The significance of the current gridlock in Iran goes beyond what happened in the June 12 elections. It strikes at the heart of a political theory, which is the source of religious and political legitimacy of the State of Iran, namely "Wilayat Al-Faqih or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, which has served as a barrier protecting and theocratizing the Iranian State for over three decades. One fault of the Iranian constitution is that it did not draw boundaries between the authorities within the State of Iran. Instead, they apportioned the powers and authorities and made them overlap in an ambiguous way. The legislative power, for example, has been apportioned among several parties such as the Majlis of Iran (the Islamic Consultative Assembly), the Guardian Council and the Expediency Discernment Council. There is no judicial authority that can decide on the validity of laws. Although the Iranian constitution gives the Supreme Leader absolute powers and a guardianship over the whole country (and sometimes over all Muslims of the world), it does not give the Council of Experts the power to bring to account the leader for his mistakes or personal inclinations, but it only has the power to appoint or dismiss him. The constitution also gives the Guardian Council powers broader than that of the president, the parliament and the judiciary (Articles 4, 68, 72, 85, 93, 94, 98, 99), while this council is answerable to the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, although the authority given to the Expediency Discernment Council seems to be fettered by the Supreme Leader's powers (Article 112) it has significant powers to interpret and amend the constitution (Article 176). Thus, the map of powers and authorities in the Iranian political system is inextricably correlated, making it vulnerable to different interpretations and changes in the event of a crisis similar to the current one. The current developments in Iran are nothing but a new episode in the struggle between religious clerics and the Ayatollahs for political clout in the decision-making process in Iran. The hidden conflict between Hashemi Rafsanjani, current head of the Assembly of Experts and the powerful Expediency Discernment Council, and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is a struggle for leadership, not only for the powers laid down by the two men when they joined forces after the death of Khomeini. Rafsanjani was the architect of Khamenei's appointment as the supreme leader following a controversy about his efficiency as an influential religious leader after the exclusion of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri a few months before the death of Khomeini. Khamenei's religious and political leadership was consolidated after a historic political trickery between him and Rafsanjani whereby they eliminated the right of the Ayatollahs inside and outside Iran to claim religious leadership. Since the mid-90s the supreme leader has broadened his powers and has tightened his grip on politics in Tehran, on the grounds that he holds both the time (guidance) and religious leadership, thus affecting his relation with Rafsanjani, who has since led a political trend aimed at minimizing Khamenei's powers and restricting them to religious matters. The conflict between Khamenei and Rafsanjani reached its peak after the latter's defeat in the 2005 presidential elections. At the time, it seemed that Khamenei was working for the defeat of his former ally so as to monopolize power with an unknown president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the absence of the electoral balance between Ahmadinejad and Mir Moussavi in the interest of Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani had only two options: to exercise pressure in order to divest Ahmadinejad of his legitimacy by calling into question the integrity of the entire electoral process, assisted by the mistakes committed by Ahmadinejad during the electoral campaign, most notably accusing Rafsanjani and his family of corruption and nepotism, as well as the arrest of a number of his family members during the post-election week of protests. The second option was to move the conflict from the president to the supreme leader by re-opening the file of Khamenei's religious and political capacity and his efficiency to lead the Iranian nation, and reviving the controversy that surrounded Khamenei's assumption of power 20 years ago. Therefore, the possible way out of the current Iranian crisis will be either one of two scenarios: the first is to remove Ahmadinejad from the presidency to appease Rafsanjani and restore the balance between him and Khamenei as well as to give the reformists their share of the Republic's cake. The second scenario, which is more dangerous, is to remove Khamenei from his religious and political post by inciting the religious leaders against him. Khalil Al-Ananiisan expert on Political Islam and Deputy Editor of Al Siyassa Al Dawliya journal published by Al-Ahram Foundation.
