Compared to that seen during the referendum on the constitutional amendments in March 2011, the turnout in the recent referendum on the new constitution was low. In general, low voter turnouts have usually been considered to be a form of passive alienation from the political scene, with voters not so much refraining from casting their votes as not identifying themselves with ongoing political realities. However, it could also be thought that such low turnouts could be judged, with the typical conventional wisdom, as a sign of political negativity or apathy, long considered as characteristic traits of Egyptians before the 25 January Revolution. The latter should be considered as the starting point for the new era in which Egyptians have become able to have their say on what concerns Egypt's politics and society. For many Egyptians, particularly young people, the revolution did end their political apathy. Indeed, the days before the recent referendum took place saw various forms of contentious politics with the participation of millions across the various governorates. The December protests against the new constitution also witnessed the participation of many Egyptians, including the de novo opposition to President Mohamed Morsi, who had earlier voted for him. Such protests have been directed against the Muslim Brotherhood and its role behind the scenes in the current political landscape. And in fact the referendum was one on the whole ruling regime, its constitutional declarations and definitely its draft constitution. It therefore seems inconceivable that the actively participating millions could have turned, overnight, into passive spectators on the referendum day itself. Rather, many among them had their own antipathies against the whole political landscape and not just the draft constitution. There can be no other logical explanation for such a sizable no show on referendum day but that many of those who had previously protested against the constitution deliberately boycotted the referendum as a form of continued protest and to put pressure on the ruling regime. Contrary to the claims of the Muslim Brotherhood that Egyptians did not respond to the opposition's calls for a boycott of the referendum, there was a form of conscious boycott of it. In effect, the majority of Egyptians did not participate in the referendum despite the opposition's calls to participate in it even if by only voting against the constitution. Many people obviously rejected the endless calls of those urging participation, either by approving or disapproving the constitution, by deciding to adopt their own perspective of not participating in it. In other words, many Egyptians made an independent decision regarding the referendum, the draft constitution and the latter's likelihood of achieving the revolution's objectives. As a result, the low turnout should not be taken as a totally negative attitude towards the political process. Instead, it should be seen as a way of indicating that some sectors of society reject the policies and practices of the ruling regime, particularly its hostile attitude towards the sit-ins surrounding the presidential palace. It can be argued that such sectors belong to the new Generation Y, the youth generation, with its various social classes and political orientations. Seemingly, those who boycotted the referendum came from a cross-section of Egyptian youth, the very people who made up the critical mass of the 25 January Revolution and who actively participated in the December protests. It is also important to mention that some of the youth may have boycotted the referendum because they thought that the regime would commit violations that would guarantee a yes vote to the draft constitution. A boycott of this sort should also be considered as a tacit indictment of the ruling regime, identifying it as repeating the practices of the ousted Mubarak regime. Therefore, in addition to the decision deliberately to boycott the referendum made by some sectors within the youth, other absentees expressed their growing mistrust towards the ruling regime as a whole and not just regarding the draft constitution. Regardless of the motive in boycotting the referendum, Egypt has a sizable mass of young people who have not found their place in the state that is being established. Moreover, this state, with its oligarchic regime, has not been able to contain the rising aspirations, as well as the dashed expectations, of growing numbers of young Egyptians. Many have talked about the youth and its indispensable role in the 25 January Revolution. Not unrelated has been the fact that the “youth bulge” characteristic of Egypt's present population was a crucial factor in the genesis and evolution of the revolutionary tide in Egypt and in the December protests. Yet, who are these young people? Demographically speaking, they represent more than 50 per cent of Egyptians. In other words, Generation Y offered the revolution its vanguard and its critical mass of supporters. No other single political force or trend can claim to fully represent such a large cohort of the population. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming to be the most formidable political force, cannot be seen as incorporating such a cohort with its plethora of political, social and economic demands. Yet, a mapping of the different political and societal forces within the youth sector has not been attempted. Within such a cohort one can identify the younger members of the judiciary who forced the previous general-prosecutor to resign. But at the other extreme one can also identify the so-called Ultras, young people who have become fully dedicated to their respective football clubs and their related issues and causes. The same could be said about the militarised elements belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, such as those belonging to the rising leader Hazem Abu Ismail. In between the two extremes lie the millennial generation members, representing all the known and unknown political orientations across the whole political spectrum. However, the vast majority of Egypt's young people remain far from having been categorised within a specific political orientation. The majority of the millennial generation has not been immune to politicisation and even progressive radicalisation. In other words, many of the youth have maintained the revolutionary thrust they originally had before the revolution. In fact, this majority, with its inevitably growing numbers of mass groups, has gradually acquired escalating anti-establishment attitudes. Starting with the demonstrations in August last year and continuing until the December protests, the group called Jika was a typical example of such a group. But many other groups formed of young people have become deeply involved in various forms of contentious politics that have been recurring across many governorates and have directed their grievances towards the ruling regime. That the political views of this generation were close to those of the opposition to the constitution is axiomatic. This was the case in the early days of the January Revolution also. Yet, this proximity has not necessarily meant that both the opposition and the youth groups have had identical stands, even bearing in mind the divisions within the youth. Hence, we can understand the divergence in the youth's stand versus that taken by the opposition with regard to participation in the referendum. Such a critical mass of young people has become the real driver of political change in Egypt, and the ruling regime has not addressed its pressing problems. The youth's boycott of the referendum should not be seen as a solitary event, but instead should be seen within the broader context of the youth uprising. Most serious of all is that the impending economic crisis will add fuel to the fire of the youth's radicalisation. It seems that many have been quite unaware of the unhappy combination of two devastating and highly interactive factors: a radicalised youth and an appalling economic situation. The writer is a political commentator.
