Pelosi's recent regional trip signals a new approach to Washington's Middle East, writes David Dumke* While its alliance with Israel has long been anathema to the Arab public, there is little debate that America's standing in the Arab world has deteriorated since United States President George W Bush assumed office in January 2001. This decline, which accelerated after the US invasion of Iraq, is attributable to US policies and posture. Commentators have endlessly speculated that the image problem has permanently alienated a generation, and could take decades before the US again is seen as a moderating force, if not a beacon of hope in the Arab world. However, the recent regional trip by Representative Nancy Pelosi (Democrat-California), which included stops in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, suggests an American recovery could occur more rapidly than predicted. This is a unique period of history in Arab politics. The last decade has seen the Arab media, thanks largely to satellite television and the internet, grow more assertive and independent. Because there is no longer a monopoly on information, the Arab public is far more informed about current events than ever before. Arab governments are more accountable to their citizens, and unpopular American policies can no longer be sanitised before being consumed by the public. One positive result of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the lingering Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, and the US emphasis on promoting Arab reform is the emergence of a serious societal debate about the region's future. This debate is not limited to US-Arab relations, but includes internal discussions about governance, extremism, religion, and foreign policy -- Arab-Israeli, Arab-Iranian, and intra-Arab relations. Though it is an internal debate in which the US can only play a secondary role, the Bush Administration has wrongly assumed it can shape the debate. Its actions and reactions -- on democracy and reform, public diplomacy, and policy -- have collectively proved either ineffective or lacking credibility. A decade ago, a decision by the US to focus on promoting democracy and reform would likely have been more warmly received. During the George H W Bush and Clinton Administrations the US enjoyed favourable public opinion and warm relations with most nations in the region. Acting as a selfless agent of change, particularly by promoting economic reform, education, and women's empowerment, the US could have gotten credit for assisting the Arab world as it worked to reform itself. Unfortunately, given the context of the post-9/11 world, the "democracy and reform" program was seen as a self-serving attempt to force Arab governments into compliance with US regional interests. Moreover, the tone adapted by the Bush Administration in pushing reform was perceived as a not so subtle form of neo-imperialism. Individuals working with the Americans were condemned as puppets, discredited by the public even if they had the best of intentions -- which not all did. The United States belatedly acknowledged the importance of public opinion -- or as they concluded, despite obvious cultural insensitivity, the "Arab street". But in formulating a new, aggressive public diplomacy strategy, the White House made fundamental mistakes. Flashy television commercials, glossy magazines, and a television station dedicated to propaganda may have worked in the past. But given the recent evolution in the Arab media, the strategy was an outdated spin. In essence, it is not the message, but the policies themselves that are problematic. The US would have been better served by increasing "soft diplomacy" -- investing in more programs such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative and USAID -- which have proved to be effective over the long term. Today the problem ultimately lies in US policies. Despite its scepticism, the Arab public has always been willing to listen to America. But in return, it expects the US to demonstrate, in spite of deeply unpopular positions such as its unwavering support of Israel, that it has the region's best interests at heart. This requires the US to play an active role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and conducting diplomacy throughout the region -- even with nations America views as pariahs. This is why the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report was well received in the Arab world. Led by respected senior statesmen, James Baker and Lee Hamilton, the ISG provided a plan which required, among other things, for the US to refocus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and aggressively re- engage in diplomacy -- including with Damascus and Tehran. Notably, the ISG did not call for an immediate withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, nor distancing itself from Tel Aviv, which would be wildly popular with the Arab public. But the Bush Administration greeted the ISG report coolly, and opted to pursue its own "surge plan". True, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has recently attempted to promote Israeli-Palestinian dialog and re-engage with regional leaders. But given the Bush Administration's weakness at home, lack of credibility abroad, and stubbornness, Rice's efforts to date have not yielded demonstrable results. Which brings us to Pelosi, who became Speaker of the House of Representatives after Democrats won control of Congress last November. The congressional role in foreign policy has never been clearly defined. Officially, the Congress merely supports or opposes the policies set by the President by utilising its constitutional power to provide or deny funding. But in special circumstances, such as when a president's power is weak, Congress occasionally plays a more direct role in diplomacy. Pelosi and her fellow Democrats recently passed a legislation that Bush has promised to veto which would require US forces to withdraw from Iraq late next year. Beyond that, Pelosi has embraced the ISG report. The Speaker's decision to visit Damascus deeply angered the president. But her meeting President Assad was cordial and productive, and her very public break with Bush proved enormously popular in the Arab world. Perhaps the president -- or whoever sits in the White House after the 2008 election -- should see her recent foray into the realm of foreign policy as an opportunity rather than a distraction. Pelosi demonstrated that dialog, not necessarily a reversal of policy, can greatly help the US regain its credibility among the Arab leaders and public alike. * The writer is a political analyst and principal of the MidAmr Group.
