Is Ankara changing tack? Since it rose to power in 2002, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (JDP) has tried to fashion a new course for the country, one that is tinged with Islamic ideals but tolerant of the hard-earned modernism and secularism of the Turkish state. To many in the West this was a relief, seeing a nation that can espouse Islam without straying into the extremism that had become the hallmark of Iran-Hizbullah on the Shia strain of Islam or the runaway fundamentalism of militants in Al-Qaeda and other like-minded Sunni extremist groups. There is a lot to say for Ankara's foreign policy over the past decade or so, and no denying the fact that it was self-motivated and innovative. Striking a balance between the ideals of Islam and the freedoms of the modern state is not always an easy task, but Turkey seemed to be able to pull it off without much turbulence. Prime Minister Erdogan's “zero problems” policies also worked for a while, allowing him close relations with Syria and winning him the goodwill of other nations in the region. Relations between Turkey and Egypt improved, just as Ankara edged closer to Libya, Iraq, and took particular interest in Iraq's Kurdistan. The success of the experience dissipated many of the old fears about Turkey, its connections with NATO, and its old imperial ambitions dating back to the Ottoman times. Modern Turkey was not always viewed with trust in the Arab world, mostly because of its Western orientation and also its long-term relations with Israel. Turkey recognised Israel in 1949, enjoyed cordial relations with it, and in recent memory had close strategic ties with it. This didn't endear Ankara to those who took the side of the Palestinians in the long-running Middle East conflict. Turkish policies on the Balkans, Cyprus, Iraq and Syria also alienated many in this region. Even Turkey's domestic policies were often viewed with suspicion by its neighbours, especially its inflexibility on the Kurdish question and its refusal to grant its significant Kurdish minority the cultural and education rights they deserve, or a measure of autonomy that could have alleviated tensions not just in Turkey but across its borders. But over the past decade, Ankara's policies were greeted with enthusiasm in the region, especially when it changed tack on Israel and lost nine of its nationals in a confrontation with the Israelis during the Freedom Flotilla affair. When the Arab world was hit by a wave of protests three years ago, Ankara sprang into action, hoping to capitalise on the goodwill it had in the region, and perhaps posing as a role model and potential leader of regional politics. It was a gamble that Erdogan pursued with characteristic zeal. He offered unfettered support to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. And — after a period of hesitation due to close ties with the Gaddafi regime — took the side of the revolutionaries in Libya. But it was in Syria that Ankara threw its full weight, first giving advice of reform to Bashar Al-Assad's regime, then demanding its removal and standing firmly on the side of the opposition. In Iraq, Ankara also tried to extend its influence, forging closer ties with Baghdad and Kurdish Iraq simultaneously. This was a tricky game, for the Iraqi government was not amused when it discovered that the Turkish foreign minister was developing a taste for visiting Kirkuk behind its back. It was clear, as of 2011, that Ankara was trying to establish its status as a regional power broker, one that coached the nations of the region on the modern ways of life, while keeping close ties with NATO and acting as a bridge between East and West. The role Ankara envisioned for itself was grandiose, and at least for some in this region, it carried a familiar whiff, that of the Ottoman past. Was Ankara trying to pose as a latter-day caliphate, one that can capitalise on its Eastern connections without sacrificing its Western links? The answer to this question remains moot, for disappointment soon set in, dashing Turkey's bid for the top spot in regional politics. The turning point came when Egypt had its second revolution, protesting against and then removing the Muslim Brotherhood and its president from power. The 30 June 2013 protests, following by the army action to oust Mohamed Morsi three days later, was too much for Ankara to accept. Turkey's Islamist-coloured, NATO-compatible, Western-blessed, heritage-based quest for regional hegemony started to crumble. In Syria, the failure was complete, with Al-Assad holding on to office and the West balking at the prospect of aiding the resistance in a highly volatile, fast-changing, militant-driven situation. Now beset by a financial scandal and recurring political turmoil, Turkey seems to be withdrawing in its own cocoon, just as it did before the rise of the JDP to power. Will this trend continue? Or will Turkey continue to seek a role to play in this volatile region? The jury is still out.
