The nuclear agreement between Iran and the Western powers has precipitated repercussions that herald an unprecedented degree of change in the region. Prior to the agreement, the Middle East experienced tumultuous waves of change as the result of the Arab Spring revolutions. Dictatorships were unseated and doors were flung open to new modes of domestic politics and the prospect of democratic transitions. However, few of these revolutions have succeeded. Many have floundered, and the resulting confusion has provided the soil for an upsurge in violence that in some cases has escalated into civil war. Some regional powers that did not experience Arab Spring revolutions have been alarmed at the possibility that what they regard as the “evils” of these will spill over into their own countries. Others have seen the revolutions as an opportunity to augment their regional influence. The upshot has been that Arab nation states find themselves vulnerable to disintegration or partition as a result of a sharp rise in sectarian and ethnic tensions and the proliferation of terrorist groups bent on exploiting the political and security vacuum in many Middle Eastern countries. The Iranian-Western nuclear agreement thus comes as a factor that could complicate rather than alleviate the situation. Its repercussions could overturn regional balances and, indeed, it could be a “strategic earthquake” of the kind identified by US journalist Thomas Friedman, the impact of which on regional arrangements could exceed both the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The agreement could give rise to a new Middle East in which Iran, not Israel, would become the most powerful regional player, relying on its own capacities, its understandings with Western powers, and support from both regional allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, and international allies such as Russia and China. At the level of international diplomacy, the new variable is that the US has initiated practical measures to disengage from the Middle East and reorient itself toward Asia. This has been evident in its determination to conclude the nuclear deal with Iran despite its flaws and concessions. Washington's withdrawal from the region is a response to its inability to solve the problems of the Middle East within the framework of a mono-polar order. Indeed, it has had to accept many solutions proposed by Russia, whether with respect to the Syrian chemical weapons crisis or to the Iranian nuclear question, because it has lacked alternatives. In so doing, the US has effectively recognised the growing Russian role in the Middle East, which in turn has helped alleviate the tensions that have arisen between Washington and Moscow over the latter's policies in both Syria and Ukraine. In other words, the Middle East is experiencing a US withdrawal, a rise in Russian and Chinese influence, and, perhaps, the birth of a multipolar world order. At the international and regional level, the nuclear agreement has generated an unprecedented degree of US-Iranian rapprochement, which will impact on many regional issues, as well as on the very nature of the US role in the region. The collapse of the wall of animosity between the US and Iran due to the need for the two to work together has profound regional implications. Above all, it underscores the Iranian role as a major regional power and the shift in the American role from an anti-Iranian deterrent to a balancing force between rival regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, in order to safeguard its interests with Iran, the US might turn a blind eye to the interests and concerns of other regional powers. The effect of this would be to propel Iran to more hardline stances on the regional issues in which it is involved, most notably the Syrian and Yemeni crises. It could simultaneously inspire Tehran to step up its drive to augment its regional influence and impose its hegemony over other countries. The Arab countries might also agree to engage Iran in dialogue and to work with it if it ceases its hegemonic policies and Shia expansionism. Changing alliances: Another change at this level may come in the pattern of alliances. Increasingly, there is likely to be a trend towards diversifying foreign policy resources and away from the dependence on a single strategic ally, namely the US, which has proven itself ready to abandon its allies for the sake of its own interests. This trend was manifested in the recent visit by the Saudi deputy crown-prince to Russia, where he met with the Russian president. The two parties signed six strategic protocols, the most important of which involves cooperation in nuclear energy and military cooperation. Prior to this, Egypt moved to diversify its relations with the world powers following the 30 June Revolution, turning to Russia in particular. President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi recently visited Moscow and the two sides worked to reach understandings over the implementation of previously concluded agreements, especially those pertaining to armaments and the construction of an Egyptian nuclear reactor for peaceful energy production using Russian expertise. Perhaps the most significant change on the international and regional level, however, concerns Israel, which has described the Iranian nuclear agreement as a “historic mistake” that will enable Iran to produce a nuclear weapon in the future. The agreement signals that Israel's function as a proxy for the West in the Arab region has begun to wane, at least temporarily, and that Israel has become a burden on the new US strategy for the Middle East, especially since the Israeli prime minister appeared