Istanbul, Turkey's commercial and business centre, has received its first snowfalls, and the capital Ankara, about 500km inland and 800m above sea level, is now covered in a glittering white blanket. Turkish winters are cold and this winter promises to be no exception. However, in contrast to the meteorological temperatures, political temperatures are rising, especially when it comes to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) since the country's elections marathon is now just around the corner. While there are still several months to go before the municipal, legislative and presidential elections next year, the AKP rank and file are hunkered down, as though already in a race against time. The future of their Party over the next decade is at stake and the challenges are great. Above all, the AKP's popularity and that of its leader has sunk, reaching unprecedented lows following the brutal break-up of the peaceful pro-environment protest in Istanbul's Taksim Square in June and sparking a wave of countrywide anti-government demonstrations that were met with what was described at the time as excessive force. The government's handling of the Gezi Park protests precipitated a sharp rift between the party and segments of its support base. That rift has since broadened into a gulf, as was demonstrated in an opinion poll carried out recently by Konsensus, a marketing and research firm reputed for its impartiality. The study sampled opinion in 81 provinces, and its results came as a shock to AKP leaders and particularly to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, since they threaten to stymie his boundless political ambitions. The study revealed that 67 per cent of respondents were strongly opposed to the ruling party's handling of the drafting of a new Turkish constitution, a process that has ground to a halt for this very reason with other parties, social forces and civil society organisations being underrepresented. Three-quarters of those polled opposed Erdogan's dream of transforming the Turkish system of government from a parliamentary to a presidential one. But this was only one of many indicators that stunned AKP leaders. In response to a question about who should succeed Erdogan as Party chief and prime minister, the current Turkish President Abdullah Gül headed the list at 26 per cent, should he decide not to run again as president, while Numan Kurtulmus, whom Erdogan has been grooming as his successor, followed at a distant second at 13 per cent. Only five per cent of those polled felt that current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu would be suitable as the next prime minister. If this was one telling sign of Turkish public opinion towards Ankara's foreign policy, others soon followed. 48 per cent of respondents opposed the ruling party's stances on Egypt, while 40 per cent approved of them. More than 56 per cent were strongly critical of Erdogan's policy on the Syrian crisis. It is little wonder, then, that a party that casts itself as the bastion of moral righteousness, religious virtues and authentic values and traditions has now begun a feverish campaign to reverse its slump in popularity. Leading the charge is current Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arynç, co-founder with Erdogan of the AKP and the latter's companion in arms from the days of the long-since banned Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party. Exercising pressure in the national press, Arynç has ensured exhaustive media coverage of the prime minister's tours of a number of cities in support of AKP election candidates. Receptions and rallies for Erdogan have been aired live on Turkish television, and large pictures of him feature in pro-government newspapers. The strategy seems to be to try to shore up support among the party's conservative constituency, whose mindset Erdogan knows very well. A speech that he delivered in a meeting with representatives from the AKP branches in the province of Tekirdag typifies his message, which is heavy in religious overtones. In the past, Erdogan said in the speech, dress had been a reason to prevent people from entering universities and government offices. That situation had now changed, since people could now sit side by side without discrimination. Erdogan was referring, of course, to the veil and the recent lifting of the ban on wearing it in government institutions. Lifting the ban, Erdogan said, “is in the interest of our nation”. Erdogan also seized the opportunity to lash out at his adversaries, claiming that the AKP had become synonymous with sound administration in the areas it controlled throughout the country, while municipalities run by other, meaning opposition, parties lacked regular services, growth and investment, he claimed. According to Erdogan, the reason for the opposition parties' lack of success had been their ideological obsessions, personality based politics and opportunism. His party, by contrast, was not ethnically or racially based, he said, citing its extension across the country as proof of this assertion. The latter comment was a reference to the AKP government's attempts to build peace with Turkey's large Kurdish community in the interests of “building a nation in which no minority is excluded”. However, rhetoric is one thing, and realities on the ground are quite another. The Kurdish card may not be working as the AKP leaders had anticipated, and according to the Konsensus survey less than half the public, or some 43 per cent of those taking part, support the government's talks with Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), as a means to resolve the Kurdish question. In contrast, 60 per cent of respondents felt that Erdogan had not succeeded in halting Kurdish secessionist “terrorism,” an impression seconded by some Turkish dailies. While these may not criticise government policy directly, they have been featuring reports on the secessionist PKK's threats of violence in order to undermine the peace talks if the government fails to make real concessions to the Kurdish people. Other political forces have not been idle in their attempts to drive wedges into AKP ranks and to expand their own. Though the country's domesticated media does not give them many openings to do this, there are other channels through which they can expose the flaws of AKP rule. One of these is the Turkish parliament, which will soon summon Davutoglu, regarded as the architect of policies that have brought unprecedented deterioration in Turkey's relations with other countries in the region and that have invited the scourge of the Syrian crisis into Turkey itself, to testify before it. A number of opposition parties are also expected to merge in a united front in an attempt to halt the AKP juggernaut. In view of the demographic and political importance of Ankara and Istanbul, the CHP hopes to wrest control over these cities from the AKP in the municipal elections scheduled for 30 March, and it is spearheading a drive to forge a broad coalition that is expected to include the right-wing National Movement Party (MHP) and a number of left-wing parties and that is united by the objective of ending AKP rule and forestalling what it believes is the latter's intention to undermine the principles of the Turkish state. The main strategy is to avoid splitting the opposition vote, and so it seems that the MHP will “concede” Ankara and Istanbul, not fielding mayoral candidates in these cities in the elections, in order to put its votes behind the CHP candidates and the coalition agreement. The CHP has agreed to reciprocate in other municipal elections that the MHP wants to contend. The question on the minds of many Turks today is whether this strategy will succeed in breaking the AKP's rule and halting Erdogan's overweening ambitions.
