with. How do you explain this apparent relinquishing of functions by a state which historically has been highly centralised and controlling? Globalisation has been one obvious factor. There is now a much greater movement of commodities and ideas. The media has practically broken down all boundaries. There are also other elements specific to Egypt. One has been the adoption of the World Bank and IMF's structural adjustment programmes in the early 1990s. The state ever since has been lifting its hand and withdrawing from several economic sectors. Also, if you will allow me to be frank, a major political factor has been the United States' deliberate policy of weakening the Egyptian state on the regional and domestic levels. This is being done in the context of Egypt's prescribed role as a major partner in peace with Israel. Add to this the fact that ever since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the latter has adopted an ongoing and deliberate approach of humiliating and intimidating the Egyptian regime. Hence, the repeated public allegations that Egyptians had planned for, and participated in, the attacks on the World Trade Center. UNDP reports came out as well, concluding that the Arab world lacks in democracy and does not adequately uphold women's rights. The Egyptian regime had meanwhile become almost totally dependent on the United States, not only in the economic domain, but for guaranteeing its survival and security. This was all the more pressing due to the regime's lack of popularity among its own domestic constituency. The regime knows quite well that it cannot afford to lose the US protection. These factors, combined, have weakened the Egyptian state. The year 2006, saw several developments, amongst which was the increasing visibility of the Muslim Brotherhood. Is this a problem for the political regime? If the regime had not wanted the Muslim Brotherhood to be where they are today, it would not have allowed them to get there. The apparently increasing strength of the Brotherhood is because they have been allowed to play on the field. It is very easy to put them back into their holes. The regime is actually not at all comfortable with the current situation, and has not resorted to even 10 per cent of what it can do by way of "security" measures. Given what it can do, the regime has been quite mild in dealing with the Brotherhood, as it has been with the students and workers. It is practising restraint in my view, because of US pressures. This is not to say that the Americans are very concerned about democracy. The latter is a catch-word by which the US is intimidating the regime. If the government remains frightened, it will not adopt confrontational stances on regional matters related to Israel, including what Israel is doing in Lebanon for instance. Nor, for that matter, can the Egyptian government take much of a position on its own internal economic matters related to liberalisation, etc. The game or ploy of democracy has become the surest way of weakening the regime and getting whatever the US wants out of it. Religious manifestations have increased within society. How do you account for this? The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood have surfaced and become more visible in the media and elsewhere might have given some encouragement to this trend. But there are also the economic difficulties that are driving people crazy. For the Egyptian, with his or her background, upbringing, and mentality, religion is a very handy solution. I would attach more importance to the economic factor in accounting for this "religiosity". The factors constituting economic and social pressure, such as unemployment, have been incremental and are expected to increase rather than diminish. Seen within this context, religiosity is actually the other side of the coin of various manifestations that have emerged, and are a reaction to social-economic conditions. These include the harassment of girls in downtown Cairo and proliferation of street gangs. When under stress, one person will resort to religion, and the other to violence. Do you see the adoption of religion as an ideal in politics as eroding the principles of secularism and civil society upheld by Egypt's political establishment for the past 100 years? Yes of course, this can happen. Let me qualify this by saying that the values of secularism and civil society pertained to Egypt's old middle class, which was very prominent before the 1952 Revolution. This class survived Nasser's regime, but began to weaken under Sadat. In the past 20 years, it has become even weaker. Its values are certainly being eroded as a result of all this. We see parallel to this, the invasion of a new, rising middle class with a totally different upbringing, and, probably, a very shallow education. You see them in the media and in politics. Many of them made their money by ways which contrast very strongly with those of the old middle class. The latter's primary vehicle for advancement was education. There is as a result, a totally different outlook on things. You need only look at the satellite channels to see how they cater to the "culture" of the new middle class. You see the religious programmes of a supposedly high "spirituality" and, at the same time, music channels that are often quite explicitly sexual. Can Egypt evolve into a theocracy, at any point in time? Again, I would ascribe much to the external political factor here. By that I mean the United States. America and Israel could actually want the chaos, and desire that the Egyptian decline continue. The best way to ensure this would be for Egypt to become a