before the US Congress as part of Israeli efforts to lobby US lawmakers to vote against the nuclear deal. At all events, it has become difficult for Israel to attack the Iranian nuclear programme, which is internationally recognised as being designed for peaceful civilian purposes, without being perceived as opposed to the US and the West when the programme has in fact been nurtured by the US. At the same time, the Iranian-Western nuclear agreement has led to closer relations between Turkey and the US, and between Turkey and Iran. Turkey had been reluctant to take an active part in the US-led coalition against terrorism, as epitomised by the Islamic State (IS) group, perhaps because it has been covertly supporting IS. Suddenly, however, it has turned against IS and began to launch air strikes against it, having realised, after the Iranian nuclear deal was concluded, that it had strayed too far from Washington, which had drawn closer to Tehran. To stem the negative repercussions on Turkey of the nuclear agreement and the rise of the Iranian regional role against the backdrop of declining US influence, Turkey also hastened towards Tehran. The president's visit to the Iranian capital, on the surface, was about strengthening economic ties. In reality, the diplomatic initiative was about reducing the tensions that have been mounting between the two countries for several years. The visit resulted in five economic agreements that will increase the volume of trade between Turkey and Iran from $14 billion in 2014 to more than $20 billion in 2016. It should be added that because of this strengthening of Turkish-Iranian relations, as well as the lack of sectarian sensitivities between these two countries, the Gulf states no longer feel that they can consider Turkey as a counterweight to Iran. A further point at the international and regional level is that Russia has remained a constant ally to its friends in the region, including Iran. The Russian-Iranian relationship has become more robust and dynamic since the nuclear agreement, as though Tehran wanted to reward its Muscovite ally, regardless of any differences that had arisen and despite the fact that Russia had refused to go beyond certain bounds in its relationship with Tehran. Changes in the region: At the regional level, the nuclear agreement has triggered a range of changes, notably precipitating closer inter-Arab cooperation, especially between most of the Gulf countries and Jordan, Egypt and Morocco. This spirit was reflected in the call to create a Joint Arab Force to undertake rapid intervention operations and to prevent and contain disputes in order to safeguard the stability of the Arab states, along with their territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence. The Arab states responded to this call at the 26th Arab Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh in March 2015. The spirit of inter-Arab cooperation was also manifested in the participation of ten Arab states in the Saudi-led Storm of Resolve Operation against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias that had seized power in Yemen. The internationally recognised Yemeni president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, described the Storm of Resolve Operation at the Arab Summit as “a practical application of the call to create a Joint Arab Force.” Another effect of the agreement between the P5+1group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran was that it galvanised the Arab countries, after some considerable wavering, into pursuing the same course of developing nuclear energy programmes for peaceful purposes. One of the purposes of the visit by the Saudi deputy crown prince to Moscow was to conclude an agreement for the construction of 16 nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia. Egypt is also close to concluding a final deal with Russia on the construction of a nuclear reactor in Dabaa, and many other Arab countries have begun to contemplate moves in this direction as a means to counterbalance Iran's nuclear superiority. But it remains a fact that the Arabs cannot ally themselves with Israel against Iran. They continue to reject any form of normalisation with Israel. As long as Israel continues to occupy Arab land and assault Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, Arabs will regard as a threat to Arab national security. Reports on Israeli websites claiming a Saudi-Israeli alliance against Iran and possible Israeli support for an Arab confrontation against Iran in exchange for Arabs abandoning the Palestinian cause are figments of the imagination. Until the creation of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, the Palestinian cause will remain the Arabs' central cause. The numerous and profound changes that have been ushered in by the Iranian-Western nuclear accord raise the question as to where the region is heading. Is it on the threshold of what might be termed an “Iranian era”, in the light of the US-Iranian entente and against the backdrop of ongoing instability and chaos in the Arab region? Or will there be a new era of equilibrium and concord? This will depend on Iran's behaviour and Arab reaction to it. If Iran seeks mutual understanding, this will propel the Middle East towards stability. If it seeks to escalate its drive to expand its influence regionally, to the detriment of Arab interests, the region will be in for a new era of conflict. The Arabs will be left with the choice of either uniting more closely against Iran or bowing to life under Khomeini's mantle in an Iranian-dominated Middle East. The writer is editorial consultant of Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya.
