The revolution and pacts (58). The Bernadotte plan (V). ‘A haunting legacy'. The assassination at first seemed to increase the chances of UN endorsement of Bernadotte's proposals, but the situation changed dramatically. This was in part because of Israel's military successes in October 1948, which altered the front lines and broke the backbone of the military coalition of the Arab states, and in part because of a shift on the part of the US Administration during 1948 elections. A watered-down version of Bernadotte's proposals was endorsed on December 11, 1948 in UN Assembly Resolution 194, which created the Palestine Conciliation Commission and contained a declaration on the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Nothing to bring the culprits to justice. Bernadotte's mediation mission was defeated by insufficient UN backing resulting from the Cold War; the utter rejection of his proposals by the rival parties. Ironically, it was also the result of the unforeseen impact of the UN embargo, which aimed to dry up the military resources of both warring parties but in fact increased Israel's military edge over the Arabs, resulting in an Arab defeat and an armistice based on lines more favourable to Israel than those Bernadotte had recommended earlier. In the end, those lines received international legitimacy. While the world mourned for Bernadotte, some in Israel, such as former Tehiya Member of Knesset and former LEHI radio announcer Geula Cohen, saw it as ‘just another death in war, no more immoral than other killings committed during the long Arab-Israeli conflict.' Cohen considers the assassination to have been an effective measure ‘because we prevented the internationalisation of Jerusalem'. Others, however, such as Hebrew University professor Joseph Heller, argue that the killing actually provoked support for the Bernadotte plan by making its author into a martyr. The plan was never implemented, but whether its failure was due to the assassination or simply because of Israeli military strength and other outside factors is pure speculation. The Israelis were so taken with the success of Arab removal that they adopted a resolute policy of no return of the refugees. Count Folke Bernadotte is said to have been dismayed that Jews with their history of persecution would themselves act so unjustly. It is also reported that he had tried to pursuade Moshe Sharett, then Israel's Foreign Minister, to make at least a gesture of conciliation by allowing a partial return. Sharett replied that such idealism had no place in a world dominated by men of action (such as himself, presumably), and that Israel would be regarded as foolish by such men if it discarded the favourable situation created by war. A day after the release of Bernadotte's report on refugees, men of action from the Stern Gang murdered him. It is noteworthy that no one was ever punished for Bernadotte's assassination. Israel did virtually nothing to bring the culprits to justice. Yitzhak Shamir, who played a major role in planning the assassination if Bernadotte, was never tried and went on to become Prime Minister of Israel as mentioned in an earlier article of this series. The Swedish government itself believed that Bernadotte had been assassinated by Israeli government agents. They publicly attacked the inadequacy of the Israeli investigation and campaigned unsuccessfully to delay Israel's admission to the United Nations. [email protected]
