The Ukraine crisis has raised — and is still raising — a number of questions that extend beyond its local boundaries. The first is what are the Russian motivations, or precisely the grievances, whether real or imagined, towards the United States and the West? To answer this question we must return to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of its empire — particularly the independence of the former Soviet republics. When Boris Yeltsin assumed power as Russia's president he was very keen to assure the West that the Cold War was over and that the Russian Federation would be a reliable alley to the US and the West. In contrast, the US not only kept NATO but it extended it to Russian borders, in Eastern European countries and the Baltic States. Moreover, the US and the West failed to fulfill their promises of economic support for Russia. The first years of Yeltsin witnessed economic and social deterioration, the rise of crime and the deterioration of the living standards of Russians. By the end of 1993, Russian foreign policy was subject to fierce criticism from number of national trends inside Russia, accusing it of submitting to the West, scarifying the national interest, betraying national ties with former friends, and a deterioration of Moscow's international status. Yeltsin was obliged to respond to this criticism, discharging Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was loyal to the West and said: “Open hatred towards the West is open hatred to human advancement as a whole.” Yeltsin appointed a soviet veteran personality, Yevgeny Primakov, as foreign minister and then prime minster — a man who tried to reverse the trend towards deterioration. Primakov did not last long. He was succeeded by Soviet Intelligence chief Vladimir Putin. Putin, as prime minster and then president, reassured the West that the Cold War had ended and sent signals of cooperation. When he was the head of state he phoned the US president after the 9/11 attacks and opened the Russian airspace to American flights to Afghanistan. As Putin was assuring the end of the Cold War, however, equally he was assuring that his foreign policy would restore the Russian foreign role in the international issues. In this context, Putin opposed US strategy of building a missile defence system in Eastern European countries Hungary and the Czech Republic. In international forums, Putin started to oppose what he called “American hegemony” and called for multipolar world order. As Russia considered the former Soviet republics its “sphere of influence”, Russia followed intently US efforts to steer the so-called “Orange revolutions”. Events in Georgia in 2008, where a regime hostile to Russia was installed, motivated Russian military intervention and the annexation of Ossetia. The West swallowed the Russian action. Against this background, comes the crisis in Ukraine where a regime friendly to Russia was replaced by a government unfriendly to Moscow with an agenda of joining the EU and NATO. In Russian thinking, Ukraine is regarded as a traditional and historical part of Russia. According to Putin's speech before parliament, he could not imagine the port of Sevastopol “the Russian entrance to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean” under the umbrella of NATO. The second major question raised by the crisis is whether the crisis will mean or lead to a second Cold War? Although the crisis bears the atmosphere of the Cold War, current relations between Russia and the West lack the main element of the Cold War — the ideological factor. Moreover, economic and trade relations during the Cold War were not that significant compared to the great interdependence that is a major feature of today's power relations. As a number of scholars and analysts indicate, Russian action in Ukraine together with US and Westerns responses are more tactics than strategic positions. They add that since the Cold War ended, and particularly after 9/11, any confrontation or a war among major powers is unlikely. The third question raised by the crisis is whether Russia will harden its position on issues such as Syria, Iran and Afghanistan, where the UA and the West needs its cooperation. Russian statements indicate that these positions will remain the same. However, I believe that if the US and the West escalated pressure and economic sanctions, Putin's response would further complicate the situation in Syria and Iran. It is indicative that recently Putin addressed Syria's president, assuring him that Russia will continue supporting him against what he called “terrorism”. The writer is executive director at the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
