The National Council for Human Rights has ended its first three-year term with no change in its board membership and a low-profile performance. Gihan Shahine wonders if the second term will be any better Not surprisingly, the Shura Council made no changes in the board members in the government-affiliated National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) as the council concluded its first three-year term two weeks ago. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali remains the NCHR's chair while Islamic thinker, Ahmed Kamal Abul-Magd, will continue as the council's secretary-general. For many like Mohamed Zarie, the director of the Egyptian Human Right Association for the Assistance of Prisoners, it comes as no surprise that the government made no change to a council "that has not actually caused it [the government] any trouble so far, and would thus be better than any other alternative." Analysts comment by saying that in making selections for leading positions, the government apparently leans more towards that which it knows, as opposed to that which it does not. Out of the council's 27 members, only four belonged to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including Hafez Abu-Seada, the secretary-general of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, and Bahieddin Hassan, the chairman of the Cairo Centre for Human Rights Studies. The figure dropped to two with the resignation of two NGO members, including Hassan. The rest were either members or supporters of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Hassan, who is also chairman of the Cairo Centre for Human Rights Studies, said he refused "to continue fooling public opinion in a council that has largely failed to fulfill its primary role" as a counseling body for the government. "The NCHR is not an NGO recording and reporting violations; its primary mission is to provide the government with recommendations that should ultimately affect the decisions of the executive power." Many human right activists, however, would agree with Hassan that the NCHR has done nothing so far to improve the state of human rights in Egypt. "The basic reality remains... that lost security is the strongest constant in today's Egypt," commented Youssef Sidhom in the daily Al-Watani. "Egyptians suffer from a state security grip and oppressive sway of the police state, all the time knowing that security officials are immune to accountability." Two recent reports by Hassan and Seada explained how both the government and the NCHR board have worked to abort the council's primary mission. The government did not take any of the NCHR's reports seriously. Rather, as Zarie puts it, "the council was established as a scapegoat for the government so that people would spend their energy criticising the council instead of the government for the deterioration in human rights conditions in Egypt." Although the first NCHR was unexpectedly bold in revealing human right violations and police torture in Egypt, it barely prompted any action on the part of the Ministry of Interior, or the authorities concerned. The NCHR board, for its part, was also quick to dilute its candid tone in the second report, which according to critics, was pathetic, having used blurred and vague terms to describe serious human rights violations in Egypt. "It seems that the first report was nothing but an attempt on the part of the council to prove its independence as a government-affiliated body," Zarie said, insisting that the council "does nothing without receiving a green light from the regime, even when being critical." Hassan said that a similar situation to that of the NCHR made headway in Morocco "because the government there was actually willing to change, which is definitely not the case in Egypt." "All the regime's talk about reform has proved cosmetic," Hassan said. "The government did not cooperate at all with the council, which ended up as no more than window dressing for the government and a podium for foreign relations with embassies and foreign diplomats with the aim of curbing foreign criticism." The council has, at most, met 10 times with government officials although meetings with foreign diplomats have been estimated at 110 over the past three years, according to Hassan. Both Seada and Hassan similarly criticised the NCHR management for its "absence of transparency" and "the security approach which dominated its policy", resulting in rifts among members who worked in "isolated islands". "The five-party committee, which included representatives from the ministries of interior, justice, and foreign affairs, the prosecutor general's office and the NCHR, held meetings without informing the other council members," Sidhom wrote, quoting two reports by Seada and Hassan. The NCHR's proposed draft on constitutional amendments was, perhaps, the most recent case of confusion and disarray. Many NCHR members were not informed on proposed amendments before they were invited to participate in discussions. The report was announced to the media in a press conference before it reached its final draft and at a time when NCHR members were still negotiating its controversial parts. That, and the fact that the proposed amendment unexpectedly adopted demands by the opposition to curtail the power of the executive and guarantee the smooth rotation of power, made many believe that the council only aimed at making newspaper headlines and proving its neutrality as a government-affiliated body before it concluded its work. But even when dealing with the press, Hassan said the NCHR lacked transparency and would not give press releases to journalists. "This way the council lost public credibility," Hassan said. The council equally lost the support of NGOs when it succumbed to government pressure in the second report by not quoting any of the violations recorded in reports by NGOs; when it described police harassment of female journalists on May 25 as dual-violence between the police and the opposition; and when it supported the government proposal to issue an anti-terror law which is likely to further curtail freedom in the country without even consulting all its members, according to Hassan. Like many, Hassan provides a dim outlook over the prospects of the status of human rights in Egypt and the NCHR. Serious deterioration in human rights conditions began at the end of 2005 with the clampdown on the opposition in the parliamentary elections; the police massacre of Sudanese refugees; the detention of activist Ayman Nour who had run for president in the multi-candidate elections; widespread use of the emergency law in curbing peaceful protests in support of judges; and the rejection of 12 political parties seeking official registration. "The message is that peaceful rallies are not tolerated anymore and not a single protest is allowed, even if one is held in support of the Palestinian issue, for instance," Hassan said. He expected the coming period to witness even more violations when the government-proposed constitutional amendment is ultimately approved and put into practice. "The state of emergency will continue and the anti-terror law, which will allow detentions and espionage of potential suspects without any judicial order, will gain constitutionality, which will be a serious blow to freedoms in Egypt." In that context, human rights activists wonder whether a council with at least two-thirds of its members belonging to the ruling party will be able to improve the status of human rights in Egypt.
