The case of debating Israeli-Western propaganda regarding the outcome of the October War 1973: “(Ex-US State Secretary Henry) Kissinger left Egypt on December 12, 1973. But at this point I was in great pain. I was suffering daily, hourly. I could see no way out "everything seemed to have gone wrong, and I wasn't able to put it right because it was no longer up to me. For four days I hemorrhaged. The doctors, who examined me, when my urine had turned literally into clots of blood, said it was due to tension but that it wasn't really serious. They gave me some medication which, two days later, stopped it altogether. “On December 25, I convened ameeting of the commanders of all corps, armies, and divisions. The plan laid down to liquidate the Devresoir Pocket (plan shamel, which means comprehensive) was discussed for over seven hours, and I endorsed it. A commander was appointed to carry it out " General Saad Mamun, who is governor of Cairo at present,” wrote Sadat. “On December 25, my birthday, I went to my home village, Mit Abul- Kum. I always spend it there. The next day I left for Aswan. In January 1974 Kissinger arrived and the first disengagement of forces agreement was signed. The United States had played the role of mediator between us and Israel. “In negotiating the Aswan agreement, I had only one thing to focus on. I didn't want more than to maintain the real magnitude of my victory on the ground. I didn't bother about the Israeli pocket because I knew that they were my prisoners on the West Bank and that their presence there meant their death. On the basis of defining and maintaining the real magnitude of my territorial victory, agreement was reached. Yet I was still ingreat mental anguish, because all the powers wanted to negate my victory. The United States certainly wanted to discount it, and the Soviets suffered a setback in spite of the presence of Soviet military experts and I had won a victory in spite of the expulsion of Soviet military experts. And Israel, of course, wanted to undo our victory. “Such attempts didn't in themselves worry me. But I wanted my victory to be maintained because I regarded it as the avenue to the just peace for which I had worked unceasingly.” III -3-3- The Devresoir battle and "Operation for Television" conceptual metaphor In their book, entitled “The Ramadan War”, Generals Hassan el -Badri, Taha el-Magdoub and Mohamed Dia el-Din Zohdy used the conceptual metaphor of "operation for television to describe the Devresoir battle. They quoted General Andre Beauffre, the former manager of the French Strategic Centre, who also used the term 'Television-show Battle'. Army Generals el-Badri and Magdoub stated: "…The Israeli General staff and the Command of the Southern front realised the risk from the very outset. They tried to limit the operation but General Sharon's ambition caused him to ignore these controlling efforts, threatening the collapse of the general strategic situation of the Israeli armed forces. The Israeli command was compelled to concentrate all its efforts and its available resources to protect and secure its forces exposed to annihilation at any moment inside this death trap. The Egyptian armed forces, despite their losses, stood in both the East and West as self-contained and strong forces efficient enough to continue violent and desperate fighting. The new portrait ofthe Egyptian soldier, who had proved himself able to handle the most modern weapons, was now a haunting sight to the Israeli commanders. Accordingly, they could no longer rely on a military solution to the situation; more military involvement would not improve the situation, but could worsen it…" Al-Badri continued: "…The American undertaking to safeguard Israel's security and stature, which is a major strategic objective in American Middle East policy was taken as a point of departure for American action…That is why President Nixon hurried to appropriate 2.2$ billion to provide Israel with urgent military support without having to wait for the American Congress's approval. He quickly ordered modern American weapons stored in arsenals all over the world to be poured into Israel over anaerial and naval bridge. For this he used the regional lands and skies of some nations without awaiting their permission…" Egypt found out that the battle ended up by the complete involvement of the US. That serious development gave new meaning regarding the acceptance of the cease fire that the United States had been asking for. The ceasefire was implemented and the corridor west of the Suez Canal became a graveyard for Israeli armored units and personnel. To be continued next week Wageih is a professor of linguistics of negotiation, Chairman of the English Department, Faculty of Languages & Translation, Al-Azhar University, and a PhD holder from Georgetown University [email protected]