theocracy. This would be a very big blow. Social mobility is one of your central concerns. How does the average Egyptian citizen move from one social/ economic bracket to the other? People are getting wealthy from inflation, migration, speculation, or access to power -- namely -- all the wrong reasons. However, if development is not put in the right direction, with people profiting from industry and agriculture, or gaining mobility through good education and abiding by the rule of law, then things will go into a downward spiral. We are also entering into an era where private foreign investment will increase. One way of moving up would be to affiliate oneself with foreign investment projects. But this requires an education that is appreciated by investors, pertaining to certain technical and educational skills, and the command of a foreign language. Given the current circumstances, I believe that this will result in an even greater dualism within Egyptian society. It will be between those who are qualified and those who are not, and could result in the marginalisation of a sizeable segment of the population -- no less than 40 per cent. Is Egypt following a course of equitable development? Social disparities appear to be sharpening. The proximity of insulated luxury compounds to impoverished slums might best exemplify this condition. The answer is clearly no, we are not charting any equitable development. What strikes me is that the "state" or government seems quite indifferent to the fact. The very expression "social dimension" which at one point was a staple of official rhetoric is no longer even used by the cabinet members. I sense here an attitude to the poor that is almost racist. It is as though "poor" were a word that must not be even used. The whole dimension of poverty seems totally absent from the horizon of these policy makers, as opposed to their fantastic fascination with technology, privatisation and the Western way of life. Would you subscribe to the view that a powerful nexus of political and economic interests currently governs state and society in Egypt? To have ministers who are businessmen was, at one point in Egypt, and especially in another era, before the revolution, highly unconstitutional. Now in our day and time, the principle of having business run the country opens the scope for even more corruption. It is patently clear, however, that the current government has succeeded in achieving what it was designated to. A tremendous "push" was given to privatisation, and, most important, to the establishment of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) with Israel. This latter which for a long time was a very problematic issue for the Egyptian government was pushed through by the current cabinet within a matter of only days. A new category has also appeared, as a part of the new ruling elite. This is formed by members of the "old guard" who are now also working with the new "elite". The former are more experienced politically, and are thus helping disentangle matters for the latter, and pave the way for policies to be implemented. "Cairo is mother of the world", the saying goes. The capital is still the primary focus of attention for politicians, economists and intellectuals. Where is the rest of Egypt's over 70 million-strong in the scheme of things? Rural Egypt is no longer the same. The urban centres inside the countryside have expanded. Egypt's urban population thus constitutes half of the country's inhabitants because of the number of people residing in provincial towns. The latter are now manifesting many of the characteristics of major cities, as regards the exposure to the external world, bureaucracy, population density, and even corruption. But it is also true that rural Egypt, esecially Upper Egypt, the Saeed, is particularly deprived and neglected. It is this that has fallen out of the scope of attention of politicians and the media, etc. The influx from the countryside into the cities also continues. There is the attempt by young people to escape, as we read in newspapers, to European countries like Italy using boats. They often end in tragic catastrophes, like drowning in the sea. The alleged harassment of women in downtown Cairo and violence against street children have captured the media limelight. Are we seeing novel phenomena here? There was a succession of events in 2006, which were actually rather unique. There was the ocean liner which sank with thousands aboard in the Red Sea, trains that crashed, harassment, and the killing of street children. Suddenly, all these things seemed to rise to the fore. But they are actually the outcome of a cumulative process -- of 20 years of bad economic policies, low levels of development, high unemployment, and increasing social inequality. Why do we see them so visibly today? I would pinpoint one new factor which is the new Egyptian independent newspapers, like Al-Masri Al-Yom, and the Egyptian satellite television programmes like Al-Ashira Masaan. They picked up these issues and opened them up to national debate. Were it not for this new, independent media, these issues might have been brushed under the carpet as they often have been. That said, the urban violence which manifested itself, especially in the street children's case, brings home to me, the Latin American model. The phenomenon of street gangs that steal, kidnap, rape and kill is very alien to Egypt. One reason that this phenomenon occurred in Latin America has been the fantastic disparity in incomes. We now see this being replicated here. These young children see the affluence around them, and the media plays its role in fuelling their