III- 3-2- Lord Owen's “The Israeli tanks on the outskirts of Cairo” is debated by the conceptual metaphor of the “Devresoir Pocket” as introduced by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. The Devresoir pocket metaphor was used by Sadat himself when he was threatening to liquidate that pocket. The following dialogue that took place between Sadat and the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (as narrated by Sadat) is very illustrative of how the Devresoir Pocket conceptual metaphor was deployed by Sadat. It also includes the extended discourses that justify it. The following text illustrates Sadat's version of the negotiating situation between himself and Kissinger (December 13, 1973). This negotiating situation brought the events that followed the October War to a peak. This text highlights his perception of the situation at that stage and the nature of negotiating moves between himself and Kissinger. In the following context, Sadat introduced the conceptual metaphor of Devresoir Pocket. Sadat recounts: Kissinger said he wanted to see me. He arrived in Egypt for the first time in November, and Said: “You've created an international crisis, and that's why I've come to see you. What are your requests? “I want a return,” I replied, “to the cease-fire lines of October 22. I have 800 tanks, while Israel has only 400; for each Israelis tank I have one and a half rockets; the Israelis are besieged, and the gap they've cut open between our armies " 4 miles wide " could close and so spell the end of them. There can be no question about that.” We had a three-hour session, during which we agreed on six points, one of which was that Egyptian-Israeli talks for a disengagement of forces and a return to the lines of October 22 would start at Km101 on the Cairo-Suez Road. The talks were held under UN supervision. But they were very protracted. I left at the time for Algiers to attend the Arab Summit Conference, and when I came back, the negotiations still hadn't gotanywhere. I asked el-Gamasy to suspend them. “I am not prepared,”I said, “to engage in this sort of haggling and bickering.” Sadat's readiness to liquidate the Devresoir Pocket In December 1973 I was ready to liquidate the Devresoir Pocket. Our forces started a war of attrition and consistently put pressure on the infiltrators. We regained a good deal of ground every day " sometimes advancing a few yards, sometimes a few miles, but always advancing. I wasreally fully prepared to liquidate the Israeli there " especially as we had no water barriers to cross now, no Barlev Line to deal with " but I had to take one risk into consideration, that of possible US intervention. On December 11, 1973 Kissinger came to see me again. I told him: “I cannot accept this way of conducting the negotiations. I am going to liquidate the Israeli Devresoir Pocket. What will be the American attitude?” “I know you're ready for it; I know it before I came to see you,” Kissinger answered. “I asked the Pentagon for a few aerial photographs of the battlefield and received a full report. Your wall of rockets consists of so many batteries [he specified the number], you have 800 tanks surrounding the Israeli Deversoir Pocket, the number of your guns is [again he specified it] and you can actually wipe out that pocket. You must know, however, that if you do this the Pentagon will strike at you.” “Ah!” I said. “That is the question. What would the US attitude be?” “The Pentagon will strike at you,” he reiterated. “The Pentagon will strike you for one reason: Soviet weapons have once before defeated US weapons and in accordance with our global strategy, we can't allow it to happen again.” And Kissinger went on to say: “Do you know, when you created an international crisis, when you asked the two superpowers to come in and get the forces back to the ceasefire lines of October 22, otherwise, you threatened, you'd do it yourself provided the Penetagon didn't stand against you " do you know what sort of plan the Pentagon laid down at the time? We planned to land in your country, in Sinai, if the Russians landed west of the Canal, to finish you off. Our aim was to show you that the Russians were unreliable, and so we'd have dealt you a blow that actually hit the Russians! We're in the same situation today. If you attempt to liquidate the Israeli pocket, the pentagon will strike at you because this is US established policy. Besides, the Pentagon wants to avenge the defeat of its weapons in October. But do you insist on a military liquidation of the infiltrating forces?” I care very much for human life, and am loath to losing one soldier, not to mention an officer. But you didn't take me seriously " and this is the outcome.” “Well, just as we embarked on a peace process, let us have a forces disengagement which would peacefully put an end to this counterattacking.” To be continued next week
Wageih is a professor of linguistics of negotiation, Chairman of the English Department, Faculty of Languages & Translation, Al-Azhar University, and a PhD holder from Georgetown University [email protected]
