The Egyptian people have once again proven its ingenuity in devising mechanisms to express their opposition to tyranny, whether in a political or religious guise. The Tamarod (Rebel) movement has revived the climate that had prevailed before the revolution through a particularly innovative way to voice the widespread discontent at the perverse Islamist-dominated situation that has arisen following the revolution. The 25 January Revolution was the product of the interplay between a dominant political party and protest movements. The party in question was the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the movements were Kifaya (Enough) and similar movements that emerged afterwards. The NDP symbolised the dictator and the authoritarian state. The movements reflected a long-suppressed society deprived of its political and economic rights in the interests of perpetuating the dictatorial regime. In a sense, the antithesis between the two sets of symbols was borne of a dialectical conflict between a regime that sought to perpetuate itself and socio-political forces opposed to this. The lines began to coalesce when the NDP Policies Committee, which was formed in 2002, conceived the hereditary succession scenario, sparking the Kifaya movement, after which the regime's policies and tactics in response to this movement and growing democratic demands precipitated a proliferation in movements demanding change. Eventually, the conflict culminated in the victory of the protest movements that, effectively, were the unknown soldiers of the Egyptian revolution. These were the agencies that, over the years that preceded the revolution, had elevated the public's awareness on civil and human rights and that fortified the hearts of the sons and daughters of the middle classes to the point that they could amass in Tahrir and other urban squares to press the demand for the fall of an entire regime. The success of these grassroots movements altered the dynamics of political life. Above all, they undermined the legitimacy of many pre-revolutionary parties, whether those that existed primarily on paper, lacking anything that could be remotely called a grassroots base, or the more established parties such as the Wafd and Tagammu parties. These conventional parties were now tainted by a past in which their existence and scope of operations were contingent on a relationship of dependency on the dominant NDP that would bestow or withhold its favours at whim. It is also important to note that during the six years that preceded the revolution the evolution of the protest movements involved two interrelated dynamics. On the one hand, the “mother” movement gave birth to similarly minded movements in reaction to the political actions of the regime. On the other hand, these movements gained ground in society in tandem with the growth of movements among labour and business sectors whose interests and welfare were harmed by the government's privatisation policies. It had been widely expected that the conditions that had spawned the pre-revolutionary protest and labour movements would change after the 25 January Revolution and the advent of a democratically elected civilian president. Unfortunately, the policies of the new ruling party, which has not only adopted many of the modes of operation of its predecessor and outstrips it in lack of political acumen, have only engendered mounting discontent and protest actions of a scope and frequency far greater than anything that had existed before the revolution. In the course of the melee, there have emerged new and original forms of protest, foremost among which is the Tamarod movement, which has begun to make its mark before President Mohamed Morsi completes his first year in office. Tamarod has surpassed all its predecessors in originality, organisation and impetus. In the few weeks since it was launched, this grassroots movement has already collected more than nine million signatures to a petition to withdraw confidence from the elected president and it looks like it will reach its target of 15 million signatures well ahead of schedule. The power of this form of protest is not so much in its ability to gather, in record time, more signatures than the number of people that had voted for Morsi in the presidential elections. Rather, it resides in its very simplicity. The petition has set into motion a new grassroots mechanism that will drive home through straightforward facts and figures the extent of popular discontent, and that will pose a source of embarrassment to the regime both at home and abroad. If the Kifaya movement, which began in the hundreds and was encumbered by police crackdowns and other forms of repression, could eventually lead to the January Revolution, imagine the impact of a movement signed and sealed by more people than belong to any other single political organisation, including the Islamist ones. Yet, if our experience of the years before and after the revolution tells us that protest movements — whether political, social or economic — are more successful and effective than political parties, one is compelled to ask whether these movements will or should transform themselves into political parties. By way of an answer, we should consider, firstly, that these movements can go where political parties cannot. They generally enjoy all the vigour and innovativeness of youth, they are not restricted by rigid ideological platforms, they are open to all, and they revolve around values, such as justice and equality, as opposed to individuals or institutions. They also are better poised to take advantage of the Internet and social media, which effectively form the structural frameworks for their organisation and activities. Secondly, if they transform themselves into political parties they risk encumbering themselves in structural restrictions that could hamper their appeal and lower their ideological sights. Instead of focussing on general values and issues that concern the whole of society, they might begin to emphasise issues that relate more to the narrower interests of a political party. And instead of locking horns with the state or the establishment, they would become embroiled in petty wrangling with other political parties which, again, would lead them away from more all-embracing national ideals and towards narrower dogmatism shaped by partisan calculations. Thirdly, as the movements that initiated the campaign for democratic change and brought it to the threshold of revolution, it seems that the continued pursuit of their goals is best accomplished by performing the same role they have always played, as opposed to becoming a partner in government. If they were able to generate a revolutionary political consciousness in society, they should not only continue to perform this function but add to it another, which is raising society's awareness on a range of developmental issues. This function is of particular value at this time of social and religious conflict in which a particular political camp is working to impose its dogmatic religious outlook as a means to monopolise control over society. The importance of the protest movements resides precisely in the fact that their aims transcend the narrow doctrinaire of such political camps and express the essential values of a nation of all its people. Tamarod stands as a powerful illustration of these dynamics. With its simple means combined with the potency of its idea, it has reaffirmed that, as long as the constitutional and institutional framework of the state fall dismally short of the demands of the revolution, Egypt will remain fertile ground for mass action against whose who rule, regardless of their political orientation.
The writer is managing editor of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya published by Al-Ahram.
