'I am a violent man who has learned not to be violent and regrets his violence' – John Lennon Hardly a week now goes by in Tunisia without some form of violence. A protest gone awry, an assassination, an exchange of gunfire, a confiscation of a cache of weapons, an attempted bombing, arms smuggling, an armed confrontation in the mountains — such is the nearly daily substance of the local headlines. Yet, for Tunisians it was not that long ago that these were the type of things one only heard about on the international news bulletins. As a result, this year has been the most violent in Tunisia's modern history. One recent episode comes from the governorates of Gafsa and Siliana where clashes between demonstrators and the security forces in the last week of November resulted in hundreds of injuries among the protesters and at least 50 wounded among the security forces. The protesters had been pressing for the development of their provinces and for the prosecution of those responsible for using spray pellet guns to disperse demonstrations in Siliana a year ago. Although no one died in those demonstrations, many were left permanently disfigured, with one demonstrator losing both his eyes. Violence in the form of arson and vandalism has struck at political party headquarters in Tunisia during the year. While the Islamist Al-Nahda Movement premises have borne the brunt of such assaults, the headquarters of the Labour Party, headed by Hamma Al-Hamami, have also been a recent target. Two incidents from 2013 will stand out most in the minds of all Tunisians: the assassinations of Chokry Belaid on 6 February and of Mohamed Al-Brahmi on 25 July. Both were prominent political activists in the Popular Front, and their assassinations were political earthquakes. The outcry over the first brought down the government led by the then prime minister Hemadi Jebali. The repercussions of the second ultimately forced the Ali Laarayedh government to offer its resignation in November. The fate of the country's transition process also continues to be in the balance. Observers recall that this came to a standstill following the assassination of Al-Brahmi, and in the months since then the army and National Guard became embroiled in a war, in the fullest sense of the term, against militia groups ensconced in the Chaambi Mountains on the Tunisian-Algerian border. The confrontations were triggered by the killing of eight army soldiers and 12 National Guard officers who were ambushed in the summer in the governorate of Sidi Bouzeid and the directorate of Goubellat 60km west of the capital. Algerian forces were mobilised in the mountainous terrain that spans Algeria's borders with both Tunisia and Libya. According to reports from the area, these forces succeeded in apprehending a number of gunmen of different nationalities, Algerian, Tunisian and Yemeni, all of them part of or allied to the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar Al-Sharia group. Such events indicate that danger continues to loom and that it may even grow more acute, and it is little help that the transition process has not begun to move again in spite of the efforts on the part of various quarters to promote national reconciliation. Time and again throughout the year, observers say, the process has moved forward a few inches only to be unbalanced by some explosion of violence that threatens to derail it. It is little wonder that many Tunisians now fear for the future of their country which, in the opinion of some, is staring at the prospect of turning into another Somalia. Many explain the violence by the vicious power struggle that has set in between rival political forces, with some Tunisians even beginning to feel that perhaps the dictatorship of former president Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali was better than the present chaos. “At least people weren't worried about their safety and the safety of their families at that time,” some say whenever a new incident of bloodshed occurs. Others, strained by the rising cost of living and the soaring prices of essential goods, also feel nostalgia for the past. However, the political elite, in government and in the opposition, views the situation through a different lens. While it is true that there was relative stability under the Ben Ali regime, this came at the price of oppression, corruption and various forms of inequality. People used to grumble at the excesses of the ruling family, but few spoke out and no one would have contemplated creating an opposition party that was more than a facade as all power rested in the hands of the ruling party and the ruling clique along with all the wealth. Grievances existed, but in the political vacuum that followed the fall of the old regime pundits and various forms of self-acclaimed experts proliferated and every political party and faction had a view that it wanted to prevail over those of others. The ruling coalition “troika” government, made up of Al-Nahda and its partners, complained that the opposition minority was trying to “blackmail” the majority, and indeed the opposition succeeded in disrupting the first and second interim governments whose legitimacy it questioned even though that legitimacy had stemmed from the historic elections held on 23 October 2011. However, it is also true that the troika has inflamed tensions due to its lack of experience in government and its consequent poor handling of a range of sensitive issues. As a result, no tangible progress has been made toward the realisation of the aspirations of the Tunisian revolution, including more equitable development, better employment prospects and a more dignified life for all. Following the assassination of Al-Brahmi, the opposition organised a “departure strike” to press for the Laarayedh government to resign and hand over power to a government of technocrats even though it has no serious alternative programme of its own. Negotiations on this question are still stalled, but as these pressures began to build up against the Laarayedh government at the time when former president Mohamed Morsi was removed from office in Egypt, the Islamist-oriented A-Nahda Movement may have feared that it could soon face the same sort of problems as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The situation in Tunisia, like in other countries of the Arab Spring, has two main dimensions: the political Islamisation, or more precisely “Brotherhoodisation”, of the Arab world, and the ability of the revolutionary movements to withstand the attempts of those associated with the old regimes to undermine them. This is a geostrategic dilemma, and the leading international powers will have a major hand in how it plays out. The US supports democratic transformation in the Arab world, but it has certain red lines when it comes to Islamist governments. The clearest no-go area is permitting the spread of jihadist Salafist groups, sometimes seen as being responsible for Islamist terrorism. The latter have been a source of embarrassment for Islamist leaders such as Rached Al-Ghannouchi, one of the founders of the Al-Nahda Movement, who has helped make way for jihadist Islamist groups, arguing that their members were Tunisian citizens and that dialogue with them would bring them into peaceful coexistence with other components of Tunisian society. However, the opposition has had a different reading of Al-Ghannouchi's actions, accusing Al-Nahda of using the jihadist Salafist movements in order to push for the establishment of a theocratic state rather than the type of state for which the revolution had been fought: one that respects and defends civil and individual freedoms and lays the foundations for an open and democratic society. Jihadist militants in Tunisia have been responsible for various acts of violence since the Revolution, yet on each occasion the country's security forces have said that they have received orders from the Al-Nahda-led government not to take action against the jihadist groups, even though they have been aware of their movements and the locations of their lairs. Nevertheless, the patience of the security establishment has worn thin in the face of a rise in ambushes, bombings and other terrorist attacks targeting army and security soldiers and facilities. As a result, the Tunisian security forces have initiated a drive to curb the activities of the jihadist groups. Security has been tightened in urban areas and in locations of strategic importance such as airports, transport hubs and various public places. Police raids have unearthed caches of weapons and explosives kept in homes as well as mosques, and many arms smugglers have been arrested. At the same time, the opposition has stepped up its campaign to forestall what it regards as a concerted attempt to establish a theocratic state. In short, it looks as though a “war on terrorism,” as former US president George W. Bush once described it, has now begun in Tunisia. The indications are that the violence will increase in 2014, as will the likelihood of foreign intervention.