awareness. Another feature of the Latin American model has been the weakness of the rule of law. Any rich man can break the law. This was not the case in Egypt before the 1952 Revolution, nor was it so under Nasser. The beginnings of social and economic disparity can be traced back to the mid-1970s, with the initiation of the economic "open-door" policy and the dismantling of the socialist system. You regard the status of women in society as central to its progress. How do you assess the position of Egyptian women today? This is one bright side of the picture. I see Egyptian women as becoming continuously liberated, ironically, as a result of the economic hardships which they have to face. The need to earn a living has pushed women out of the home, and is happening on all levels. Another positive element is that the percentage of women being educated has risen, and, along with it, women's employment. The laws of the Egyptian state are also giving women rights, such as childbirth leave, that they would not have had if they worked for multinational companies. I see Egyptian girls and women in public transport, behaving freely and actually quite uninhibited. The fact that a girl is veiled or otherwise has no bearing at all on the status of women, or their ability to interact with society. The Egyptian woman is actually going to play a very positive and healthy role in the coming phase. The three-day strike by the Mehalla Spinning and Weaving Company workers was unprecedented. What is its significance? Let me say again that a competent media played its role here. Its coverage had its effect in encouraging and raising sympathies with the workers. There was a time when one would hear that there were massive strikes somewhere or another, but one never actually saw them. What also bolstered the protesters is the fact that people are even more fed up than usual by overall conditions. The government and its police apparatuses have also come through of late, as weaker than usual. When the protest movement Kifaya first came out on the streets, it, too, was unprecedented. We should see things within this context. People are simply becoming more daring. It is also clear that the government is lightening its grip on things for now. It is as if a mouse peeped out of its hole, expecting the cat to pounce on it, and the cat did nothing. And so, the mouse ventured out a bit more. As to why the cat, or the government, is turning a blind eye on things, you can only speculate. My prognosis, though you might not agree, is that again it is the United States that is recommending that the grip be lightened on things. The Egyptian political and social arenas appear to be in a state of flux. Where do you see them heading? The whole scene sometimes reminds me of the six months before the 1952 Revolution. The Cairo fire occurred in January of that year, and the king kept changing cabinets and bringing in very unlikely candidates. He seemed weak and unable to run the country. Everyone was wondering who was really in control. Suddenly, the Free Officers took over. The present situation holds several interpretations. One is that there is a group which is planning for an important change, and so it is opportune for it to have a state of chaos, after which people will welcome whatever it is which will take place. This seems to me to be the viable explanation. Fifty-four years after 23 July 1952, does Egypt need another revolution ? The Revolution of 23 July 1952 would never have taken place without the United States' blessing. It was not possible. The British were in the Suez Canal Zone, and if the Americans had not ordered them to sign the Evacuation Treaty, they would not have done so. As for the Egyptians, one of their great strengths as well as weaknesses is that they do not explode. They get very discontented and very unhappy, but they never explode. It is actually heartbreaking. A major change will inevitably take place though, but when it does, it will be foreign-designed. Unfortunately, I also believe that Israel will have a major say in the coming change. There are several indications that it has a very big scheme to realise in the region, starting with Lebanon. We might have a new regime, not necessarily led by Gamal Mubarak, which makes very good pronouncements and undertakes reforms. These, however, will actually be guises concealing this regime's acceptance of changes (inititiated by Israel) in the region. As for democracy, I do not have much faith in it on principle. The technological progress taking place in the world is, by definition, anti-democratic. I follow Orwell's school of thought in this respect. In 1984, he designated technology to be the villain. Give any central power the technological means to subjugate people, and it will. But there is a positive side to all of this. New balances of power are emerging. The protagonists could be China, Iran, Russia, or, even, Latin America. Egypt can in theory benefit from all of this, although I believe that the possibility of its actually doing so is quite remote. On your daily commute to the American University in Cairo, what captures your attention? That the standard of living of passengers using the metro has noticeably declined. It could be that this is because more people have bought cars, leaving the metro to those who are "less privileged". But I also see a grimness on people's faces. Another very obvious element is the religiosity. You see people pressed in the crowd and holding on to their Quran, poring over it in the middle of the throng. Add to this the blaring music from some passengers' radio or mobile phone -- and you get the full picture.
