Of all the Decembers that have passed over the last few years, that of 2013 looks the most promising. Each of the last three Decembers, of 2010, 2011 and 2012, has witnessed a major event or master scene that has cast its shadows over the following year or even several years afterwards. These events have invariably resulted in growing popular resentment against the respective ruling regimes, and the Egyptian people have been the major players in such scenes, with their responses to the events of December 2010 shaping history in the 25 January Revolution and to the events of December 2012 shaping those of 2013. December's frustrations, particularly in 2010 and 2012, have also been tremendous, leading to the alienation of many people who have actively challenged and even changed the ruling regimes. It is sometimes a form of simplification to set a specific date as the starting point or watershed event for major shifts in history. Historical shifts have always come about as the result of long-term changes that have required years of fermentation in order to induce such waves of change, with their unfreezing, freezing, and then refreezing impacts affecting a given social formation. In other words, major changes do not usually happen overnight. Rather, such historic shifts have always had a more progressive course that has been necessary in order for them to exert their subsequent changes. This feature should not obscure the fact that certain events may be considered to be the signals of changes going on underneath, or that some incidents may trigger or even precipitate such changes. In Egypt, the last three Decembers have been remarkable in terms of the events that have taken place in them, these illustrating the ongoing changes within the political landscape, its actors and its dynamics, with all the repercussions of these on the body politic. The idea here is to show how misperceptions of power in these three Decembers were conducive to the popular revolutions of 25 January and 30 June. In December 2010, the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak had finished the legislative elections that witnessed the boycott of nearly all the opposition parties and forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood. There was also a consensus among human-rights groups both inside and outside Egypt that the elections had been the most fraudulent ever. In holding the elections when it did, the Mubarak regime had set the stage for the 2011 presidential elections that were expected to possibly push Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak's son, into line for the presidency. With its 92.3 per cent majority in the People's Assembly, the ruling party of the time, the National Democratic Party, was able to dictate, practically unchallenged, the whole course of events conducive to either the re-election of Mubarak or the highly probable scenario of the grooming of his son. As a result, the legislative elections were the culmination of the regime's efforts in enforcing the growingly unpopular scenario of this inheritance. However, Mubarak committed his worst mistake when he believed that his will would always prevail. He had not fully understood the rising resentment to his regime, as well as the built-up popular rejection of his policies. Since the 25 January Revolution, the ongoing crises that Egypt has been passing through have basically been Mubarak's legacy. The utterly unjustified nostalgia felt by some for Mubarak's rule today should be understood in terms of these people's failure to trace the origins of the current crises and identify them with the later years of Mubarak's failing regime. Thus, December 2010 was the peak of that regime's plan “to clone” the Mubarak era by extending its life cycle for a new term. However, the very same December witnessed the beginnings of the Tunisian revolution that inspired the youth of Egypt to start acting as the vanguard of the Egyptian revolution in January 2011. Ironically, the starting date of the first parliamentary elections to take place in the aftermath of the 25 January Revolution was 28 November 2011, the same date as for Mubarak's 2010 elections. Yet, the election results were totally different, with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood as the leading party achieving 37.5 per cent of the seats in the newly elected parliament for 2012. In fact, the results of these elections were not fully expressive of the different social forces within the national fabric, and they were won by traditional forces that had not participated in the revolutionary events. From a revolutionary perspective, some then started to question the eligibility of the Brotherhood to lead the state in the aftermath of January's popular revolution, bearing in mind its opportunistic behaviour that had been exemplified in the various events that had followed the ousting of Mubarak. Frustration was not uncommon within some sectors of Egyptian society at the time, particularly among the so-called secular trend. However, such frustration only grew over the following months as a result of the deplorable performance of the newly elected legislature. Misperceiving its electoral victory, the Brotherhood also started to accelerate its hidden plans for the domination of Egypt's state and society. The composition of the Constituent Assembly, the performance of the cabinet, and the Brotherhood's candidates for the presidential elections all exhibited the group's efforts to flex its muscles. In the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, nearly half of the voters categorically rejected Mohamed Morsi, the Brotherhood candidate, favouring Ahmed Shafik instead as president. In other words, the minority that had been deeply embarrassed as a result of the parliamentary elections had now expanded to reach half of all the voters in an unprecedented state of political polarisation. Morsi and his parent association also did not spare any efforts in expanding this rejection of the association's rule. Unable to manage the state and the nation, Morsi made a deadly mistake by promulgating his ill-fated constitutional declaration, which led to a new tidal wave of frustration in December 2012. However, this wave had no obvious inspiring event as had been the case in 2011. Morsi's constitutional declaration was fiercely opposed by a widespread popular rebellion that lasted for many days. Endeavouring to quell the demonstrators then surrounding his palace, Morsi called upon his own clan in the Brotherhood to savagely attack or kill some of them. But despite this opposition, Morsi was able to pass his specially tailored constitution with a 67 per cent approval rate. Yet, disregarding the legitimate popular demands for the abrogation of his declaration and to put together a more representative Constituent Assembly was not a victory for Morsi. On the contrary, the countdown to Morsi's failure started with his arrogant attitude, which led to the expanding popular rejection. Morsi's management of the December uprising unequivocally exposed the precariousness of his regime as well as that of his parent association. No less significant was the response of the army to the people's dissatisfaction and frustration, and one can easily identify the early signs of an active army with an agile leadership decisively opting to perform its historical role of safeguarding the nation and the state. Thus December's uprising was the prelude to the 30 June Revolution. Today, in December 2013, though the country is full of anxieties, it is nevertheless moving forward in one way or another. In the last three Decembers, many Egyptians shared a common feeling of frustration. Egypt's path has not been strewn with roses. Nevertheless, Egyptians have had no other choice but to continue, and to excel, in the rebuilding of their state. The writer is a political analyst.
