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The empty core in Al-Qaeda's vision for Iraq
Published in Daily News Egypt on 16 - 09 - 2007

The June 7, 2006 US air strike that killed Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi had a far more profound impact on the status and prospects for Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) than might have been appreciated at the time by many commentators. Zarqawi was a talented strategist and charismatic leader - as well as a criminal and psychopathic killer - who was able to effectively reconcile the many contradictions that plague Al-Qaeda in its efforts to build support, particularly among secular and tribal Sunnis, while operating as a secretive terrorist band of jihadi-salafists.
Zarqawi, like Osama bin Laden, was also a magnet for media coverage who could focus attention on AQI, in the Arab world as well as the West, in a manner that no strike against coalition forces or the Shia in Iraq has been able to accomplish. Perhaps most ominous for AQI s future in Iraq is the fact that US, Iraqi and Jordanian intelligence were able to penetrate sufficiently deep into AQI s organizational structure to identify where to score an exact hit. The effectiveness of AQI s new leader, Abu Ayyub Al-Masri, to at once tighten internal security, maintain operational flexibility, increase recruitment and build mass appeal among the Sunnis in Iraq, will go a long way in determining the future of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The prospects are not terribly promising.
Ironically, AQI faces some of the same dilemmas as the coalition forces in Iraq (and let it be known up front that this is by no means an argument for moral equivalency). Both are driven by ideologies that are for the most part alien particularly to Sunni tribal sheikhs. Neither the advocates of western-style democracy nor the champions of strict Islamic orthodoxy offer an appealing vision for the country s future. Both are led by foreigners and viewed by the majority as occupiers, not liberators. Both are condemned for what is viewed by locals as the indiscriminate killing and brutalization of a civilian population caught in the crossfire of a conflict over which they have little say. Both are well financed and view Iraq as the battlefield for a global struggle that leaves no room for compromise.
Where AQI suffers in this equation is in the number of top tier fighters it can call into service, the military resources it has at its disposal and now a diminution in the internal cohesion it enjoyed under the leadership of Zarqawi. Its key asset, and this must not be underestimated, is time. It does not operate under the same political restrictions as coalition (read US) forces nor is there an imperative for quick victory. It has no exit strategy because it plans to stay.
Nevertheless, it must give pause to AQI ideologists that Sunni tribal leaders are increasingly distancing themselves from the organization and renouncing former alliances. This, along with battlefield victories and successful counterinsurgency programs spearheaded by the US, has contributed to a significant decline in the number of attacks mounted by AQI. Furthermore, to the continuing consternation of the top Al-Qaeda leadership in and around Pakistan, a large part of Zarqawi s legacy is an organization that terrorizes a population it needs for support and cover. Rape and brutal murders of locals, including children, with absolutely no system for accountability, are not the most effective tactics in a national liberation campaign. As far back as 2005, Al-Qaeda s second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahri, was warning Zarqawi against such grotesqueries as beheadings and their subsequent broadcast.
Where AQI has been more effective, of course, is in stoking the fires of sectarian violence in an effort to radicalize Iraqi Sunnis. Whether such violence will lead to the realization of its larger political ambitions is no more known to AQI than to those who are desperately struggling to prevent the dismemberment of Iraq.
AQI s immediate future will be determined in large part by the degree of success the so-called Islamic State of Iraq has in absorbing likeminded groups and intimidating would-be competitors into submission. As of the moment, Iraqi insurgents and tribes appear too weak to defeat AQI fighters without help from the US and Iraqi government forces. Witness the case of Diyala Province, where the insurgent group, the 1920s Revolution Brigade, which had previously been on the other side of the battle lines, actually teamed up with US forces to successfully counter an AQI threat.
AQI s larger challenge is how to convert submission borne out of terror into support for an ideology that has at its core no discernable program for governance and economic development beyond the all too vague call for the return of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Ummah Wahid. No political organization can long survive with all guns and no butter. Paying fighters and buying suicide bombers is a dead end as far as a future vision for Iraq is concerned.
Dr. Hrach Gregorianis president of the Washington, DC-based Institute of World Affairs, a partner in the consulting firm Gettysburg Integrated Solutions, and associate professor in the Graduate Program in Conflict Analysis at Royal Roads University in Victoria, Canada. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org


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