The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rode on an uprising that swept through society last year to end 80 years of power struggles with the military. The religious organisation used its victory to give birth to a political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Supported by its parent, the FJP managed to seize two strong fortresses of Egypt's constitutional authority: the parliament and the presidency. Although the MB manipulated the voters' religious views and considering that about 60 per cent of Egyptians are helpless victims of two beasts (poverty and illiteracy), it must be said that the MB's dramatic victories were the result of free and transparent elections. All the same, eyebrows were raised when the MB refused to disband. Furthermore, contrary to all expectations the clandestine movement refused to act like any other non-governmental organisation and open its books to official watchdogs and inspectors in order to guarantee transparency. Nor did the MB show any measure of willingness to take the lid off its secrecy and persuade the public and different political forces to abandon their decades – long suspicions concerning the movement's future aspirations. In fact, the MB and FJP have separate ideological identities and are seeking two different – albeit overlapping – goals. On the one hand, the MB is an international organisation and does not limit its goals to a particular territory. Although its headquarters are in Cairo, the MB uses religion as an ideological strategy – or mechanism – towards greater achievements (than just the presidency and parliament in Egypt) in the region and the world. In other words, since its formation in the 1930s, the MB has used its birthplace – Egypt – as a springboard for exporting its primary goal (the revival of a Muslim empire) first to the Middle East and then beyond. Thanks to their shared nostalgia for a past Muslim empire, it was not surprising that after the MB seized power in Egypt, powerful MB men and leaders from Turkey's Development and Justice Party (AKP) shuttled between Cairo and Ankara. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan, escorted by AKP high commanders, was the first non-Arab Muslim official to visit Cairo after the January 25 Revolution. He congratulated the MB on its great political success. It was equally no surprise that the political parties formed by Islamists in other Arab countries after their uprisings were keen to add the two words ‘Justice and Development' to their manifestos. Egypt and Tunisia were just two examples; Syria's MB would undoubtedly follow suit if Bashar al-Assad's regime crumbled. Standing on the debris of their former military regimes, the MB and AKP synchronised their steps to expand their joint influence across the Muslim-dominated Arab world. As a result, Cairo and Ankara adopted a unified stance on the Islamist-led uprising in Syria; Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sat next to the Egyptian and other Arab foreign ministers, who hurried to Gaza to show solidarity with the Palestinians during the Israeli war last month. In collaboration with Ankara, which has a strategic relationship with Tel Aviv, Cairo under the MB managed quickly and smoothly to broker ‘a permanent' truce between Israel and Hamas. On the other hand, the FJP is primarily concerned with domestic politics. In other words, the FJP is given a political task limited to the home front. Although it has a chairman, the FJP is governed and managed by MB's general guide and advisory council. Both President Mohamed Morsi and FJP Chairman Saad el-Katatani belong nominally to the FJP, but in reality they belong to the MB. This could mean that both men are not committed to acting unilaterally or independently. The fact that both men suck on the same thumb could mean that the MB's general guide, together with the advisory council, has more influence at home and abroad than the president and FJP chairman together. Fortifying himself with the MB's big support base and the nation's religious emotions, the president ignored the strong opposition to his decision to give immunity – as temporarily as it may be – to his presidential decisions and whims. President Morsi called any opposition to his constitutional quake a counterrevolutionary attempt to sabotage his efforts towards achieving the goals envisaged by the January 25 Revolution. He equally ignored the judiciary's stormy opposition. Egypt's judges protested that the president's power grab constituted ‘an unacceptable and unprecedented' attack on the judicial system and its members. The president will soon call the nation to a referendum on the new constitution before withdrawing his controversial decree. However, if the MB survives the battle of the constitution successfully, the FJP could win the majority in the next parliament, and its president could easily stay in office after the next presidential election.
