Two conflicting groups in Yemen have intensified the fighting between their respective militias after Saudi Arabia labelled them terrorist groups in the mould of Al-Qaeda. About 40 people have been killed in the north and north-east of Yemen over the last few days between the Sunni Islamist Islah Party (the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood) and the Shiite Houthi group. Each group seems to have been happy to call its enemy “terrorists,” while denying that it itself is made up of terrorists. The Islah activists say that Islah was not mentioned by Saudi Arabia as a terrorist group, but the Houthis were, while the Houthis have not cared what Saudi Arabia has said about them since they are the traditional enemies of the country. These developments are likely to complicate the implementation of the outcome of the national dialogue in the country which the international community insists on supporting apparently regardless of the consequences. The UN envoy in Yemen, Jamal Binomar, arrived in Sanaa this week in order to find out to what extent the conflicting groups will listen to him after he convinced the UN Security Council to issue a threatening Resolution, number 2140, on the matter. Binomar, now in his 28th visit to Yemen since he started as mediator between the county's conflicting groups in 2011, appears to be happy to come to Yemen wielding the biggest stick he has ever been issued with. The UN Security Council has threatened to apply sanctions to the country after the groups disputed an UN-supported decree to divide it into six provinces, four in the north and two in the south, within a the framework of a federal state. The Security Council issued its third resolution on Yemen in late February in an attempt to try to help this conflict-torn country establish a state of law and order by drafting a new constitution and approving it through a referendum and electing a new president. The new constitution and elections are the most important steps that need to be taken now after the 10-month national dialogue that ended last December. The British-drafted UN Security Council Resolution 2140 came after it became clear, at least to Yemenis, that it was apparently impossible for the transitional president, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, to stop the campaign against the transition in the country that has included assassinations, the bombings of gas and oil and electricity installations, and kidnappings. Al-Qaeda recently attacked the country's maximum security prison and released at least 29 criminals. Earlier, it attacked the headquarters of the ministry of defence, killing more than 52 people in the hospital of its compound. The two terrorist operations inside the capital showed that Al-Qaeda felt safe in Sanaa, even as US drones are striking its operatives elsewhere in the country. The Islamist-headed consensus government and president Hadi have also pointed the finger at former president Ali Abdulla Saleh, accusing him of being behind some of the obstructions. Meanwhile, Binomar, who is supposed to mediate between the conflicting sides, has seemed to fail to deal neutrally. At least in some of his speeches, Binomar has discriminated between the two sides, calling one “revolutionaries” and the other “not revolutionaries” (those belonging to the former regime), though the transition deal recognised both of them as equal partners. Saleh's side has accused Binomar of bias as a result, and the Party and its allies have lodged an official complaint with the Security Council to this effect, causing political wrangles between the UN mediator and Saleh. UN Security Council Resolution 2140 is seen by observers as a “big stick” to support Hadi and Binomar, both of whom have failed to ensure a reasonable degree of consent, or at least to clear the air with Saleh's side. According to observers, it is known that each side is trying to spoil the prospects of the other in order to push things in its favour. However, it would be too easy to say that the spoiler is Saleh and his Party and not to an extent the other way around. The Resolution is supposed to sanction those setting out to wreck the national dialogue outcomes by freezing their assets and banning travel. Over the last two years, neither Binomar nor the Yemenis themselves have been able to determine who has been responsible for the most disruptions. A committee is now to be formed of all 15 members of the UN Security Council, the idea being that this will assign blame for the delay in the implementation of the national dialogue resolutions. At present three scenarios present themselves. In the first, the best scenario, all those aiming to damage the national dialogue will want to avoid sanctions and the possible use of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter by the Security Council and will therefore submit to its implementation. However, they may still cooperate with each other by stopping the obstructions in order only to protect themselves, while not being fully committed to the federal solution. It is widely believed in Yemen that what happened in 2011 was not a real revolution but merely a division within the traditional ruling group, one side calling itself “revolutionaries” and the other the “protectors of legitimacy.” Because neither group was able to prevail, both of them now effectively rule the country under the UN-supported and Saudi-US sponsored deal (GCCI) which they signed in November 2011 in the Saudi capital Riyadh. The only person now outside this system of rule is Saleh himself. However, he still presides over his Party, the GPC, which still has 50 per cent of the ruling senior posts throughout the country. In the second scenario, the second-best one, the UN committee would identify those seeking to disrupt the transition using hard evidence that can be submitted to the courts. While it would be preferable for such people to be tried in Yemeni courts, because Yemeni judges would likely be unwilling or unable to try them they could be tried outside Yemen. This scenario would be difficult to implement as it would require hard evidence. In the third scenario, the worst-case one, the committee could designate the spoilers on the basis of fabricated reports, politicised information or media guessing. In this case, the wronged groups would return to conflict without thinking of the consequences, as for them other sanctions would be better than the threatened freezing of their assets or travel bans. Al-Qaeda is expected to push in this direction in order to achieve its long-awaited wish to bring what it calls “the soldiers of the enemy” out into the open. UN Security Council Resolution 2140 focuses on ending the presidency of former president Saleh, saying that it was “turning the page” on his presidency. This has been understood to mean that Saleh must also step down as president of the GPC in favour of Hadi, who is now deputy chair of the GPC and thus Saleh's Party deputy. Removing Saleh from the presidency of the GPC by force would be extremely difficult if not impossible, especially since the transition deal was signed by Saleh in his capacity as head of the GPC. “If the Resolution violates the GCCI in any way and turns into a tool for settling accounts, then Yemen will return to the swamp of war,” said Ahmed al-Sufi, a GPC senior official and secretary to Saleh. Rajeh Badi, official spokesman of the consensus government, said that he did not expect the failure of the Resolution, which no one in Yemen would dare to challenge. “The Resolution will stop the spoilers, and no one would dare to confront the unanimity of the international community by even thinking of obstructing the outcomes of the dialogue,” he said. The UN Resolution would certainly help Yemen if it is wisely implemented, but it will also hurt it if it is implemented in a politicised way. It should be implemented in such a way as to help the Yemenis to establish a state that respects all the country's communities.
